We thus reach another question. If these exclusive privileges are expressly given, how does this clause of the Constitution * operate on them? If it makes them irrevocable, and forever forbids any repeal or withdrawal of them, or any interference with or modification of them, does it not destroy the power of the legislature to give them, on the ground that they are the agents of the public only for the present, and not for the future; and have no authority, expressly given, or implied from their function and duty as a legislature, to deprive the public of a future exercise of the power which the legislature now abandons ? Thus, to put the question in the simplest form, if a State sells a square mile of land, expressly covenanting by its authorized deed, and expressly enacting by a confirmatory which it cannot be enjoyed are also given, ut res moqis voleat quam pereat. I maintain that a different doctrine is utterly repugnant to all the principles of the common law applicable to all franchise* of a like nature, and that we must overturn some of the best securities of the rights of property before it can be established. I maintain that the common law is the birthright of every citizen of Massachusetts, and that he holds the title-deeds of his property, corporeal and incorporeal, under it. I maintain that, under the principles of the common law, there exists no more right in the legislature of Massachusetts to erect the Warren Bridge, to the ruin of the franchise of the Charles River Bridge, than exists to transfer the latter to the former, or to authorize the former to demolish the latter. If the legislature does not mean in its grant to give any exclusive rights, let it say so expressly, directly, and in terms admitting of no misconstruction. The grantees will then take at their peril, and must abide the results of their overweening confidence, indiscretion, and zeal." Pp. 647, 648. In the State court, 7 Pick. 344, the judges were equally divided on the question whether the Charles River Bridge had any exclusive rights beyond its own limits: Morton, J. (pp. 461, 464), and Wilde, J. (pp. 468, 469), holding against such a right; and Putnam, J. (p. 477), and Parker, C. J. (p. 506), in favor of such exclusive right beyond its limits. The doctrine of the case of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge has been repeatedly confirmed. The West River Bridge v Dix,

6 How. 532, 16 Vt. 446, The Mohawk Bridge v. The Utica & Schenectady R. R. Co. 6 Paige, 554, The Oswego Falls Bridge v Fish, 1 Barb. Ch 547; Thompson v. The New York & Harlem R. R. Co. 3 Sandf. Ch. 625; Tuckahoe Canal Co. v Tuckahoe R. R Co. 11 Leigh, 42; Washington & Baltimore Turnpike Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R Co. 10 Gill & J. 392; Harrison v. Young. 9 Ga. 359; McLeod v. Burroughs, id. 213 , Shorter v. Smith, id. 517; White River Turnpike Co. v. Vt. Central R. R. Co. 21 Vt 590, Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & N. ft. R. R. Co. 17 Conn. 40, 454; Miners Bank v. United States, 1 Greene (la.), 553; Hyde's Ferry Turnpike Co. p. Davidson County, (Tenn ) 18 Southwestern Rep. 626; Greenl. Cruise, tit. xxvii. § 29. Of the Charles River Bridge Case, it is said by Barculo, J., that, "to say the least of it, it stands upon the extreme verge of the law, and perhaps reaches a little beyond justice and good faith." Benson v. The Mayor, etc. of New York, 10 Barb. 243. Where the right to build a bridge is given, it is exclusive within its own limits. Piscata-qua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, statute, that the land shall forever be exempt from taxation, is this * covenant binding upon the State, that is, upon future legislatures? (o)

7 N. H. 35.

An answer to this question would require some consideration of the nature and extent of the rights of supreme sovereignty, and especially of eminent domain; and of the authority of the legislature in relation to them. Undoubtedly, the feudal system forms no part of, and no foundation for, our system of legislation, in one sense; but, in another, it is true that some of its important principles remain as valid with us at this moment as ever anywhere. One of these is, that all property is held from the sovereign. We hold that the theory of our laws goes even further on this point than the feudal system, because it extends this principle to personal as well as real property. And upon this principle rests the law of eminent domain; for dominium, from which this phrase comes, bears, as its legal sense, property, and not power. We think that everything whatever that a citizen of this country owns, he holds in the same way as if he could trace his title back to an original grant from the sovereign; and as if this grant contained an expressed reservation of a right by the public or the State, which is the sovereign, to resume the property or any part of it, whenever it shall be wanted for the use of the sovereign; payment or compensation being made, or adequately provided for by law, for all that is thus resumed. And this is what we understand to be, in this country, the law, or the right, of eminent domain, (p)

(o) See next note. In Richmond R. R. Co. v. The Louisa R R. Co. 13 How. 71, Curtis, J., maintained that the State may grant an exclusive right to a railroad within certain limits, and pledge itself not to allow another to he constructed within these limits. See Piscataqua Bridge v. N. H. Bridge, 7 N. H. 35, per Parker, C. J.

(p) Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenec-tadv R. R Co. 3 Paige, 72, 73; The West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 532, 533. Daniel, J. "Under every established government, the tenure of property is derived, mediately or immediately, from the sovereign power of the political body, organ* ized in such mode or exerted in such a way as the community or State may have thought proper to ordain. It can rest on no other foundation, can have no other guaranty. It is owing to these characteristics only, in the original nature of the tenure, that appeals can he made to the laws, either for the protection or assertion of the rights of property. Upon any other hypothesis, the law of property would be simply the law of force. Now it is undeniable, that the investment of property in the citizen by the government, whether made for a pecuniary consideration, or founded on conditions of civil or political duty, is a contract between the State, or the government acting as its agent, and the grantee; and both the parties thereto are bound in good faith to fulfil it. But into all contracts, whether made between States and individuals or between individuals only, there enter conditions which arise not out of the literal terms of the contract itself; they are superinduced by the pre-existing and higher authority of the laws of nature, of nations, or of the community to which the parties belong; they are always presumed, and must be presumed, to be known and recognized by all, are binding upon all, and need never, therefore, be carried into express stipulation, for this could add nothing to their force. Every contract is made in subordination to them, and must yield to their functions, full authority to exercise an unlimited power as to the management, employment, and use of the eminent domain of the State, and to make all the provisions consequent upon, or necessary to, the exercise of this right or power; but no authority whatever to give this away or take it out of the people, directly or indirectly. Assuming this to be a true principle, let us see how it applies. Let it be certain that the legislature can give to any parties the right to build a bridge over any stream, and between any termini; and as certain, that when the bridge is built they may destroy it for. public purposes, on paying or providing for compensation. (q) But can *they not