It will be observed that the act vesting admiralty jurisdiction in the district courts saves to suitors, in all cases, their right to a common-law remedy, where that law is competent to give it. The effect of this provision is not to permit the state courts to exercise in any way admiralty jurisdiction, but to give to the suitor the option of pursuing in those courts any common-law right that he may have.11 vessel. This is conclusively determined in The Moses Taylor12 and Hine v. Trevor.13

But in no case may a state court entertain a suit in the nature of an admiralty proceeding, that is, a proceeding in rem against a

11 Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U. S. 99; 23 L. ed. 819.

But though the state courts may not exercise admiralty jurisdiction, it has been held that the state legislatures may by statute create maritime rights, which the federal district courts, sitting as admiralty tribunals, will enforce. In other words, the state law-making body may create admiralty rights which the state courts may not enforce as such, but which the federal courts may.14

In The Lottawanna case the court say: "It seems to be settled in our jurisprudence that so long as Congress does not interpose to regulate the subject, the rights of material men furnishing necessaries to a vessel in her home port may be regulated in each State by state legislation. State laws, it is true, cannot exclude the contract for furnishing such necessaries from the domain of admiralty jurisdiction, for it is a maritime contract, and they cannot alter the limits of that jurisdiction; nor can they confer it upon the state courts so far as to enable them to proceed in rem for the enforcement of liens created by such state laws, for it is exclusively conferred upon the District Courts of the United States. They can only authorize the enforcement thereof by common-law remedies, or such remedies as are equivalent thereto. But the District Courts of the United States having jurisdiction of the contract as a maritime one, may enforce liens given for its security, even when created by state laws."

The court go on to admit that this is a somewhat anomalous practice, but in justification say: "The practice . . . has existed from the origin of the government and, perhaps, was originally superinduced by the fact that prior to the adoption of the Constitution, liens of this sort created by state laws had been enforced by state courts of admiralty; and as those courts were immediately succeeded by the District Courts of the United States, and in several instances the judge of the state court was transferred to the district court, it was natural, in the infancy of federal legislation in commercial subjects, for the latter courts to entertain jurisdiction over the same class of cases, in every respect, as the state courts had done, without due regard to the new relations which the States had assumed toward the maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction."

12 4 Wall. 411; 18 L. ed. 397. 13 4 Wall. 655; 13 L. ed. 451.

14 The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; 22 L. ed. 654; and The Glide, 167 U. S. 606; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 930; 42 L. ed. 296.

In Butler v. Boston Steamship Co.15 a limitation upon the power of the States to create maritime liens which the federal courts will recognize and enforce is suggested, though not definitely declared. In that case Justice Bradley, after applying an act of Congress in modification of the federal maritime law, and with reference to a cause arising within the territorial limits of a State, said: "It might be a much more serious question whether a state law can have force to create a liability in a maritime case at all, within the dominion of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, where neither the general maritime law nor an act of Congress has created such a liability. On this subject we prefer not to express an opinion." This dictum would, however, appear to be overruled in Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Gilmore.14a

The Supreme Court has, however, held that until Congress acts on the subject a State may legislate in regard to the duties and liabilities of its citizens and corporations while on the high seas and not within the territory of any other sovereign, and that where a fund is being distributed in a proceeding to limit the liability of the owners of a vessel all claims to which the admiralty does not deny existence must be recognized whether admiralty liens or not In this ease the vessel belonged to a Delaware corporation. The law of Delaware gave damages for death caused by a tort. The vessel was in collision with another vessel belonging also to a Delaware corporation. It w,as held that claim against the owner of one of the vessels in fault for such death can be enforced in a proceeding in the admiralty brought by such owner to limit its liability.14b

In The Lottawanna case it is pointed out that the general doctrines of maritime law as they are to be deduced from the practice of civilized nations, from the decisions of their courts, and from the comments of scientific writers, are, in the absence of congressional statute to the contrary, to guide the federal courts in the administration of their admiralty jurisdiction.16

14a 207 U. S. 398; 52 L. ed. 264.

14b The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398; 2S Sup. Ct. Rep. 133; 52 L. ed. 264.