48. 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. Sec. 933; Coppage v. Alexander's Heirs, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 313, 38 Am. Dec. 153, note on page 158; Collier v. Slaughter's Adm'r, 20 Ala. 263; Shackelford v. Hall, 19 111. 212; Graydon's Ex'rs v. Graydon, 23 N.

J. Eq. 229; Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N. Y. 162, 42 Am. Rep. 244; Munroe v. Hall, 97 N. C. 206, 1 S. E. 651; Maddox v. Maddox's Adm'r, 11 Grat. (Va.) 804; Phillips v. Ferguson, 85 Va. 509, 1 L. R. A. 837, 17 Am. St. Rep. 78, 8 S. E. 241; Reuff v. Coleman, 30 W. Va. 171, 3 S. E. 597. See cases cited 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. at p. 140.

49. Giles v. Little, 104 U. S. 291, 26 L. Ed. 745; Vaughn v. Lovejoy, 34 Ala. 437; Phillips v. Medbury, 7 Conn. 568; Chapin v. Cooke, 73 Conn. 72, 84 Am. St. Rep. 139, 46 Atl. 282; Becker v. Becker, 206 111. 53, 69 N. E. 49; Coppage v. Alexander's Heirs, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 313, 38 Am. Dec. 153; Mann v. Jackson, 84 Me. 400, 16 L. R. A. 707, 30 Am. St. Rep. 358, 24 Atl. 886; Bostick v. Blades, 59 Md. 231, 43 Am. Rep. 548; Knight v. Mahoney, 152 Mass. 523, 9 L. R. A. 573. 25 N. E. 971; Dumey v. Schoeffler, 24 Mo. 170, 69 Am. Dec. 422; Chapin v.

Occasionally, in this country, the courts, in discussing the validity of a condition the effect of which is to divest an estate upon the marriage of the person to whom it is given, have referred to the fact that there is a devise over to another on that event, as validating the condition in the case of real as well as personal property.53 That such is the effect of a gift over in the case of personalty has been frequently recognized in both England and this country, it being said that in the absence of a gift over the condition is in terrorem merely, and therefore nugatory,54 but this doctrine, adopted by the English ecclesiastical courts from the civil law, has usually been ignored in connection with real property.

The view has been not unfrequently asserted that, though a condition restraining marriage would be inMarvin, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 538; Luigart v. Ripley, 19 Ohio St. 24; Com. v. Stauffer, 10 Pa. St. 350, 51 Am. Dec. 489; Martin v. Seig-ler, 32 S. C 267, 10 S. E. 1073; Herd v. Catron, 97 Tenn. 662, 37 L. R. A. 731, 37 S. W. 551.

50. See Newton v. Marsden, 2 Johns. & H. 356; Allen v. Jackson, 1 Ch. Div. 399.

51. Allen v. Jackson, 1 Ch. Div. 399; Bostick v. Blades, 59 Md. 231; Stivers v. Gardner, 88 Iowa 307, 55 N. W. 516.

52. Newton v. Marsden, 2 Johns. & H. 356; Allen v. Jackson, 1 Ch. D. 399; Herd v. Catron,

97 Tenn. 662, 37 L. R. A. 731, S7 S. W. 551; Overton v. Lea, 108 Tenn. 505, 68 S. W. 250; Contra, under local statute, Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266, 46 Am. Rep. 598.

53. Randall v. Marble, 69 Me. 310, 31 Am. Rep. 281; In re Miller's Will, 159 N. C. 123, 74 S. E. 888; Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169, 4 Am. Dec. 107; Otis v. Prince, 10 Gray (Mass.) 581; Contra, Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N. Y. 162, 42 Am. Rep. 244; Jenner v. Turner, 16 Ch. D. 188.

54. See 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. at p. 140, note to Holbrook's Estate.

55. Post Sec. 90.

56. Randall v. Marble, 69 Me. 310, 31 Am. Rep. 281; Bostick v. Blades, 59 Md. 231, 43 Am. Rep. 548; Maddox v. Yoe, 121 Md. 288, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1235, 88 Atl. 225; Harlow v. Bailey, 189 Mass. 208, 75 N. E. 259; Pringle v. Dunk-ley, 14 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 16, 53 Am. Dec. 110; In re Hotz's Estate, 38 Pa. St. 422, 80 Am. Dec. 490 and note; Little v. Birdwell, 21 Tex. 597. 73 Am. Dec. 242; Selden v. Keen, 27 Grat. (Va.)

576; See Wood v. Logue, 167 Iowa 436, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 116. 149 N. W. 613.

It has been held that such a limitation is not a condition in restraint of marriage of a widow within the Indiana statute invalidating such a condition. Summit v. Yount, 109 Ind. 506, 9 N. E. 582; Levengood v. Hoople, 124 Ind. 27, 24 N. E. 373.

57. Per Wigram, V. C. in Mor-ley v. Rennoldson, 2 Hare, 570.

- (e) Repugnant conditions. A condition which is repugnant to the estate limited is absolutely void.

58. Jones v. Jones, 1 Q. B. D. 279.

59. Arthur v. Cole, 56 Md. 100, 40 Am. Rep. 409; Mann v. Jackson, 84 Me. 400, 24 Atl. 88G; 16 L. R. A. 707, 30 Am. St. Rep. 358; Ruggles v. Jewett, 213 Mass. 167, 99 N. E. 1092; In re Miller's Will. 159 N. C. 123, 74 S. E. 888: Trenton Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Armstrong, 70 N. J. Eq. 572, 62 Atl. 456; In re Holbrook's Estate, 213 Pa. 93, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 545,

110 Am. St. Rep. 537, 5 Ann. Cas. 137, 62 Atl. 368; Selden v. Keen, 27 Crat. (Va.) 576.

60. See editorial note in 10 Columbia Law Rev. at p. 758.

In Jones v. Jones, 1 Q. B. D. 279. that the provision in reference to marriage was in the form of a condition was not regarded as indicating a purpose to restrain marriage.

61. 3 Jarman, Wills, 893.

Of such a character is a condition that the tenant of the estate shall not take the profits of the land,62 or that he shall lease it at a named rent,63 as is a condition prohibiting a tenant in fee simple or fee tail from aliening the land,64 or the widow of such a tenant from claiming dower.65 And the tendency is adverse to the support of conditions which are merely the result of caprice, and are not calculated to benefit any individual or the community generally.66

The courts have usually regarded as valid and enforcible a condition restrictive of the mode of utilization of the land conveyed or devised, a condition, for instance, which gives in effect a right of reentry in case the property is used,67 or ceases to be used, for a particular kind of business,68 or for public69 or religious purposes.70 A condition as to the size, character or location of the structure to be erected on the laud has also been held to be valid.71

62. Co. Litt. 206b; Sheppard's Touchstone 131, 132; Moor v. Sa-vill, 2 Leon 132; Compare Pav-kovich v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 150 Cal. 39, 87 Pac. 1097.

63. Attorney General v. Catherine Hall, Jac. 395; Attorney General v. Greenhill, 33 Beav. 193.

64. Gray, Restraints, Alien. Prop. Sec.Sec. 19, 23. 77. See, on the question of conditions and stipulations involving restraints on the alienation of property, post Sec. 592.

65. Perkins, Conveyancing, Sec. 731; 2 Jarman, Wills, 854.

66. In Mitchell v. Leavitt, 30 Conn. 587, it is said that "a restriction on the use of real estate, where it does not appear that either some individual or the public would be benefited by it, would be contrary to public policy and void." In Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin it is provided by statute that conditions annexed to a grant or conveyance which are merely nominal, and evince no intention of actual or substantial benefit to those in whose favor they are to be performed, may be wholly disregarded. How. Ann. St. Mich. 1912, Sec. 10668; Gen. St. Minn. 1913, Sec. 6695; Wis. St. 1913, Sec. 2070. See Barrie v. Smith, 47 Mich. 130, 10 N. W. 168; Johnson v. Warren, 74 Mich. 491, 42 N. W. 74; Sioux City & St. P. R. Co. v. Singer, 49 Minn. 301, 15 L. R. A. 751, 32 Am. St. Rep. 554, 51 N. W. 905; Pepin Co. v. Prindle, 61 Wis. 301, 21 N. W. 254.

A condition that windows shall not be put in one wall of a house is valid; while a condition that there shall be no windows in the house, or no passage in or out, would, it has been said, be invalid. Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 284.

67. Southard v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 26 N. J. L. 13; Seeck v. Jakel, 71 Ore. 35, L. R. A. 1915A, 679, 141 Pac. 11.

A condition providing that intoxicating; liquor shall not be sold on the land conveyed, or shall be sold only to a limited extent, has been upheld in a considerable number of cases.72 And a condition providing for the

68. Sperry's Lessee v. Pond, 5 Ohio 387, 24 Am. Dec. 296; Reed v. Hatch, 55 N. H. 327; Allen v. Howe, 105 Mass. 241; Langley v. Chapin, 134 Mass. 82; See Sherman v. Town of Jefferson, 274 111. 294, 113 N. E. 624.

69. Pepin County v. Prindle, 61 Wis. 301, 21 N. W. 254; May v. City of Boston, 158 Mass. 21, 32 N. E. 902.

70. Wilcoxon v. Harrison, 32 Ga. 480; Grissom v. Hill, 17 Ark. 483.

71. Adams v. Valentine. 33 Fed. 1; Firth v. Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, Ann. Cas. 1912D 1190, 116 Pac. 729; Hoyt v. Ketcham, 54 Conn. 60, 5 Atl. 606; Wakefield v. Van Tassell, 202 111. 41, 65 L. R. A. 511, 95 Am. St. Rep. 207, 66 N. E. 830, writ of error dismissed 192 U. S. 601, 48 L. Ed. 583 (mem. dec): Gibert v. Peteler, 38 N. Y. 165, 97 Am. Dec. 785; Duester v. Alvin, 74 Ore. 544, 145 Pac. 660; McKissick v. Pickle, 16 Pa. St. 140. But see Klasener v. Robinson, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1032, 100 S. W. 255.

72. Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co., 100 U. S. 55, 25 L. Ed. 547; Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Blaisdell, 33 Cal. App. 239, 164 Pac. 804;

Collins Mfg. Co. v. Marcy, 25 Conn. 242; Fushu v. Dacono Town Site Co., 60 Colo. 315, Ann. Cas. 1917C 108, 153 Pac. 226; Star Brewery v. Primas, 163 111. 652, 45 N. E. 145. aff'g 59 111. App. 581; O'Brien v. Wetherell, 14 Kan. 616; Hatcher v. Andrews, 5 Bush. (Ky.), 561; Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314, 56 Am. Rep. 391, 22 N. W. 816; Whealkate Min. Co. v. Mu-lari, 152 Mich. 607, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147, 116 N. W. 360; Sioux City & S. P. R. Co. v. Singer, 49 Minn. 301, 15 L. R. A. 751, 32 Am. St. Rep. 554, 51 N. W. 905; Plumb v. Tubbs, 41 N. Y. 442.

In Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Tremper, 75 Mich. 36, 4 L. R. A. 373, 13 Am. St. Rep. 420, 42 N. W. 532, such a condition was regarded as invalid when inserted for the purpose of aiding in the establishment of a local monopoly, and this decision was followed in Burdell v. Grandi, 152 Cal. 376. 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 909, 125 Am. St. Rep. 61, 92 Pac. 1022. But in a later Michigan decision (Wheel-kate Min. Co. v. Mulari. 152 Mich. 607, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147, 116 N. W. 360) the earlier decision was placed on a different ground.

R. P.-19 improvement of the land in a particular manner appears to be valid.73

Conditions requiring the grantee or devisee of property to live thereon are usually regarded as valid.74