Ins. Co. 54 N. T. 193; Franklin Ins. Co. v. Martin, 11 Vroom, 568; Ashworth v. Builders' Ins. Co. 112 Muss. 422.

1 Morse v. Buffalo Ins. Co. 30 Wis. 534, was to the point that a policy on a steamboat, prohibiting the use or keeping of "gunpowder, camphene, spirit-gas, naphtha, benzine, benzole, chemical, crude, or refined coal or earth oils," was not avoided by the use of kerosene oil to light the cabin and saloon. See Mears v. Humboldt Ins. Co. 92 Penn. St. 16, as to the construction of the words "keep or have " and "use" in an insurance policy.

[book iii said generally, that warranties, restrictions, or declarations, of this kind, are construed somewhat liberally towards * the which the alteration may occasion, must be paid, otherwise no benefit will arise to the assured in case of loss. The assured, who was a cabinet-maker, placed a small engine on the premises, with a boiler attached, and used it in a heated state for the purpose of turning a lathe, not in the course of his business, but for the purpose of ascertaining by experiment whether it was worth his while to buy it to be used in that business; and after the engine had been on the premises for several days, a fire happened. It was held that a policy was avoided, and that whether the engine was introduced for experiment as an improved means of carrying on the plaintiff's business, whether used for a longer or shorter time, or whether the fire was occasioned by the working of the steam-engine or not, were immaterial questions. Glen v. Lewis, 8 Exch. 607, 20 Eng. L. & Eq. 364, Parke, B.: "Now the clause in question implies, that the simple introduction of a steam-engine, without having fire applied to it, will not affect the policy; but if used with fire-heat, it will; and nothing being said about the intention of the parties as to the particular use of it, and as, if it be used, the danger is precisely the same, with whatever object it is used, it seems to us that it makes no difference whether it is used upon trial with the intent of ascertaining whether it will succeed or not, or as an approved means of carrying on the plaintiffs business, nor does it make any difference that it is used for a longer or a shorter time. The terms of the conditions apply to the introduction of a steam-engine in a heated state at any time, without notice to the company, so as to afford an opportunity to them to ascertain whether it will increase the risk or not. The clause proceeds to provide that every such alteration must be allowed by indorsement on the policy, and the premium paid, and if not, no benefit will arise to the insured in case of loss. The expression 'alteration' is inaccurate; but it obviously means to embrace all the circumstances before mentioned, though all are net, properly speaking, alterations. This appears to be the natural and ordinary construction of this part of the contract, and it is far from unreasonable. In such cases, which are unquestionably likely to increase the risk, the company stipulate for notice in clear terms, in order that they may consider whether they will continue their liability, and on what terms. There is not a word to confine the introduction of the steam-engine to its intended use as an instrument or auxiliary in carrying on the business in the premises insured. If a construction had already been put on the clause precisely similar in any decided case, we should: defer to that authority. But, in truth, there is none. All the cases upon this subject depend upon the construction of different instruments, and there is none precisely like this. Indeed, it seems not improbable that the terms of this policy have been adopted, as suggested by Sir F. Thesiger, to prevent the effect of previous decisions; the provision that 'no description of fire-heat shall be introduced' in consequence of the ruling of Lord Tenterden, in Dobson v. Sotheby. 1 Moody & M. 90, and the addition of 'process or operation' to trade or business, to prevent the application of that of Shaw v. Robberds, 6 A. & E. 75. The latter case is the only one which approaches the present One cannot help feeling that the construction of the policy in that case may have been somewhat influenced by the apparent hardship of avoiding it, by reason of the accidental and charitable use of the kiln, the subject of the insurance. The court considered the conditions in that case to refer to alterations, either in the buildings or the business, and to those only. Here the introduction of steam-engines, or any other description of fire-heat, is specifically pointed at, and expressly provided for. If, in that case, the condition had been (inter alia) that no bark should be dried in the kiln, without notice to the company, which would have resembled this case, we are far from thinking that the court could have held that the drying which took place, did not avoid the policy, by reason of being an extraordinary occurrence and a charity. We are therefore of opinion, that the defendant is entitled to our judgment, and that the material part of the second plea is proved." See Sillem v. Thornton, 3 Ellis & B. 868. Where there was a warranty that certain mills should be worked "by day only," a plea that a "steam-engine and horizontal shafts, being parts of the mills were worked by night," was adjudged bad, because it did not appear that the mills were worked "as a part might always be at work to supply water." Mavall v. Mitford, 6 A. & E. 670. See Whitehead v. Price, 2 Cromp. M. & R. 447. The description in an application for insurance of a building insured, and somewhat strictly towards the insurers.1 It would be reason enough for this, that the insurers frame the policy as they choose, and may make its language as strict as they think proper.

The words which describe the property insured, are construed according to the common meaning of such words as they are commonly used; thus "merchandise" does not include any fixed or movable implements, then in the store, but only what was bought to be sold again. (ss)