62. Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352; Gerke v. Colonial Trust Co., 114 Md. 289, 79 Atl. 587; Oxlny v. Lane, 35 N. Y. 340; Dwyer v. Cahil-, 228 111. 617, 81 N. E. 1142.

63. Perin v. Carey, 24 How. (U. S.) 465, 16 L. Ed. 701; Mills v. Davison, 54 N. J. Eg.

But it may perhaps be questioned whether a restrainl of that character, which would be invalid in the case of a private gift, is validated by the fact that it is contained in a gift to a charity.64 Such a restrainl is not valid, it appears, as against a decree of a court of equity directing a sale of the property for the benefit of the charity,65 and the question of its effectiveness in the absence of such a decree is not a very practical one, especially in view of the lack of incentive, in the ordi nary case, to dispose of property devoted to a charitable purpose. Even if a condition against alienation in a charitable gift is invalid, the purpose of such a condition could ordinarily be effected by a condition of forfeiture on the utilization of the land for another purpose.

(b) Estates in fee tail. The right of a tenant in tail to transfer the land by a common recovery, or a fine levied in accordance with certain statutes, and so to bar the entail, has been recognized as an essential incident of the estate, of which it cannot be deprived by any provision in the instrument creating it:66 ' and the statutory right of barring the entail by a conveyance no doubt stands upon the same footing.07

(c) Life estate. A provision attached to the creation of a legal estate for life, not that it shall or may terminate upon its voluntary transfer, but declaring in effect that such a transfer shall be nugatory, is invalid.68 But a condition, a special limitation, or an executory limitation, terminating a legal estate for life, or making it terminable, upon the making of a transfer by the owner thereof, is valid.69 The first case in which a provision of this latter character, occurring in connection with a life interest, was upheld,70 suggests the analogy of a lease for years, in which a condition against alienation has always been regarded as valid, but the analogy is incomplete, since, in the case of a life interest, the creator of the interest ordinarily retains no reversionary interest which such a provision serves to protect. It is true that a restriction upon the alienation of a life estate does not, to the same extent as in the case of a fee simple, operate to withdraw the property from commerce, but it does to some extent so operate, and the courts might reasonably, it is conceived, from the point of view of public policy, have refused to recognize a condition or limitation restricting the alienation of a life estate, except when the creator of the estate retains a reversion and has consequently a possible interest in the identity of the person to whom the life estate may belong.70 a

664, 35 L. R. A. 113, 55 Am. St Rep. 594, 35 Atl. 1072; Rolfe & Rumford Asylum v. Lefebre, 69 N. H. 241, 45 Atl. 1087.

64. In Female Orphan Society v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 119 La. 278, 12 Ann. Cas. 811, 44 So. 15 such a provision was regarded as invalid under the Louisiana Law.

65. Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 119, 18 L. Ed. 502; Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174, 27 L. Ed. 401; Amory v. Attorney-General, 179 Mass. 89, 60 N. E.

391; Woman's Christian Ass'u v. Kansas City, 147 Mo. 103, 4S S. W. 960; Rolfe & Rumford Asylum v. Lefebre, 69 N. H. 238, 45 Atl. 1087; Smart v. Town of Durham. 77 N. H. 56, 8G Atl. 821; Tacoma v. Tacoma Cemetery, 28 Wash. 238, 68 Pac. 723.

66. Portington's Case, 10 Coke. 35b; Gray, Restraints on Alienation, Sec. 77; Stansbury v. Hubner. 73 Md. 228, 11 L. R. A. 204. 25 Am. St. Rep. 584, 20 Atl. 904.

67. See Dawklna v. penryhn, 4 App. Cas. 51.

68. Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429; Rochford v. Hackman, 9 Hare, 475; Jones v. Port Huron Engine & Thresher Co., 171 111. 502, 49 N. E. 700; Streit v. Fay, 230 111. 319, 120 Am. St. Rep. 304, 82 N. E. 648; McCleary v. Ellis, 54 Iowa: 311, 37 Am. Rep. 205, 6 N. W. 571; McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Gates, 75 Iowa, 343, 39 N. W. 657; Nash v. Simpson, 78 Me. 142, 3 Atl. 53; Todd v. Sawyer, 147 Mass. 570, 17 N. E. 527; Fristoe v. Laytham, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 157, 36 S. W. 920; Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N. C. 460, 67 L. R. A. 444, 48 S. E. 785; Lee v. Oates, 171

N. C. 717, 88 S. E. 889; Scruggs v. Murray 2 Lea (Tenn.) 44; Seay v. Cockrell, 102 Tex. 280, 115 S. W. 1160; Bridge v. Ward, 35 Wis. 687. Contra, Abbott v. Doyle, 90 Kan. 45, 132 Pac. 1177.

69. Lewis v. Lewis, 76 Conn. 586, 57 Atl. 735; Conger v. Lowe, 124 Ind. 368, 9 L. R. A. 165, 24 N. E. 889; Bull v. Kentucky Nat. Bank, 90 Ky. 452; Bramhall v. Ferris, 14 N. Y. 41; Camp v. Cleary, 76 Va. 140; Lewes v. Lewes, 6 Sim. 304; Hurst v. Hurst, 21 Ch. D. 278.

70. Lockyer v. Savage, 2 Strange, 947.

592 Restrictions on Transfer. 2315.

(d) Estates for years. A condition or limitation, by which a term of years is, in favor of the landlord, to terminate, or to be terminable, upon a transfer by the tenant, is valid;71 but a lessee cannot, on transferring the term, impose any restrictions upon alienation by his transferee, since this would be equivalent to imposing a restriction upon the transfer of an absolute interest in personalty.72 Furthermore, as in the case of a legal life estate, a provision that the term shall not be transferred, but that, in spite of any such attempt by the tenant or his creditors, it shall still belong to him, is, it seems, invalid.73

(e) Involuntary alienation. To the same extent that a provision in connection with a legal estate, which restricts the right or possibility of voluntary transfer by the tenant is invalid, a provision in connection with such an estate restricting the liability to involuntary transfer in behalf of creditors is likewise invalid. That is, a mere provision that the estate shall not be liable for the tenant's debts is invalid whatever the quantum of the estate,74 and a provision terminating an estate