"The case of Bank vs. Hume, 128 U. S., 195; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 41, is not in point. The moneys there used were in truth the property of the husband, although he was insolvent, and he used some of his property to purchase insurance for the benefit of his wife and children. The Supreme Court held that a policy of insurance taken out by the husband in the name and for the benefit of the wife made the contract a contract with the wife, and that even though the premiums were paid by the insolvent husband, with moneys which, or some part of which, ought to have been used for the payment of his debts, yet, if there were no fraud as between the wife and the company, the wife could hold the policy as against the creditors of the husband, except the amount which had been wrongfully used in the payment of premiums. If the amount of the husband's estate used to pay the premiums were no more than reasonable and moderate under the circumstances, it was further held that the creditors could not recover back the moneys so paid for them, although the husband was, at the time of their payment, insolvent. It was said the interest insured did not belong to the husband or his creditors; that the contracts were not payable to the husband, his representatives, or his creditors; that no fraud on the part of the wife, the children, or the insurance company was shown or pretended; and that there was no gift or transfer of the debtor's property, unless the amounts paid for premiums were to be held as excessive. That is a very different case from the one under consideration. It was no trust fund (within the meaning of that term when used to authorize the following thereof) which went to pay for the policy in that case. The moneys belonged to and were the property of the husband. They might, under certain circumstances, be reached in proceedings after judgment and return of execution, but the title was in the husband and he used his own property to procure the insurance. Having done so, the policy thus procured became a contract with the wife, and her insurable interest in her husband's life was thus made effectual. The creditors could not follow the moneys into other property, and demand such property. No principle of following trust funds was involved.

"In this case, however, there is the fact which alters and colors the whole transaction, and is fundamental and controlling in its nature, and that fact is that the moneys which procured the insurance were trust moneys, and, although invested in the policies, they were subject at the very moment of such investment to the right of the owner of the funds to follow them into whatever change of form they might assume, and to claim the thing into which they were changed as if it were the original fund. In the case in the Federal court, the whole matter was discussed with reference to the violation of the Statute of Connecticut, based upon the statute of Elizabeth (13 Eliz., c. 5), prohibiting the transfer of the property of an individual in fraud of his creditors. We have a statute to the same effect, 2 Rev. St., p. 137, Sec. 1. The learned chief justice said, that the statute was passed to prevent debtors from dealing with their property to the prejudice of their creditors, but dealing with that which creditors irrespective of such dealing could not have touched was within neither the letter nor the spirit of the statute. This was spoken of the insurable interest of the wife, and it was spoken in regard to creditors as that term is generally used. In this case it is not in the simple character of a creditor of Mr. Gilman, or of the defendant, Mrs. Gilman, that the plaintiff asks relief. He seeks the aid of a court of equity to enable him, in the character of a cestui que trust, to follow his property which was wrongfully converted by one bearing towards him the obligations of a trustee, and by such trustee invested in these policies, and such cestui que trust now asks, in substance, for his own property, or for the property into which his trust funds were wrongfully converted; and we think he has the right to recover the property which represents and stands in the place of the original trust fund. The case in the Federal court is not at all parallel, and is, therefore, no authority against our contention. Whether at common law or under the provisions of our statute the procurement of policies of insurance in the wife's name, under the facts developed in this case, does not prevent the cestui que trust from following and claiming the trust funds or their proceeds, if the proceeds of these policies had been greater than the whole amount of the indebtedness of the husband to the cestui que trust, arising out of the husband's breach of trust, we do not decide what might be in equity the different rights of the wife and cestui que trust in the balance, or whether any different rule could be logically applied. The husband in this case converted over $200,000 of what stood in the nature of a trust fund, and the plaintiff recovers only a little over one-fourth thereof in case the judgment on the referee's report be affirmed. We simply decide the case now before us. As to other questions discussed in the defendant's brief, we have carefully considered them, and we think there is no error in the result arrived at by the referee. The order of the general term is therefore reversed, and the judgment entered upon the report of the referee is affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff at general term and in this court. All concur. Judgment accordingly."