The cases of which we have just been speaking, and which require an express disclaimer to avoid the effect of the contract, are all cases in which an interest was acquired in permanent property to which liabilities attached, or in which the contract entered into by the infant involved continuous rights, duties, and liabilities. If, on the other hand, the promise of the infant is to perform some isolated act. or if the contract is wholly executory, it will not be binding on him unless he expressly ratifies it on coming of age.14 As we have seen, if a person who has entered into a partnership during his minority fails to disaffirm the agreement after reaching his ma-jority, and so holds himself out as a partner, he will be liable for debts of the firm contracted after he became of age; but he will not be liable for debts of the firm contracted during his minority, unless he ratifies them.15 Some courts hold that his ratification of the partnership agreement is a ratification of debts of the firm contractgations attached to it which they were bound to discharge, and have thereby been placed in a situation analogous to an infant purchaser of real estate, who has taken possession, and thereby becomes liable to all the obligations attached to the estate; for instance, to pay rent in the case of a lease rendering rent, * * * unless they have elected to waive or disagree the purchase altogether, either during infancy or at full age, at either of which times it is competent for an infant to do so." See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 57; Cent. Din. §§ 186-148, 151.

12 Goode v. Harrison, 5 Barn. & Ald. 159; Miller v. Sims, 2 Hill (S. C.) 479. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 57; Cent. Dig. §§ 136-1',8, 151.

13 Lumsden's Case, 4 Ch. App. 31. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 57; Cent. Dig. §§ 136-148, 151.

14 Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 4G0, 7 Am. Dec. 229; Carrell v. Totter, 23 Mich. 379; Savage v. Lichlyter, 59 Ark. 1, 26 S. W. 12. See, also, post, p. 206. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Keg-No.) § 57; Cent. Dig. §§ 186-148, 151.

15 Tobey v. Wood, 123 Mass. 88, 25 Am. Rep. 27; Todd v. Clapp, 118 Mass. 495; Bush v. Lintliinmi. 59 Md. 344. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 57; Cent. Dig. §§ 186-148, 152.

ed during his minority,18 and this would seem the proper doctrine; but the contrary has been held.17

Same - Who May Avoid Contract

99. The privilege of infancy is personal to the infant, and he alone can take advantage of it during his life and sanity.

100. On his death, or if he becomes insane, his contracts may be avoided by his heirs, personal representatives, or conservator or guardian.

101. The other party to the contract, not being himself under disability, is bound if the infant chooses to hold him.

The privilege of infancy is intended to protect the infant, and during his life and sanity he alone can take advantage of it.18 It is even held that his guardian cannot avoid his contracts for him, though there is some dictum to the contrary.19 On his death, however, or if he becomes insane, his contracts may be avoided by his heirs,20 his personal representatives,21 or his guardian or conservator.22 The reason of the rule, it has been said, extends only to them because the privilege is conferred for his sole benefit. While living, he should be the exclusive judge of that benefit, and when dead those alone should interfere who legally represent him. Could his contracts be avoided by third persons, the principle would operate, not for his, but for their, benefit; not when he chose to avail himself of his privileges, but when strangers elected to do it.23

16 Salinas v. Bennett, 33 S. G. 285, 11 S. E. 968; Miller v. Sims, 2 Hill (S. C.) 479. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 57; Cent. Dig. §§ 186-148, 151.

17 Mehlhop v. Rae, 90 Iowa, 30, 57 N. W. 650; Crabtree v. May, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 289; Minock v. Shortridge, 21 Mich. 304. And see eases cited in note 15, supra. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 57; Cent. Dig. §§ 186-148, 151.

18 Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 511, Ewell's Cas. 17; Holt v. Ward Clar-encieux, 2 Strange, 937; Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. 272, 8 Am. Dec. 101; MANSFIELD v. GORDON, 144 Mass. 168, 10 N. E. 773, Throckmorton, Cas. Contracts, 137; Harris v. Ross, 112 Ind. 314, 13 N. E. 873; Hartness v. Thompson, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 160; Beardsley v. Hotchkiss, 96 N. Y. 201; Baldwin v. Rosier (C. C.) 48 Fed. 810; Hooper v. Payne, 94 Ala. 223, 10 South. 431; Chambers v. Ker, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 373, 24 S. W. 1118; Dentler v. O'Brien, 56 Ark. 49, 19 S. W. Ill; Holmes v. Rice, 45 Mich. 142, 7 N. W. 772; Garner v. Cook, 30 Ind. 331; Oliver v. Houdlet, 13 Mass. 237, 7 Am. Dec 134; Van Bramer v. Cooper, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 279; Alsworth v. Cordtz, 31 Miss. 32. In an action, for instance, for enticing away a servant from plaintiff's service, the defendant cannot escape liability by showing that the servant was an infant, and was therefore not bound by his contract with the plaintiff. Keane v. Boycott, supra. The surety on a bond given by an infant, and afterwards disaffirmed by him, has been held liable. Kyger v. Sipe, 89 Va. 507, 16 S. E. 627. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 58; Cent. Dig. §150.

19 See Oliver v. Houdlet, 13 Mass. 240, 7 Am. Dec. 134; Irvine's Heirs v. Crockett, 4 Bibb (Ky.) 437; Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508, 93 Am. Dec. 117; Cf. Stafford v. Roof, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 626; post, p. 205. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 58; Cent. Dig. § 150.

The other party to the contract, not being himself under a disability to contract, cannot avoid it. He is bound if the infant chooses to hold him by ratifying the contract on becoming of age.24 A court of equity, however, will not grant an infant specific performance of a contract by the adult.25 Of course, those contracts which are held void, and not merely voidable, at the infant's option, are of no effect at all, and can bind neither party.

20 Illinois Land & Loan Co. v. Bonner, 75 I11. 315; Harvey v. Briggs, 68 Miss. 60, 8 South. 274, 10 L. R. A. 62; Searcy v. Hunter, 81 Tex. 644, 17 S. W. 372, 26 Am. St. Rep. 837; Veal v. Fortson, 57 Tex. 487; Ferguson v. Bell's Adm'r, 17 Mo. 351; Levering v. Heighe, 2 Md. Ch. 81, 88; Breckenridge's Heirs v. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 248, 19 Am. Dec. 71. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 58; Cent. Dig, § 150.

21 Parsons v. Hill, 8 Mo. 135; Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 207; Person v. Chase, 37 Vt. 650, 88 Am. Dec. 630; Jefford's Adm'r v. Ringgold, 6 Ala. 547; Hussey v. Jewett, 9 Mass. 100; Smith v. Mayo, 9 Mass. 62, 6 Am. Dec. 28; Breckenridge's Heirs v. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 248, 19 Am. Dec. 71. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 58; Cent. Dig. § 150.

22Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508, 93 Am. Dec. 117. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 58; Cent. Dig. § 150.

23MANSFIELD v. GORDON, 144 Mass. 168, 10 N. E. 773, Throckmorton, Cas. Contracts, 137. Though ordinarily a plea of Infancy is personal, a beneficiary in a policy on the infant's life may plead it in answer to the company's defense of false warranties in the application; for otherwise an infant's contract of insurance would be in effect binding on him during his minority. O'Rourke v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 R. I. 457, 50 Atl. 834, 57 L. R. A. 496, 91 Am. St. Rep. 643. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 58; Cent. Dig. § 150. *

24Holt v. Ward Clarencieux, 2 Strange, 937; Thompson v. Hamilton, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 425, 23 Am. Dec. 619; Hunt v. Peake, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 475, 15 Am. Dec. 475; Field v. Herrick, 101 111. 110. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 47, 58; Cent. Dig. § 150.

25 Flight v. Bolland, 4 Russ. 298. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 58; Cent. Dig. § 150.