34. Anglesea v. Churchwardens of Rugeley, 6 Q. B. 107; Board Com'rs Mahoning Co. v. Young, 8 C. C. A. 27, 59 Fed. 96; Scovill v. McMahon, 62 Conn. 378, 21 L. R. A. 58, 36 Am. St. Rep. 350, 26 Atl. 479; Portland v. Terwilliger, 16 Ore. 465, 19 Pac. 90.

35. Co. Litt. 206b; Sheppard's Touchstone 132.

36. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, L. R. 12 Ec. 604; Cartwright v. Cart-wright, 3 D. M. & G. 982; Coe v. Hill, 201 Mass. 15, 86 N. E. 949; Conrad v. Long, 33 Mich. 78; Matter of Haight, 51 N. Y. App. Div. 310, 64 N. Y. Supp. 1029; Hawke v. Enyart, 30 Neb. 149, 27 Am. St. Rep. 391, 46 N. W. 422. See In re Gunning's Estate, 234

Pa. 139, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 637, 83 Atl. 60.

So a condition the possible effect of which was to make permanent a separation which had already taken place has been regarded as invalid. Witherspoon v. Brokaw, 85 Mo. App. 169; Compare Cooper v. Remsen, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 382.

37. Born v. Horstmann, 80 Cal. 452, 5 L. R. A. 577, 22 Pac. 169, 338; Coe v. Hill, 201 Mass. 15, 86 N. E. 949; Thayer v. Spear, 58 Vt. 327, 2 Atl. 161; Ransdell v. Boston, 172 111. 439, 43 L. R. A. 526, 50 N. E. Ill (divorce proceeding already begun) Snor-grass v. Thomas. 166 Mo. App. 603. 150 S. W. 106.

A condition in a devise that the devisee shall not contest the validity of the will is usually, in this county, regarded as valid,39 without reference, according to some authorities, to whether there is probable cause for such contest.40

- (d) Conditions in restraint of marriage. The question of the validity of conditions "in restraint of marriage," by reason of which the estate will vest only on failure to marry, or to marry in a certain way, or will be divested upon marriage, has been the subject of much discussion, and it is recognized that the decisions thereupon are in irreconcilable conflict. The complexity of the subject results from the fact that, while the common law permitted considerable restrictions of this sort, the Roman law absolutely forbade them, and the latter law was introduced into England and applied

38. Cowley v. Twombly, 173 Mass. 393, 46 L. R. A. 164, 53 N. E. 886.

39. Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501; In re Hite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 953 and note, 17 Ann. Cas. 993, 101 Pac. 443; Hoit v. Hoit, 42 N. J. Eq. 388, 59 Am. Rep. 43, 7 Atl. 856; Bradford v. Bradford, 19 Ohio St. 546. 2 Am. Rep. 419; In re Friends Estate, 209 Pa. 442, 68 L. R. A. 447 and note, 58 Atl. 853; Thompson v. Gaut, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 310; Massie v. Massie, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 617, 118 S. W. 219; Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, 169 U. S. 398, 42 L. Ed. 793; Cooke v. Turner, 15 Mees. & W. 727, 14 Sim. 493. But in Rouse v. Branch, 91 S. C. 1ll, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.)

1160, Ann. Cas. 1913E 1296, 74 S. E. 133, it is decided that such a condition is not effective unless there is a devise over, thus applying the in terrorem doctrine applied by the English courts in the case of personal property, and see diction to same effect in In re Chew's Appeal, 45 Pa. St. 228.

40. In re Miller's Estate, 156 Cal. 119, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 868, 103 Pac. 842; Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa, 451, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 898, 123 N. W. 202. Contra, South Nowalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 Atl. 961; In re Friend's Estate, 209 Pa. 442, 68 L. R. A. 447, 58 Atl. 853. And see Rouse v. Branch, 91 S. C. 111. 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1160, Ann. Cas. 1913E 1296, 74 S. E. 133.

282 . Real Property. [ Sec. 81 to personal property by the ecclesiastical courts. These two systems have interacted one on the other, and considerations arising from the nature of the condition, and the presence of a limitation over on breach of the condition, have been introduced to modify the rules in particular cases. The matter will here be considered only in so far as it affects real property.41

A provision in a devise making the vesting of the estate conditional upon the marriage of the devisee with the consent of certain persons has been regarded as effective to prevent the vesting in case marriage takes place without such consent.42 Decisions of this character are probably the basis for the occasional statements that a condition precedent in restraint of marriage is perfectly valid;43 but it may be questioned whether;a condition the effect of which is to give an estate to one upon his or her marriage, even if coupled with a requirement of consent to the marriage, can properly be regarded as in restraint rather than in encouragement of marriage. A gift to a man if and when he arrives at the age of fifty without having married would be a clear case of a condition precedent in restraint of marriage, and how such a condition would be regarded does not appear from the decisions. Presumably it would be upheld as valid, since a different view would deprive the devisee of all benefit from the gift, though it might possibly be considered that such a condition is so opposed to public policy as entirely to invalidate the devise. Whatever view a court might hold as to the impropriety of such a condition precedent, it could not well ignore it and give the devisee a vested estate, when the declared intention was to give him merely the possibility of an estate.

41. The subject is discussed in 2 Jarman, Wills, p. 885 et seq, and Mr. Bigelow's notes thereto; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. Sec.Sec. 386-406; Ed itorial note in 10 Columbia Law Rev. p. 756. And the cases are most conveniently collected in 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 138, note to Holbrook's Estate.

42. See Bertie v. Faulkland, 3 Ch. Cas. 129; Reeves v. Heme, 5 Vin. Abr. 343; Harvey v. Aston, 1 Atk. 361; Reynish v. Martin, 3

Atk. 330; Fry v. Porter, 1 Mod. 300.

43. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. Sec. 288; 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. Sec. 933; Phillips v. Ferguson, 85 Va. 509, 1 L. R. A. 837, 17 Am. St. Rep. 78, 8 S. E. 241; Dusbiber v. Melville, 178 Mich. 601, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 367, 146 N. W. 208; citing Conant v. Stone, 176 Mich. 654, 143 N. W. 39, which does not support the statement.