This section is from the book "The Constitutional Law Of The United States", by Westel Woodbury Willoughby. Also available from Amazon: Constitutional Law.
Shares of stock in incorporated companies may be viewed either as property in the hands of their holders or as representing the property of the company. Thus they are viewed in the latter light when their value is taken as measuring the value of the property of the company for the purposes of a property tax upon that company. In such cases, as we have seen, tangible property of the company permanently located outside of the State may not be as was justly observed by counsel, that the non-resident holder and owner of a bond secured by a mortgage in that State owns any real estate there. A mortgage being there a mere chose in action, it only confers upon the holder, or the party for whose benefit the mortgage is given, a right to proceed against the property mortgaged, upon a given contingency, to enforce, by its sale, the payment of his demand. This right has no locality independent of the party in whom it resides. It may undoubtedly be taxed by the State when held by a resident therein, but when held by a non-resident it is as much beyond the jurisdiction of the State as the person of the owner.
"It is undoubtellly true that the actual situs of personal property which has a visible and tangible existence, and not the domicile of its owner, will, in many cases, determine the State in which it may be taxed. The same tiling is true of public securities consisting of state bonds and bonds of municipal bodies, and circulating notes of banking institutions; the former, by general usage, have acquired the character of and are treated as property, in the place where they are found, though removed from the domicile of the owner; the latter are treated and pass as money wherever they are. But other personal property, consisting of bonds, mortgages, and debts generally, has no situs independent of the domicile of the owner, and certainly can have none where the instruments, as in the present case, constituting the evidence of debt, are not separated from the possession of the owners." included in the appraisement. The States may also levy a license tax upon a domestic corporation, that is, upon its right not simply to be, but to do business within the State, and this license tax it may measure by the value of the capital stock. Also a State may levy a similar tax upon a foreign corporation, unless engaged in interstate commerce, the payment of which is made a condition precedent to its right to enter the State and to do business therein, and measure this tax by the nominal or market value of the capital stock of the company. In both of these cases the tax is not, in reality, upon the capital stock, but is measured by it.46 The present section will be concerned with the taxation of corporate stock as intangible personal property in the hands of its holders or owners.
The declaration of the court in the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds would, if strictly pursued, have prevented the levying of such a tax upon non-resident holders of the stock of domestic corporations, upon the principle of mobilia sequuntur personam. In Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank,47 however, the court held that, as to shares of stock at least, this principle does not reasonably apply, and that, for purposes of taxation, these shares may be separated from the person of their owner and given a situs where the corporation has its situs, namely, at the place of its incorporation. The court in that case say:
"The question is then presented whether the General Assembly, having complete jurisdiction over the person and the property, could seperate a bank share from the person of the owner for the purposes of taxation. It has never been doubted that it was a proper exercise of legislative power and discretion to separate the interest of a partner in partnership property from his person for that purpose, and to cause him to be taxed on its account at the place where the business of the partnership was carried on. And this, too, without reference to the character of the business or the property. The partnership may have been formed for the purpose Constitutional Limitations Upon Taxing Powers. 959 of carrying on mercantile, banking, brokerage or stock business. The property may be tangible or intangible, goods on the shelf or debts due for goods sold. The interest of the partner in all the property is made taxable at the place where the business is located. "A share of bank stock may be in itself intangible, but it represents that which is tangible. It represents money or property invested in the capital stock of the bank. That capital is employed in business by the bank, and the business is very likely carried on at a place other than the residence of some of the shareholders. The shareholder is protected in his person by the government at the place where he resides; but his property in this stock is protected at the place where the bank transacts the business. If he were a partner in a private bank doing business at the same place, he might be taxed there on account of his interest in the partnership. It is not easy to. see why, upon the same principle, he may not be taxed there on account of his stock in an incorporated bank. His business is there as much in the one case as in the other. He requires for it the protection of the government there, and it seems reasonable that he should be compelled to contribute there to the expenses of maintaining that government. It certainly cannot be an abuse of legislative discretion to require him to do so. If it is not, the General Assembly can rightfully locate his shares there for the purposes of taxation." 48
46 But see 74. and especially W. U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190, and The Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232.
47 19 Wall. 490; 22 L. ed. 189.
48 In criticism of this argument, Professor J. H. Beale, Jr., in the Harvard Law Review (XVII, 254), says: "But it is submitted that the supposed distinction between bonds and stocks in this respect does not exist. It is true, as has been seen, that the owner is taxable upon the capital and proceeds of a business where that business is carried on, and that a partner in a firm is therefore taxable on the value of a firm business where the firm acts; and that in many ways the shareholder in a private corporation is like a partner. But the very difference in their legal position should lead to a difference in taxation. The partner is taxed on the business of the firm because he is the legal representative of the business; there is no one else to tax. The tax paid by the partners is the tax and the only tax on the firm. But the corporation, being a legal entity, is itself, as has been seen, taxed upon the business done; to tax the stockholders also upon it is to tax the very same thing twice. The legal interest of the partner in the business is that of the owner; the legal interest of the stockholder is not that of the owner but of the creditor; to him is due from the corporation
The doctrine declared in Tappan v. National Bank, though difficult to harmonize with prior decisions, is declared in Corry v. Baltimore49 to be conclusively established.50
 
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