*This is, then, a right reserved and possessed by the public, and a right which extends over all property. And one question is, whether the people themselves can give away this right, or grant property without this reservation. To this it might be answered, that the people, by their constitutions, bind themselves to act only constitutionally, and that no way is provided for such transfer or relinquishment. But, without now denying that the public might, by some sufficient act, divest themselves of the right of eminent domain, we proceed to the next question, * which is, What is the power and authority delegated to the legislature over or in regard to this right of eminent domain?

We have no doubt whatever that the true answer to this question is, that each legislature derives, in part from the language common to all our constitutions, in part from implications from their expressions, and in part from the very nature of its control, as conditions inherent and paramount, whenever a necessity for their execution shall occur. Such a condition is the right of eminent domain. This right does not operate to impair the contract effected by it, but recognizes its obligation in the fullest extent, claiming only the fulfilment of an essential and inseparable condition. Thus, in claiming the resumption or qualification of an investiture, it insists merely on the true nature and character of the right invested. The impairing of contracts inhibited by the Constitution, can scarcely, by the greatest violence of construction, be made applicable to the enforcing of the terms or necessary import of a contract; the language and meaning of the inhibition were designed to embrace proceedings attempting the interpolation of some new term or condition foreign to the original agreement, and therefore inconsistent with and violative thereof. It, then, being clear that the power in question, not being within the purview of the restriction imposed by the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution, it remains with the States to the full extent in which it inheres in every sovereign government, to be exercised by them in that degree that shall by them be deemed commensurate with public necessity. So long as they shall steer clear of the single predicament denounced by the Constitution, shall avoid interference with the obligation of contracts, the wisdom, the modes, the policy, the hardship of any exertion of this power are subjects not within the proper cognizance of this court. This is, in truth, purely a question of power, and, conceding the power to reside in the State government, this concession would seem to close the door upon all further controversy in connection with it. The instances of the exertion of this power, in some mode or other, from the very foundation of civil government, have been so numerous and familiar, that it seems somewhat strange, at this day, to raise a doubt or question concerning it. In fact, the whole policy of the country relative to roads, mills, bridges, and canals, rests upon this single power, under which lands have been always condemned, without the exertion of this power, not one of the improvements just mentioned could be constructed. In our country, it is believed that the power was never, or, at any rate, rarely, questioned, until the opinion seems to have obtained, that the right of property in a chartered corporation was more sacred and intangible than the same right could possibly be in the person of the citizen; an opinion which must be without any grounds to rest upon, until it can be demonstrated that the ideal creature is more than a person, or the corporeal being is less. For, as a question of the power to appropriate to public uses the property of private persons, resting upon the ordinary foundations of private right, there would seem to be room neither for doubt nor difficulty." That the right of eminent domain is sometimes founded on sovereignty, public necessity, or implied compact, see Enfield Toll Bridge Co v. Hartford & N. H. R. R. Co. 17 Conn. 61; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 539, per Woodbury, J.

(q) West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507. Id 1795, the legislature of Vermont granted a charter to the plaintiffs for the term of one hundred years, which invested them with the exclusive privilege of erecting a bridge over West River, within four miles of its mouth, and with the right of taking tolls for passing the same. Under the authority of a subsequent act of the legislature* a public road was extended and established between certain termini, passing over the plaintiff's bridge, converting it into a public highway, for which compensation was awarded. The new highway was laid out for two miles on one side, and one mile on the other, over a public highway, existing where the bridge was built, and of which it formed a part. It was held, that the act appropriating the franchise of the bridge for the new public highway, compensation being made, was constitutional. Daniel, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "A distinction has been attempted, in argument, between the power of a government to appropriate for public uses property which is corporeal, or may be said to be in being, and the like power in the government to resume or extinguish a franchise. The distinction thus attempted we regard as a refinement which has no foundation in reason, and one that, in truth, avoids the true legal or constitutional question in these causes, namely, that of the right in private persons, in the use or enjoyment of their private property, to control and actually to prohibit the power and duty of the government to advance and protect the general good. We are aware of nothing peculiar to a franchise which can class it higher, or render it more sacred than other property. A franchise is property, and nothing more; it is incorporeal property, and is so defined by Justice Black-stone, when treating, in his second volume, chap. 3, page 20, of the another public use, under the supposed superiority of the latter, and the necessity of the case." Pp. 543, 544, 546. The doctrine of the West River Bridge Co. v Dix, that the franchise of a corporation may be taken by the State for public uses, or that the power to take it for public uses may be delegated by the State to another corporation on providing compensation, is confirmed by numerous authorities, s. c. 16 Vt. 446; The Richmond. etc. R. R. Co. v. The Louisa R. R. Co. 13 Mow. 71; Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston and Worcester R. R. Co. 23 Pick. 360; Armington v Barnet, 15 Vt. 745; White River Turnpike Co. v. Vt. Central R. R Co. 21 id. 590; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & N. H R R. Co. 17 Conn. 41, 454; Barber v. Andover, 8 N. H. 398; Peirce v. Somersworth, 10 id. 369; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 id. 19; Northern Railroad v. Concord and Clare-mont Railroad, 7 Foster, 183; Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. 725; Beekman v.