Sec 402

An agreement to solicit legislative action by the use of private personal influence on members individually is void as against the policy of the law.6 A fortiori, a promise made to a member of a legislature in consideration of his voting in a particular way is void.7 But an agreement between a landowner and the promoter of a railroad that the land-owner, whose land is affected by a proposed railroad, will withdraw his opposition on the payment of a sum of money, has been held in England not to be invalidated by the fact that the land-owner is a member of the legislature, his vote not being part of the consideration.1 - In this country it is settled that agreements by which parties are to be allowed contingent fees for procuring specific legislation are void as against public policy; and on this ground it has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States that a plaintiff was not entitled to recover on an agreement by which he was to be paid for his services as agent in procuring certain legislation conditionally on his efforts being successful.2 "Bribes," said Grier, J.,3 " in the shape of high contingent compensation, must necessarily lead to the use of improper means and the exercise of undue influence. Their necessary consequence is the demoralization of the agent who covenants for them; he is soon brought to believe that any means which will produce so beneficial a result to himself are ' proper means;' and that a share of these profits may have the same effect of quickening the perceptions and warming the zeal of influential or 'careless' members in favor of the bill."4 This, however, is not to be considered as conflicting with the "right of the citizen to appear Before the legislature or any other public body in person, or by a paid agent or attorney, for the purpose of asserting his just claims or urging the adoption of any measure of public or private utility."1 Hence the rule before us does not preclude a valid agreement being made for professional services before a legislature.2 But when the object Agreement privately to influence legislature is invalid.

1 Bisp. Eq. 3d ed. sec 547. See Wh. & Tu. Lead. Cas. in Eq. 4th Am. ed. 1435, 1508-10; citing Hope v. Hope, 8 D. M. & G. 731; Vansittart v. Vansit-tart, 4 K. & J. 62; 2 De G. & J. 249.

2 Curtis v. Curtis, 5 Gray, 535; Van Artsdalen v. Van Artsdalen, 14 Penn. St. 384; Com. v. Gilkeson, 1 Phila. 194; 5 Clark, 30; Com. v. Dougherty, 1 Leg. Gaz. (Phil.) 63; Mercein v. People, 25 Wend. 64; State v. Smith, 6 Greenl. 462 (a case going to the extreme limit).

3 Torrens v. Campbell, 74 Penn. St. 470.

4 Wald's Pollock, 304, citing Swift v. Swift, 34 Beav. 266; Hamilton v. Hector, 6 Ch. 705; 13 Eq. 520.

5 Bispham's Eq. sec 547. By act 36 Vict. c. 12, such agreements are, under certain conditions, validated.

6 Story's Eq. Jur. 12th ed. sec 293 b;.

Edwards v. R. R., 1 My. & C. 650; Marshall v. R. R., 16 How. 314; Me-guire v. Corwine, 101 U. S. 1,08; Usher v. McBratney, 3 Dill. 385; Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274; Pingry v. Washburn, 1 Aik. 264; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152; Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543; Harris v. Roof, 10 Barb. 489; Rose v. Truax, 21 Barb. 361; Smith p. Applegate, 3 Zab. 352; Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152; Clippenger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W..& S. 315; Martin p. R. R., 3 Phila. 316; Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana, 366; McBratney v. Chandler, 22 Kan. 692; Cummings p. Saux, 30 La. An. Part I. 207.

7 Leake, 2d ed. 725. Per cur. How-den v. Simpson, 10 Ad. & El. 821. To same general effect, see Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472; Harris v. Roof, 10 Barb. 489; Bell v. Quinn, 2 Sandf. 146; Gulick v. Ward, 5 Halst. 87.

1 Howden v. Simpson, 10 A. & E. 821. Howden v. Simpson, if it is to be regarded as sustaining an agreement by a member of a legislature to give up for money bis opposition to a bill, not only would be held bad law in this country, but the parties to such an agreement would be held indictable for bribery. See Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. sec 1858. The ruling is excused by Mr. Pollock on the ground (certainly peculiar to England) that "in practice there is little chance of a conflict between duty and interest, as the legislature generally informs itself on these matters by means of committees proceeding in a quasi-judicial manner. Of course," he adds, "it would be improper for a member personally interested to sit on such a committee." There can be no objection, it is true, to a member of the legislature making business arrangements as to matters to come before the legislature, provided that such arrangements do not touch his political action. A member of congress who is a stockholder in a national bank, is not precluded from selling his stock from the fact that such banks are under control of congress. But a bargain made by him involving in any way his action as a member of congress is not only void as a contract, but is an indictable conspiracy. As to the point in Howden v. Simpson, that a party to a road procedure may make a valid contract as to his course in the liti-gation, see Weeks v.Lippencott,42Penn. St. 474; Young v. Burtman, 1 Phil. 203; Smith v. Applegate, 3 Zab. 352.

2 Marshall v. R. R., 16 How. 314; Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45; see Rose v. Truax, 21 Barb. 361.

3 16 How. 335.

4 See, also, Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472; Frost v. Belmont, 7 Allen, 152; Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200; Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana, 366.

1 Smith's L. C. 7th Am. ed. 692, citing Sedgwick v. Stanton, 4 Kern. 289; Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273; Win-penny v. French, 18 Ohio St. 469; Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200; Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana, 366; Denison v. Crawford Co., 48 Iowa, 211.

2 Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273; Win-penny v. French, 18 Oh'. St. 469.

The distinction is thus stated by Field, J., in Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261: "In Trist p. Child, reported in 21st of Wallace, the distinction is drawn between the use of personal influence to secure legislation and legitimate professional services in making the legislature acquainted with the merits of the measures desired. Whilst the former is condemned, the latter are, within certain limits, regarded as appropriate subjects for compensation. There the defendant had employed the plaintiff to get a bill passed by congress for an appropriation to pay a claim against the United States. It was considered by the court to have been a contract for lobby services, and adjudged void as against public policy. Other similar cases were mentioned by the court, and, after observing that in all of them the contract was held to be against public policy and void, it added, speaking through Mr. Justice Swayne: 'We entertain no doubt that in such cases, as under all other circumstances, an agreement, express or implied, for purely professional services is valid. Within this category are included drafting the petition to set forth the claim, attending to the taking of testimony, collecting facts, preparing arguments, and submitting them orally or in writing to a committee or other proper authority, and other services of like character. All these things are intended to reach only the reason of those sought to be influenced. They rest on the same principle of ethics as professional services rendered in a court of justice, and are no more exceptionable. But such services are separated by a broad line of demarcation from personal solicitation, and the other means and appliances which the correspondence shows were resorted to in this case.' " See supra, sec 370.