1 Permission to engage in sea service on the "prior payment any year of an additional premium" requires such a payment every year of continuance in sea service Ayer v. New Eng. Ins. Co., 109 Mass. 430.

Policies are sometimes especially made to cover * what may be called war risks, or the risks of soldiers or officers in war; 2 or are made to cover those risks by liberty given on a common policy.

Trades or occupations deemed extra-hazardous, as employment about gunpowder, or steam-engines, are sometimes enumerated; and either altogether prohibited, or admitted upon an extra premium.

Death by the hands of justice is now excepted in all our policies. Before this provision was inserted in life policies, the question came before the courts whether this exception was not made by the policy of the law; and it would seem to be held that it was so prohibited. (d) 3 We incline to think that the same ruling cepted, and to reside in California." The insured went to Vera Cruz, and then across the country to San Blas, a distance of one thousand miles, and thence by sea to San Francisco, where he arrived in good health, and died three years afterwards. The court were not agreed on the exact construction to be put on the permit, but held, that as the defendants knew the route which the insured had gone, and afterwards received the annual premiums, they had waived their right to such a defence. In Taylor v. AEtna Ins. Co. 13 Gray, 434, the policy permitted the insured to pass between certain ports, "on first-class decked vessels." It was held that the policy was not forfeited by the assured going as a steerage passenger in such vessels, in the absence of any evidence to show that life was less safe in the steerage. In Baldwin v. N. Y. Ins. Co. 3 Bosw. 530, permission was given the life-insured to reside and travel by land or by any of the regular sea steamers in any part of the United States, "to be north of the south bounds of Virginia by the 10th of July." The person went to Florida, and on the 11th of June was seized with sickness, and was too sick to travel, and died there July 20th. Held, that the insurers were not exempt from liability. See Notman v. Anchor Ass. Co. 4 C. B. (n. s.) 476.

(cc) Walsh v. AEtna Ins. Co. 30 Iowa, 133.

(d) Amicable Society v. Bolland, 4

1 But where a relative of the assured, in ignorance of his death in forbidden territory, gave an agent money for a permit, which was forwarded to the company, and not returned, it was held, in Bennecke v. Ins. Co. 105 U. S. 355, that after a tender back by the agent of the money on learning of the death there was no waiver of forfeiture.

2 That the late civil war did not put an end to existing life insurance, see New York Ins. Co. v. Clopton, 7 Bush, 179; Manhattan Ins. Co. v. Warwick, 20 Gratt. 614; Semmes v. City Ins. Co. 6 Blatch. 445 : s. c. 13 Wall. 158 ; Sands v. New York Ins. Co. 50 N. Y. 626; Cohen v. New York Ins. Co. ib. 610; Hancock v. New York Ins. Co. 4 Big. L. & A. Cas. 488 ; Martine v. International Int. Co. 53 N. Y. 339; Hamilton v. Mutual Ins. Co. 9 Blatchford, 234; Welts v. Conn. Ins. Co. 48 N. Y. 34. Contra, Tait v. N. Y. Ins. Co. 4 Bigelow Cas. 479; Worthington v. Charter Oak Ins. Co. 41 Conn. 372; Dillard v. Manhattan Ins. Co. 44 Ga. 119; New York Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24; Semmes v. City Ins. Co. 36 Conn. 543; N. Y. Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 24 Gratt. 536.

3 Submission to an operation known to the assured to be dangerous to life, with intent to cause an abortion, without justifiable medical reasons, resulting in her death, will prevent any recovery on the ground of public policy. Hatch v. Mutual Ins. Co. 120 Mass. 650.

would be applied to a loss of life in consequence of a duel, though this is now always one of the express exceptions.

A most important exception, and one which has created much difficulty, is that of death by suicide. The phraseology used is sometimes "death by suicide," sometimes "death by his own hands," and sometimes "death by his own act," and probably sometimes by other equivalent words. The main question must always be, whether any prohibition of this kind covers a case of death caused directly by the act of the party, but unintentionally, and without knowledge. We should say, generally, if not universally, that the insurers would not be discharged by any act of this kind. As when, for example, a life-insured, by his own mistake, or that of a nurse or physician, took a wrong medicine or an excessive dose; or pulled out a tooth and died from the bleeding, which has sometimes followed fatally from the extraction of a tooth; or by cutting * off a corn, and so producing fatal inflammation or gangrene. It cannot be supposed that the insurers ever intend to exclude a death self-inflicted in any such way, and it might almost be doubted whether they could do so by any language. 1

A much more difficult question arises, when death is self-inflicted in a condition of and because of insanity. The authorities on this subject are conflicting. We cannot but think, however, that the law, especially if it were construed by the general principles of insurance, would say, that death by his own hands did not legally include a death which was self-inflicted, but not with the concurrence or action of a responsible mind or will. Here, however, we should say, that if the exception expressly included suicide under insanity, this provision would take effect. (e) 1

Bligh (n. s.), 194; Bollande v. Disney, 3 Russ. Ch. 351. Where a policy provided that it should be void if the life-assured "should die in the known violation of a law of the State," it was held, that, to avoid it, the killing of the life-assured, in an altercation, must have been justifiable or excusable homicide, and not merely under circumstances which would make the slayer guilty of manslaughter only. Harper v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 18 Misso. 109, 19 Misso. 506. Where a slave refused to surrender to patrols, and, attempting his escape, was shot by one of them in the right side, of which wound he died in a few minutes, this was held not to come within the cases excepted in a policy of insurance on his life of "death by means of invasion, insurrection, riot, or civil commotion, or of any military or usurped authority, or by the hands of justice." Spruill v. North Carolina Ins. Co. 1 Jones (N. C), 1S6. Where the life-insured in Louisiana attempted to collect a debt by taking forcible possession of his debtor's goods, and was shot in an altercation which followed, the policy was held void. Bradley v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. 3 Lans. 341.

1 A clause in a policy that if the assured should "die by suicide, felonious or otherwise, sane or insane," includes every case of " intentional self-destruction," but not accidental cases involving insured's negligence or carelessness, Pierce v. Traveler's Ins. Co. 34 Wis. 389. Thus the taking an overdose of medicine by an insured who was sane, through mistake or ignorance, causing death, will not avoid a policy, unless taken to destroy his life "voluntarily, knowingly, and intentionally," Penfold v. Universal Ins. Co. 85 N. Y. 317.

(e) In Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Man. & G. 639, the policy contained a proviso, that in case "the assured should die by his own hands, or by the hands of justice, or in consequence of a duel," the policy should be void. The assured threw himself from Vauxhall Bridge into the Thames and was drowned. In a suit on the policy, Erskine, J., instructed the jury, that "if the assured, by his own act, intentionally destroyed his own life, and that he was not only conscious of the probable consequences of the act, but did it for the express purpose of destroying himself voluntarily, having at the time sufficient mind to will to destroy his own life, the case would be brought within the condition of the policy. But if he was not in a state of mind to know the consequences of the act, then it would not come within the condition." The jury found, that the assured "threw himself from the bridge with the intention of destroying his life; but at the time of committing the act he was not capable of judging between right and wrong." It was held (Tindal, C. J., dissenting), that the policy was avoided, as the proviso included all acts of intentional self-destruction, and was not limited by the accompanying provisos to acts of felonious suicide. Erskine, J., said: "Looking simply at that branch of the proviso upon which the issue was raised, it seems to me, that the only qualification that a liberal interpretation of the words with reference to the nature of the contract requires, is, that the act of self-destruction should be the voluntary and wilful act of a man, having at the time sufficient powers of mind and reason to understand the physical nature and consequences of such act, and having at the time a purpose and intention to cause his own death by that act; and that the question, whether at the time he was capable of understanding and appreciating the moral nature and quality of his purpose, is not relevant to the inquiry, further than as it might help to illustrate the extent of his capacity to understand the physical character of the act itself. It appears, indeed, to me, that, excluding for the present the consideration of the immediate context of the words in question, the fair inference to be drawn from the nature of the contract would be, that the parties intended to include all wilful acts of self-destruction, whatever might be the moral responsibility of the assured at the time; for, although the probable results of bodily disease, producing death by physical means, may be the fair subjects of calculation, the consequences of mental disorder, whether produced by bodily disease, by external circumstances, or by corrupted principle, are equally beyond the reach of any reasonable estimate. And reasons might be suggested, why those who have

1 John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Moore, 34 Mich. 41, decided that a clause in a life policy, that if the assured "shall die by his own hand " the policy should be void, did not include suicide by an insane person. In Van Zandt v. Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. 55 N. Y. 169, it was held, that to take a case out of a proviso that a policy of life insurance should be void in case the assured should die by his own hand, on the ground of insanity, the assured must have been so mentally disordered as not to understand that the act he committed would cause his death, or he must have committed it under the influence of some insane impulse which he could not resist; it is not sufficient that the mind was so impaired that he was not conscious of the moral obliquity of the act; and in Hathaway v. National Ins. Co. 48 Vt. 335, Pierpoint, C. J., said that the jury must be satisfied that the mind of the assured, to excuse his act, "was so overthrown that he had no power to resist the insane impulse to take his life, so that the act was the direct and immediate consequence and result of his insanity; in short, that the taking of his life was an insane act, in respect to which his reason was powerless." See also Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Groom, 86 Penn. St. 22. As to condition in policy declaring it void in case of the death of the assured by his own hand or act, "sane or insane," see De Gogorza v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. 65 N. Y. 232. That, in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary, suicide by the assured will not avoid a policy for the benefit of his wife and children, see Fitch v. American Ins. Co. 59 N. Y. 557. See further on this question, Bigelow v. Berkshire Ins. Co. 93 U. S. 284; Gay v. Union Ins. Co. 9 Blatchford, 142; Newton v. Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. 76 N. Y. 426; Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Peters, 42 Md. 414.