4. Phene v. Popplewell, 12 C. B. N. S. 334; Brewer v. National Union Bldg. Ass'n 166 111. 221, 46 N. E. 752; Hesseltine v. Seavey, 16 Me. 212; Buckingham Apartment House Co. v. Dafoe, 78 Minn. 268, 80 N. W. 974; Fink v. Browe Co., (N. J. Ch.) 99 Atl. 926; Bowen v. Clarke, 22 Ore. 566, 29 Am. St. Rep. 625, 30 Pac. 430.

5. Walls v. Atcheson, 3 Bing. 462; Joslin v. Mclean, 99 Mich. 48, 58 N. W. 467; Blake v. Dick, 15 Mont. 236, 48 Am. St. Rep. 671, 38 Pac. 1072; O'neil v. Pearse, 88 N. J. L. 733, 96 Atl. 1102 aff g 87 N. J. L. 382, 94 Atl. 312; Haynes v. Aldrich, 133 N. Y. 287, 16 L. R. A. 183, 28 Am. St. Rep. 636, 31 N. E. 94; Lane v. Nelson, 167 Pa. 602, 31 Atl. 864. In Meagher v. Eilers Music House, 84 Ore.

33, 164 Pac. 373, the decision to this effect was to some extent based on the fact that the second lease expressly reserved a right in the original tenant to resume possession.

6. Humiston, Keeling & Co. v. Wheeler, 175 111. 514, 51 N. E. 893; Martin v. Stearns, 52 Iowa, 345, 3 N. W. 92; H. S. Chase & Co. v. Evans, 178 Iowa, 885, 160 N. W. 346; Scheelky v. Koch, 119 N. C. 80, 25 S. E. 713; Bumiller v. Walker, 95 Ohio, 344, L. R. A. 1918B, 96, 116 N. E. 797; Bowen v. Clarke, 22 Ore. 566, 29 Am. St. Rep. 625, 30 Pac. 430; Auer v. Penn, 99 Pa. 370, 44 Am. Rep. 114; Auer v. Hoffmann, 132 Wis. 620, 112 N. W. 1090.

7. See Williamson v. Crossett, 62 Ark. 393: Renard v. Renard,- Cal - 165 Pac. 694; Rehkopf v. Wirz, 31 Cal. App. 695, 161 Pac. 285; Brown v. Cairns, 107 Iowa, 727. 77 N. W. 478; Kean v. Rogers, 146 Iowa. 559, 123 N. W. 754; Oldewurtel v. Wiesenfeld, 97 Md. 165. 54 Atl. 969; Alsup v.

Necessarily brings to an end the tenancy previously existing,8 and in favor of this view is the fact that the contrary view appears to involve a right of possession in two distinct persons under two distinct leases at one and the same time.9

A third mode of surrender by operation of law occurs in the case of a new lease by the landlord to a third person, accompanied by the former tenant's relinquishment of possession in favor of such person.10 And it is apparently on this principle, or on a principle akin thereto, that a surrender by operation of law has occasionally been regarded as taking place when the landlord accepted as his tenant a sublessee of the original tenant.11

Banks, 68 Miss. 664, 13 L. R. A. 598, 24 Am. St. Rep. 294, 9 So. 895; Mcginn v. B. H. Gladding Dry Goods Co., 40 R. I. 348, 101 Atl. 129.

8. Oastler v. Henderson, 2 Q. B. Div. 575: Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507, 25 Am. St. Rep. 145, 27 Pac. 369: Rice v. Dudley, 65 Ala. 68; Haycock v. Johnston, 97 Minn. 289, 114 Am. St. Rep. 715, 106 N. W. 304; Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 162 N. Y. 388, 49 L. R. A. 580, 76 Am. St. Rep. 327, 56 N. E. 903; Pelton v. Place 71 Vt. 430, 46 Atl. 63.

9. See 2 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. p. 1340, 14 Mich. Law Rev. 82; 15 Id. 559.

In Whitcomb v. Brant. 100 Atl. 175, it was held by the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals that a lessor making a new lease, upon abandonment by the first lessee, at a higher rent than that reserved in the first lease, was not liable for the excess to the first lessee, although he had refused to consent to a surrender. The case is criticized, 30 Harv. Law Rev. 766.

10. Nickells v. Atherstone, 10 Q. B. 944; Morgan v. Mccollister, 110 Ala. 319, 20 So. 54; Triest & Co. v. Goldstone, 173 Cal. 240,

159 Pac. 715; Williams v. Vander-bilt, 145 I11. 238, 21 L. R. A. 489, 36 Am. St. Rep. 486, 34 N. E. 476; Rogers v. Dockstader, 90 Kan. 189, 13S Pac. 717; Kinsey v. Minnick, 43 Md. 112; Amory v. Kannoffsky, 117 Mass. 351, 19 Am. Rep. 416; Gallop v. Murphy,

160 Mo. App. 1, 141 S. W. 438; Washoe County Bank v. Campbell, 41 Nev. 153, 67 Pac. 643; In re Sherwoods, 210 Fed. 754.

As to the effect of the invalidity of the new lease, see editorial note 28 Harv. Law Rev. 313, Commenting on Johnson v. Northern Trust Co., 265 I11. 263, 106 N. E. 814. Compare 2 Tiffany. Landlord & Ten. p. 1347.

11. Dills v. Stobie, 81 I11. 202 (scmble); Stimmel v. Waters, 2 Bush (Ky.) 282; Amory v. Kan-offsky, 117 Mass. 351, 19 Am. Rep.

- Effect of surrender. A surrender by a particular tenant has the effect of extinguishing his estate,12 and if he is a tenant under a lease it terminates all future liability under the covenants,13 the most ordinary application of this principle occurring in the case of a covenant to pay rent, which ceases to be effective after a surrender.14 A surrender does not, however, operate to the prejudice of a third person.15 For instance, the interest of a subtenant is not affected by the surrender of the estate of the head tenant,16 nor is a lien on the estate surrendered affected by the surrender.17