53. Attwater v. Attwater, 18 Beav. 330; In re Rosher, 26 Ch. Div. 801; Anderson v. Cary, 36 Ohio St. 506; Schermerhorn v. Negus, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 448; Manierre v. Welling, 32 R, 1. 104, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 1311, 78 Atl. 507. See Morse v. Blood, 68 Minn. 442, 71 N. W. 682. This view is approved in Gray, Restraints on Alienation, Sec. 41. See also editorial notes in 11 Columbia Law Rev. at p. 365 and 24

Harv. Law Rev. at p. 584; article by Mr. Sweet, 33 Law Quart. Rev. at p. 342-348. Contra' Doe d. Gill v. Pearson, 6 East, 173; In re Macleay, L. R. 20 Eq. 186. Re Martin & Dagneau, 11 Ont. Law Rep. 349. Especially would this seem to be so if there is also a restriction on the price fixed at a sum below the value of the property. See Crofts v. Beamish (1905) 2 Ir. R. 249; Re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. 801.

54. That it is invalid, see Hardy v. Galloway, 111 N. C. 519, 32 Am. St. Rep. 828, 15 S. E. 890; In re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. 801; Gray, Restraints on Alienation, Sec. 26. That it is valid, see Jackson v. Schutz, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 174, 9 Am. Dec. 195; De. Peyster v. Michael, 6 N. Y. 467, 57 Am. Dec. 470; Bing v. Burn3, 106 Va. 478, 56 S. E. 222.

55. Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 363, 28 Pac. 118; Prey v. Stanley, 110 Cal. 423, 42 Pac. 908; Muhlke v. Tiedemann, 177 111. 606, 52 N. E. 843; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N. IX 352; Hill v. Gray, 160 Ala. 273, 49 So. 676 (semble); McCravey v.

As to time. The fact that a restriction upon the right to alienate a vested estate in fee simple is to endure for a limited time only does not, by the weight of authority, render the restriction valid.57 But there are dicta and occasional decisions to the effect that a condition or limitation, looking to the divesting of the estate upon the making of a conveyance within a period named, is valid,58 and in one state, Kentucky, the validity of a restriction for a "reasonable time" is fully recognized.59 As to what is a reasonable time the decisions in that state undertake to assert no positive rule,60 but the question is to some extent simplified by the fact that there the statute prohibits a suspension of the absolute power of alienation for a longer period than a life or lives in being and twenty-one years and ten months thereafter.61 In other states, also, there are occasional suggestions to the effect that, conceding the validity otherwise of a restraint on alienation limited as to time, it is invalid if it is to continue for a time longer than that fixed by the Rule against Perpetuities.62 This would seem necessarily to be the case in a state, like New York, where such is the name given to a statutory provision limiting the time during which the right of alienation may be suspended.

Otto, 90 S. C. 447, 74 S. E. 142 (semblc); McRae v. McRae, 30 Ont. 54. Contra, Earls v. Mc-Alpine, 27 Grant's Ch. 161, 6 Ont. App. 145. A requirement of the consent of a considerable number of persons would seem to be unquestionably invalid. See Ma-nierre v. Welling, 32 R. I. 104, Ann. Cas. 1912C 1311, 78 Atl. 507. 56. Litt, Sec. 361; as quoted by-Charles Sweet, Esq., 33 Law Quart. Rev. 242. That such a limited restraint on alienation is valid, is decided in Overton v. Lea, 108 Tenn. 505, 68 S. W. 250, and for judicial dicta to that effect, see Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co., 100 U. S. 55, 25 L. Ed. 547; Langdon v. Ingraham, 28 Ind. 360; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352; Mc-Williams v. Nisly, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 507, 7 Am. Dec; Jauretche v. Proctor, 48 Pa. St. 466. And see Editorial note 11 Columbia Law Rev. at p. 366. But that such a condition or provision is invalid, see 4 Kent's Comm. 131; Barnard's Lessee v. Bailey, 2 Harr. (Del.) 56; Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 363, 28 Pac. 118; Morse v. Blood, 68 Minn.

442, 71 N. W. 682; Williams v. Jones, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 620;. Ludlow v. Bunbury, 35 Beav. 36.

57. Re Rosher, 26 Ch. Div. 801; Renaud v. Tourangeau, L. R. 2 P. C. 4; Blackburn v. Mc-Callum, 33 Can. Sup. 65; Stamey v. McGinnis, 145 Ga. 226, 88 S. E. 935; Jones v. Port Huron Engine & Thresher Co., 171 111. 502, 49 N. E. 700; Goldsmith v. Petersen, 159 Iowa, 692, 141 N. W. 60; Clark v. Clark, 99 Md. 356, 58 Atl. 24, (compare Gerke v. Colonial Trust Co. 114 Md. 289, 79 Atl. 587); In re O'Leary's Estate, 136 Minn. 126, 161 N. W. 392; Latimer v. Wad-dell, 119 N. C. 370, 3 L. R. A. (N. S) 669, 26 S. E. 122, (but see Ex parte Watts, 130 N. C. 237, 41 S. E. 289); Manierre v. Welling, 32 R. I. 104, Ann. Cas. 1912C 1311, 78 Atl. 507; O'Connor v. Thetford, - Tex. Civ. App.-, 174 S. W. 680;Zillmer v. Land-guth, 94 Wis. 607, 69 N. W. 568.

58. See Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co., 100 U. S. 55, 25 L. Ed. 547; Langdon v. Ingram, 28 Ind. 360; McWilliams v. Nisly, 2 Serg. R. (Pa.) 507; Bouldin v. Miller, 87 Tex. 359, 28 S. W.

Charitable gifts. It is sometimes said that the rules forbidding restraints on alienation have no application in the case of land given for charitable purposes.63

940; Camp v. Cleary, 76 Va. 140; and other cases cited, Gray, Restraints on Alienation, Sec.Sec. 47-54; note to Latimer v. Waddell, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) at p. 672. The English dicta to this effect are examined, and condemned, 33 Law Quart. Rev. 348-351, article by Mr. Sweet.

59. Stewart v. Brady, 3 Bash (Ky.) 623; Wallace v. Smith, 113 Ky. 263, 68 S. W. 131; Frazier v. Combs, 140 Ky. 77, 130 S. W. 812.

60. Suspension of the right of alienation for the life of the tenant in fee simple has been regarded as unreasonable. Cropper v. Bowles, 150 Ky. 393, 150 S. W. 380; Harkness v. Lisle. 132 Ky. 767, 117 S. W. 264; but not necessarily so if for the life of another person, Lawson v. Lightfoot, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 217, 84 S. W. 739; Frazier v. Combs. 140 Ky. 77, 130 S. W. 812. See also Call v. Shewmaker 24 Ky. L. Rep. 686, 69 S. W. 749; Wallace v. Smith, 113 Ky. 263, 68 S. W. 131; Harkness v. Lisle, 132 Ky. 767, 117 S. W. 264.

61. See Morton v. Morton 120 Ky. 251, 85 S W. 1188 and editorial note 24 Harv. .Law Rev. at p. 245.