55a. Sternberger v. Ragland. 57 Ohio St. 148, 48 N. E. 811; Pyles v. Brown, 189 Pa. St. 164, 69 Am. St. Rep. 794, 42 Atl. 11; Veazie v. Parker, 23 Me. 170; Pierce v. Taylor, 23 Me. 246.

56. Pearce v. Smith, 126 Ala. 116, 28 So. 37; Ora v. Bane, 92 Kan. 567, 141 Pac. 303; Becker or constructive, of the equitable title.560 This general rule, restricting the operation of the record as notice to subsequent purchasers, is obviously based upon the evailing'method of indexing the records by the names of the grantors and grantees., and it is readily conceivable that the introduction, in any particular community, of a method of indexing the records with reference to the property affected, might be regarded by the courts as ground for abrogating the rule."57

If two or more persons join as grantors or mortgagors, the grantee or mortgagee, or one claiming under him, is chargeable with notice of recorded instruments executed by each of them, or by persons in the chain of title under which each of them claims.58 And the case is the same when two or more persons, as asserting conflicting claims to land, or as having merely undivided interests therein, make separate conveyances thereof to one person.59

- Conveyance of neighboring land. A purchaser is, it appears, ordinarily charged with notice of an incumbrance upon the property created by an instrument which is of record, although the primary purpose of such instrument is, not the creation of such incumbrance, but the conveyance of neighboring property, or instance, if one owning two adjoining city lots v Stroeher, 167 Mo. 306, 66 S. W. 1083; Tarbell v. West, 86 N. Y. 280; Sands v. Beardsley, 32 W. Va. 594, 9 S. E. 925.

56a. Davis & Son v. Milligan, 88 Ala. 523, 6 So. 908 (senile); Alden v. Garver, 32 111. 32; Jones v. Lapham, 15 Kan. 540; Balen v. Mercier, 75 Mich. 42, 42 N. W. 666; Crane v. Turner, 7 Hun (N. Y.) 357, aff'd 67 N. Y. 437. See Edwards v. Mckernan, 55 Mich. 520, 22 N .W. 20. These citations are in part from an editorial note in .17 Columbia conveys one of them, the instrument of conveyance expressly granting an easement as against the lot retained in favor of that conveyed, the record of such conveyance will, it seems, affect a subsequent purchaser of the former lot with notice of such easement and he will take subject thereto. In such a case, at common law, the purchaser would take subject to the easement previously created, as being a legal interest, irrespective of whether he has notice thereof,60 and the rule in this respect could not well be regarded as changed by the adoption of the recording law, as applied to a case in which the grant of the easement does appear of record, though in connection with the conveyance of other land, to which the easement is made appurtenant.61 And when, as may occur,02 the acceptance of a convev ance of land, or of a grant of an easement in particular land, involves the creation of an easement upon ether land, belonging to the grantee, in favor of land belonging to the grantor, by reason of words of contract or reservation inserted in the instrument, a subsequent purchaser of such other land from the grantee would, it seems, be charged with notice of the easement, by reason of the record of the conveyance or grant, although the primary purpose thereof was to convey an interest in

Law Rev. at p. 324, upon the effect of a mortgage by one claiming under a contract of sale.

57. See Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Tinker, 22 S. D. 427, 18 Ann. Cas. 11. 118 N. W. 700; Harris v. Reed, 21 Idaho, 364, 121 Pac. 780; Balr-h v. Arnold, 9 Wyo. 17. 59 Pac. 434.

58. Gimon v. Davis, 36 Ala. 589; Creel v. Keith, 148 Ala. 233, 41 So. 780.

59. Brannan v. Marshall, 184 Ala. 375, 63 So. 1007.

60. See ante, Sec. 566(a), 11 Halsbury's Laws of England, 247; Leech v. Schweder, 9 Ch. App. 463, 474.

61. See Hammonds v. Eads, 146 Ky. 162, 142 S. W. 379, Glorieux v. Lighthipe, 88 N. J. L. 199, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 484, 96 Atl. 94; Bowman v. Holland, 116 Va. 805, 83 S E. 393. In Mitchell v. D'olier, 68 N. J. L. 375, 59 L. R. A. 949, 53 Atl. 467, it was held that where a conveyance to B of a tract of land contained an exception of a certain part specifically described, as having been previously conveyed to A., B was chargeable with notice, by the record of the conveyance to A, that not only did she, A, have the part described, but also that an easement was granted by that conveyance to A over the balance of the tract.

62. See Dyer v. Sanford, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 404; Case v. Haight, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 632; referred to in 6 Harv. Law Rev. 311, article by H. W. Chaplin. Esq. In the first cited case, Shaw, C. J., says: "We think a grant may be so made as to create a right in the grantee's land in favor of the grantor. For instance; suppose A. has close No. 2, lying between two closes, Nos. 1 & 3, of B; and A grants to B the right to lay and main-tain a drain from close No. 1, across his close No. 2, thence to be continued through his own close, No. 3, to its outlet; and A, in his grant to B, should reserve the right to enter his drain, for the benefit of his intermediate close, with the right and privilege of having the waste water therefrom pass off freely through the grantee's close, No. 3, forever. In effect, this, if accepted, would secure to the grantor a right in the grantee's land."

2 R. P. - 63 different land. And if, in conveying lot A, the grantor enters into a restrictive agreement as to the improve ment of lot B, retained by him, a subsequent purchaser of lot B would ordinarily be charged with notice of the agreement, by reason of its record as a part of the conveyance of lot A. Were he not so charged, the restrictive agreement might be to a considerable extent nugatory.63 And, as will appear later,64 where one mortgage covers two or more lots or tracts, the purchaser of one lot or tract is, by the record of a previous conveyance or mortgage of the other tract, increasing the proportion of the mortgage debt to be borne by the former lot or tract, charged with notice thereof.