25. Jenkins v. Woodward Iron Co., - (Ala.) - 69 So. 646; Piper v. True, 36 Cal. 606; Derham v. Hill, 57 Colo. 345, 142 Pac. 181; Hornet v. Dumbeck, 39 Ind. App. 482, 78 N. E. 691; Harris v. Byers, 112 Miss. 651, 73 So. 614; Loomis v. Jackson, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 449; Lush v. Druse, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 313; State v. Herold, 76 W. Va. 537, 85 S. E. 733; Davis Colliery Co. v. Westfall, 78 W. Va. 735, 90 S. E. 328.

Reference to ownership apparently involves the insertion by implication in the conveyance of a word or words, such as "my" or "belonging to me" and this would seem to transcend the limits of construction.26 A conveyance of my tract of land in X county would presumably be sufficiently definite, provided the grantor has only one tract in that county, but a conveyance, under the same circumstances, of a tract of land in X county, might well be differently regarded. In accordance with the cases previously referred to, however, are a number of decisions that, in the apparently analogous case of a will, evidence of testator's ownership of particular land is admissible to aid the de-cription.27

Provided the property is otherwise sufficiently described, the fact that there is an incorrect element in the description, or incorrect addition thereto, will not invalidate the description, but such incorrect element will be ignored.28 This rule is ordinarily asserted in the form of the maxim falsa demonstrate) non nocet. So if the land is otherwise identified, a mistake in the name of the town or county in which it lies may be immaterial.29

26. See 4 Wigmore, Evidence Sec.Sec. 2476, 2477.

27. Patch v. White, 117 U. S. 210, 29 L. Ed. 860; Higgin v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 183 Ala. 639, 62 So. 774; Collins v. Capes, 235 111. 560, 85 N. E. 934; Graves v. Rose, 246 111. 76, 92 N E. 601; Pate v. Bushong, 161 Ind. 533, 63 L. R. A. 593, 100 Am. St. Rep. 287, 69 N. E. 296; Flynn v. Holman, 119 Iowa, 731, 94 N. W. 447; Pring v. Swann, 176 Iowa, 153, 157 N. W. 734; Mcmahan v. Hubbard, 217 Mo. 624, 118 S. W. 481; Pem-berton v. Perrin, 94 Neb. 718, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 68, 144 N. W.

164; Winkley v. Kaime, 32 N. H. 268; Moreland v Brady, 8 Ore. 303, 34 Am. Rep. 581; In re Gaston's Estate, 188 Pa. 374, 68 Am. St. Rep. 874, 41 Atl. 526. As to the Illinois decisions see 5 Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 2477.

28. See 4 Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 2476.

29. Perry v. Clark, 157 Mass. 330, 32 N. E. 226; Lambert v. Murray, 52 Colo. 156, 120 Pac. 415; Borchard v. Eastwood, 133 Cal. XIX, 65 Pac. 1047; Black v. Skinner Mfg. Co., 53 Fla. 1088, 1090, 43 So. 919, 922; Risch v. Jensen, 92 Minn. 107, 99 N. W. 628.

And a monument,30 course,31 distance,32 or statement of quantity,33 may, in particular cases, be disregarded, as may a statement as to the source of title to the property,34 or as to the present occupancy thereof.35 It has been quite frequently said that as between a general description and a particular description in the same conveyance, the latter will ordinarily control.36 It would seem questionable, however, whether this statement properly means anything more than that a description which does not undertake to give the exact location of the land conveyed will yield to a description which does give its exact location.37 It can hardly mean that a detailed description by metes and bounds or courses and distances, or by naming constituent parts of the property, will take priority over a description which does not enter into such details. A description of the property as the "X" place or the "Y" farm is not in its nature any more general than a description by

30. Ayers v. Watson, 113 U. S. 594, 28 L. Ed. 1093; Sanborn v. Rice, 129 Mass. 387; Zeibold v. Foster, 118 Mo. 349, 24 S. W. 155; Upton v. Santa Rita Min. Co. 14 N. Mex. 96, 89 Pac. 275; Stearns v. Mchugh, 35 S. Dak. 185, 151 N. W. 888.

31. Ante, Sec. 444, note 66.

32. Ante, Sec. 444 notes 65, 68.

33. Ante, Sec. 444, note 69.

34. Jay v. Michael, 82 Md. 1, 33 Atl. 322; Hastings v. Hastings, 110 Mass. 280; Drew v. Drew, 28 N. H. 489.

35. Stewart v. Davis, 63 Me. 539; Stone v. Stone, 116 Mass. 279; Hibbard v. Hurlburt, 10 Vt. 173.

36. Guilmartin v. Wood. 76 Ala. 204; Gano v. Aldridge, 27 Ind. 489; Kendrick v. Burchett, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 342, 89 S. W. 239; Pendergrass v. Butcher, 158

Ky. 321, 164 S. W. 949; Perry v. Buswell, 113 Me. 399, 99 Atl. 483; Savage v. Kendall, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 241; Mcgowen v. Lewis, 26 N. J. L. 451; Peaslee v. Gee, 19 N. H. 273; Boggess v. Allen,- (Tex. Civ. App.) - 56 S. W. 195; Ridgell v. Atherton - (Tex. Civ. App.) - 107 S. W 129; Spiller v. Ccribner, 36 Vt. 245, 2 Devlin Deeds, Sec. 1039.

37. See Barney v. Miller, 18 Iowa, 460; Black v. Skinner Mfg. Co., 53 Fla. 1090, 43 So. 919: Heman v. Gilliam, 171 Mo. 258, 71 S. W. 163; Jones v. Smith, 73 N. Y. 205; Cullers v. Piatt, 81 Tex. 258, 16 S. W. 1003; Hunter v. Hume, 88 Va. 24, 13 S. E. 305; South Penn Oil Co. v. Knox, 68 W. Va. 362, 69 S. E. 1020; Pardee v .Johnston, 70 W. Va. 347, 74 S. E. 721.

Metes and bounds, and there does not seem any plausible reason for regarding the former as less likely than the latter to represent the grantor's intention. Indeed it appears to be the general rule that if the conveyance describes the property with sufficient defmiteness by language which does not enter into details, this description will not be cut down by a subsequent clause which does attempt to give in detail the boundaries38 or numbers of the constituent lots,39 or other elements of description.40 So it has been decided that a description of a town lot by its number and the number of its block, includes the whole lot, though it is followed by a description by metes and bounds which covers only a part of the lot,41 and a description of the land as the grantor's home farm was regarded as unaffected by an attempt to give the constituent parts of the farm, which omitted several acres.42

As a description, definite in itself,43 is not cut down by subsequent words attempting to give a more detailed description, so it is not cut down by subsequent words of reference or explanation, such for instance, as indicate the source of title,44 or previous

38. Haley v. Amestoy, 44 Cal. 132; Rutherford v. Tracy, 48 Mo. 325, 8 Am. Rep. 105; Lodge v. Lee, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 237, 3 L. Ed. 210; Keith v. Reynolds, 3 Greenl. (Me.) 393; Jackson v. Barrlnger, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 471; Quelch v. Futch, 172 N. C. 316, 90 S. E. 259; Birch v. Hutchings, 144 Mass. 561, 12 N. E. 192; Barney v. Miller, 18 Iowa, 460; Gish v. Roanoke, 119 Va. 519, 89 S. E. 970.

39. Sumner v. Hill, 157 Ala. 230, 47 So. 565; Andrews v. Pearson, 68 Me. 19; Marshall v. Mclean, 3 G. Greene - (Iowa),- 363; Whitaker v. Whitaker, 175 Mo. 1, 74 S. W. 109.

40. Stukeley v. Butler Hob. 172.

41. Rutherford v. Tracy, 48 Mo. 325, 8 Am. Rep. 104; Master-son v. Munroe, 105 Cal. 431, 45 Am. St. Rep. 57, 38 Pac. 1106: Moore v. Minnesota & St. P. S. R. Co., 129 Minn. 237, 152 N. W. 405.

42. Andrews v. Pearson, 68 Me. 19.

43. See Weller v. Barber, 110 Mass 44; Hathorn v. Hinds, 69 Me. 326.

44. Maker v. Lazell, 83 Me. 562, 23 Am. St. Rep. 795, 22 Atl. 474; Wilder v. Davenport, 58 Vt. 642. See Lovejoy v. Lovett, 124 Mass. 270.

1672 Real Peopeety. [Sec. 447 occupancy,45 or the name by which the property is ordinarily known.46

A description of the property conveyed as all that part of a particular tract which the grantor has not previously sold or conveyed is sufficient, it being possible to apply the description by the introduction of evidence of what had been previously sold or conveyed.47

Even a conveyance of a certain number of acres, to be selected by the grantee,48 or by the grantor,49 out of a larger tract belonging to the grantor, would seem to be sufficient, in case the selection is duly made. The only possible objection to such a conveyance appears to be that the election constitutes a condition precedent to the vesting of an estate, and that this would involve a violation of the Rule against Perpetuities unless there were some restriction as regards the time of election.50 Such a restriction, however, might be supplied by the implication of a requirement that the election be made by the grantor or grantee personally, in which case it must be made within a life in being.

It is said that, when there are two conflicting descriptions in the conveyance, the grantee may elect as between them,51 and that when the description is am45. Hobbs v. Payson, 85 Me. 498, 27 Atl. 519, Kimball v. Schoff, 40 N. H. 190 (semble).

46. Barksdale v. Barksdale, 92 Miss. 166, 45 So. 615.

47 Maier v. Joslin, 46 Minn. 228, 48 N. W. 909; Baker v. Clay, 101 Mo. 553, 14 S. W. 734; Duncan v. Madora, 106 Pa. St. 562; Falls Land & Cattle Co. v. Chisbolm, 71 Tex. 523, 9 S. W. 479; Frost v. Eratb Cattle Co., 81 Tex. 505, 26 Am. St. Rep. 831, 17 S, E. 52.

48. Hungerford's Case 1 Leon 30; Marshall v. Marshall Moore,

Biguous, it will, in the absence of evidence to remove the ambiguity, be construed in favor of the grantee.52

602. So in the case of a devise, 1 Jarman, Wills 331.

49. See Indianapolis Natural Gas. Co. v. Spaugh, 17 Ind. App. 683, 46 N .E. 691; Indianapolis Natural Gas Co. v. Pierce, 25 Ind. App. 116, 56 N E.. 137; Hunt v. Campbell, 83 Ind. 48.

50. See Savill Bros Ltd. v. Bethell [1902] 2 Ch. 523.

51. Vance v. Fore, 24 Cal. 435; Merwin v. Backer, 80 Conn. 338, 68 Atl. 373; Sharp v. Thompson, 100 111. 447, 39 Am. Rep. 61; Hornet v. Dumbeck, 39 Ind. App. 482, 78 N. E. 691; Melvin v.