94. Bonetti v. Treat. 91 Cal. 233, 13 L- R. A. 418. 27 Pac. 612; Triest & Co. v. Goldstone, 173 Cat 240, 159 Pac. 715; Cuesta v. Goldsmith, 1 Ga. App. 48, 57 S. E. 983; Grommes v. St. Paul Trust Co., 147 111. 634, 35 N. E. 820, 7 Am. St. Rep. 248; Harris v. Heachman, 62 Iowa. 411, 17 N. W. 592; Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cnsh.

(Mass.) 337; Detroit Pharmacal Co. v. Burt, 124 Mich. 220, 82 N. W. 893; Rees v. Lowry, 57 Minn. 381, 59 N. W. 310; Edwards v. Spalding, 20 Mont. 54, 49 Pac. 443; Bouscaren v. Brown, 40 Neb. 722, 42 Am. St. Rep. 692, 59 N. W. 385; Creveling v. De Hart, 54 N. J. Law 338, 23 At. 611: Laughran v. Smith, 75 N. Y. 205; Frank v. Mcguire, 42 Pa. 77; Adams v. Burke, 21 R. I. 126, 42 At. 515; Granite Bldg. Corp. v. Rubin, 40 R. I. 208, 100 Atl. 310: Johnson v. Norman. 98 Wash. 331, 167 Pac. 923. And cases cited ante, Sec. 407, note 59c. 95 There are cases however which regard the original lessee as relieved from liability in such case. See ante, Sec. 407, note 59d.

Linquisliment of possession by the tenant and the resumption of possession by the landlord.96 The theory of such surrender would seem to be that the revesting of possession in the landlord to the exclusion of the tenant, by the action of both parties, being inconsistent with the continuance of an outstanding leasehold in the tenant, both are estopped to assert that the relation of landlord and tenant still exists. It is immaterial whether such change of possession is the result of agreement, The tenant may relinquish possession to the landlord in accordance with an agreement to that effect,97 but more frequently the change of possession occurs as a result of the abandonment of the premises by the tenant and the subsequent resumption of the possession thereof by the landlord.

The question frequently arises whether there has been such a resumption of possession by the landlord, upon the abandonment of the premises by the tenant, as to give rise to a surrender by operation of law, relieving the tenant from liability under the lease. This appears to depend, in each case, on whether the landlord has taken possession with the intention of occupying and controlling the premises as his own, to the exclusion of the tenant in case the latter desires to return,98 and this is ordinarily a question of fact. 99

96. Grimman v Legge, 8 Barn. & C. 324; Dodd v. Acklom, 6 Man. & G. 672; Shahan v. Herzberg, 73 Ala. 59; Williams v. Jones, 1 Bush (Ky.) 621; Lamar v. Mcnamee. 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 116, 32 Am. Dec. 152; Talbot v. Whipple, 14 Allen, (Mass.) 177; Prior v. Kiso, 81 Mo. 241; Elgutter v. Drishaus, 44 Neb. 378, 63 N. W. 19; Dennis v. Miller, 68 N. J. Law 320, 53 Atl. 394; Elliott v. Aiken, 45 N. H. 30; Hart v. Pratt, 19 Wash. 560, 53 Pac. 711.

97. There is such an agreement, it appears, if the landlord demands possession of the premises and the tenant accedes to such demand. See e. g. Kean v. Rogers, 146 Iowa, 559, 123 N. W. 978: Conkling v. Tuttle. 52 Mich. 630. 18 N. W. 391; Smith v. Pendergast. 26 Minn. 318, 3 N. W. 978; Frankel v. Sternau, 92 Ohio St. 197, 110 N. E. 747; Patchin's Ex'r v. Dickerman, 31 Vt. 666; Eimerman v. Nathan, 116 Wis. 124, 92 N. W. 550 (semble); Boyd v. Gore, 143 Wis. 531, 128 N. W. 68; Compare Whittaker v. Barker, 1 Cromp & M. 113; Lamar v. Mcnamee, 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 116, 32 Am. Dec. 152; Felker v. Richardson, 67 N. H. 509, 32 Atl. 830.

That the landlord, after the tenant's abandonment, entered and cared for the premises,1 or that he made repairs,2 has been regarded as not in itself involving such a resumption of possession. When the tenant, upon abandoning the premises, sends the key to the landlord or leaves it at his residence or place of business, the fact that the landlord fails to return it to the tenant does not necessarily show a resumption of exclusive possession of the premises for this purpose,3 though the

98. Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507, 27 Pac. 369, 25 Am. St. Rep. 145; Duffy v. Day, 42 Mo. App. 638; Meeker v. Spalsbury, 66 N. J. Law 60, 48 Atl. 1026; Hargrove v. Bourne, 47 Okla. 484, 150 Pac. 121. .

99. Hays v. Goldman, 71 Ark. 251, 72 S. W. 563; Carson v. Arvantes, 10 Colo. App. 582, 50 Pac. 1080; Okie v. Pearson, 23 App. D. C. 170; Brewer v. National Bldg. Ass'n, 166 111. 221, 46 N. E. 752; Armour Packing Co. v. Des Moines Park Co., 116 Iowa, 723, 93 Am. St. Rep. 270, 89 N. W. 196; Sander v. Holstein Commission Co., 118 Mo. App. 29, 121 Mo. App. 293; Hargrove v. Bourne, 47 Okla. 484, 150 Pac. 121; White v. Berry, 24 R. I. 74, 52 Atl. 682; Kneeland v. Schmidt. 78 Wis. 345, 11 L. R. A. 498, 47 N. W. 438.

1. Joslin v. Mclean, 99 Mich. 480, 58 N. W. 467; Duffy v. Day, 42 Mo. App. 638; Rucker v. Mason, - Okla., - 161 Pac. 195; Milling v. Becker, 96 Pa. 182.

2. Cook v. Anderson, 85 Ala. 99, 4 So. 713; Brewer v. National Union Bldg. Ass'n 166 111. 221, 46 N. E. 752; Sessinghaus v.

Knocke, 127 Mo. App. 300, 105 S. W. 283; Haynes v. Aldrich, 133 N. Y. 287, 16 L. R. A. 183, 28 Am. St. Rep. 636, 31 N. E. 94; Breuckman v. Twibill, 89 Pa. 58; Smith v. Hunt, 32 R. I. 326, 79 Atl. 826.

3. Oaster v. Henderson, 2 Q. B. Div. 575; Fehringer v. Wagner. Stockbridge Trading Co., 61 Colo. 359, 157 Pac. 1071; Ledsinger v. Burke, 113 Ga., 74, 38 S. E. 313; Tolle v. Orth, 75 Ind. 298, 39 Am. Rep. 147; Martin v. Stearns, 52 Iowa, 345, 35 Am. Rep. 278, 3 N. W. 92; Withers v. Larrabee. 48 Me. 570 Joslin v. Mclean, 99 Mich. 480, 58 N. W. 467; Lucy v. Wilkins, 33 Minn. 441, 23 N. W. 861; Landt v. Schneider, 31 Mont. 15. 77 Pac. 307; Underhill v. Collins, 132 N. Y. 269, 30 N. E. 576; Bumiller v. Walker, 95 Ohio 344, L. R. A. 1918B, 96, 116 N. E. 797; Bowen v. Clarke, 22 Ore. 566, 29 Am. St. Rep. 625, 30 Pac. 430; Auer v. Penn, 99 Pa. 370. 44 Am. Rep. 114; John B. Webster Co. v. Grossman, 33 S .D. 383, 146 N. W. 565, (acceptance of Key by Janitor); ('handler v. Hinds. 135 Wis. 43, 115 N. W. 339.

That the landlord, for (he pur.1586 Real. Property. [Sec. 431 acceptance and retention of the key, combined with other circumstances, may have this effect.4 The attempt of the landlord to lease the premises to a third person,5 or even his actual making of such a lease, to take effect immediately in possession, does not, in a number of jurisdictions, show such an assumption of control over the premises as to give rise to a surrender, relieving the former tenant from further liability under the previous lease,6 especially in case the landlord, before making the second lease, notifies the former tenant that he is about to make such a lease on the latter's account, that is, that his purpose is to reduce, but not necessarily to extinguish, the latter's liability for rent.7 By other cases it is held that such reletting pose of making repairs, obtained the key from the tenant, was held not to relieve the tenant, he having been notified that he would still be held liable. Smith v. Hunt, 32 R. I. 326, 79 Atl. 823.