(p) Bricheno v. Thorp, 1 Jac. 300.- It is not clear, however, if it be distinctly shown that confidential disclosures have been made to the attorney or solicitor, which if communicated to the other party must be directly prejudicial to the former client, that a court of equity would not forbid the acceptance of the second retainer, although the attorney was dismissed for no misconduct. Lord Eldon, Bricheno v. Thorp, 1 Jac. 303, 304; Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 19 Ves. 261, 275. In the latter case Lord Eldon said: " My opinion is that he [the attorney] ought not, if he knows anything that may be prejudicial to the former client, to accept the new brief, though that client refuse to retain him." - In Johnson v. Marriott, 4 Tyr. 78, where the court refused to restrain an attorney, who (without his misconduct) had been dismissed from the employment of the plaintiffs, from acting for the defendant, the judges rested their decision on the ground that there was no affidavit by the the plaintiffs that the attorney, while in their employment, had obtained a confidential knowledge of particular facts, which it would be prejudicial to their case to communicate to the defendant.

(q) Lord Eldon, Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 19 Ves. 261; Gurney, B., Johnson v. Marriott, 4 Tyr. 78.

(qq) Smith v. Brotherline, 62 Penn. St. 461.

(r) Brady v. Mayor, etc. 1 Sandf. 569; Smith v. Davis, 45" N. H. 566; Vilas v. Downer, 21 Vt. 419.

(s) Id.

(t) Coopwood v. Wallace, 12 Ala. 790.

(u) Christy v. Douglas, Wright, 485.

(v) Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. 415; Rust v. Larue, 4 Litt. 417; Caldwell v. Shepherd, 6 Monr. 392; Smith v. Thomp son, 7 B. Mon. 305.

services, merely by proof that the services were rendered; but must go farther and show that they were requested, or, in other words, that he was retained as attorney or counsel. (w)1 And his own pocket or office docket book, in which he has entered *the name of the suit and the parties in question, is no1 of itself evidence that the services were either requested or rendered. (x)

An attorney cannot recover his bill against his client, if his client has received no benefit whatever from his services by reason of his want of care and skill.(y) But if the client has received any benefit, he must in England pay the bill, and may then have an action for damages. (z) It has been there held, however, that a jury may discriminate between the several items in an account, and reject those for work entirely useless; (a) and it may be supposed, that in America the client might reduce the attorney's claim, by showing the little value of the benefit received, by the fault of the attorney, as in actions for other services.

An attorney has a lien on the judgment he recovers, and on the papers of the case, for his costs and fees; (b) and it will prevail against a set-off acquired by the judgment-debtor after the rendition of the judgment; (bb) but it seems to be settled that a set-off in ordinary course prevails over the lien; (be) and he has no lien on a claim for unliquidated damages in tort, until after a judgment. (bd) In most of our States this rule applies to barristers, counsellors, attorneys, and proctors in admiralty (be) equally. But it has been said that an attorney's lien covers only his costs and expenses, and his fees as attorney, but not his fees as counsellor, nor incidental expenses not taxable. (c)2 "We think

(w) Burghart v. Gardner, 3 Barb. 64.

(x) Briggs v. Georgia, 15 Vt. 61.

(y) Huntley v. Bulwer, 6 Bing. N. C. 111; Bracey v. Carter, 12 A. & E. 373; Hill v. Featherstonhaugh, 7 Bing. 569; Hopping v. Quinn, 12 Wend. 517. See Runyan v. Nichols, 11 Johns. 547.

(z) Templar v. McLachlan, 2 B. & P. 136.

(a) Shaw v. Arden, 9 Bing. 289.

(b) Mooney v. Lloyd, 5 S. & R. 412; Dubois' Appeal, 38 Penn. St. 231; Gray v. Brackenridge, 2 Penn. 75, 2 Greenl. Ev.

§144, n. 4; McGregor v. Comstock, 28 N. Y. 237; Newbert v. Cunningham, 50 Me. 281; Myers v. Mcllugh, 16 Ia. 335; Waters v. Grace, 23 Ark. 118; Hursh v. Sheets, 21 Ia. 501.

(bb) Warfield v. Campbell, 38 Ala. 527.

(bc) De Figaniere v. Young, 2 Rob 670.

(bd) Wood v. Anders, .". Bush, 641.

(be) The Soblomsten, L. R. l Adm. & Eccl. 293.

(c) Heartt v. Chipman, 2 Aik. 162. The subject of the attorney's lien has been much discussed in this country.

1 In fixing the value of an attorney's services, his professional skill and standing, his experience, the nature of the controversy, both in regard to the amount involved and the nature of the questions raised, as well as the result, must all be taken into consideration. Phelps >•. Hunt, 40 Conn. 97; Bruce v. Dickey, 116 111. 527; Smith v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 60 Ia. 515; Eggleston v. Boardman, 37 Mich. 14. - K.

2 The attorney's lien for costs and charges attaches to deeds or papers or upon moueys received by him on his client's behalf in the course of his employment, In re this is not law. The lien of an attorney, its extent and its limitations, are considered more fully in our chapter on Liens.

An attorney is, in general, personally liable on an agreement made by him in his own name, although only professionally concerned in the matter. (d)

If his client's papers are stolen from him without his fault, he is not liable for the loss. (dd) *How far an attorney at law may bind his clients by his arrangements in a case, without special instructions or authority, may not be quite certain. We take the practice to be, however, that his entries on the docket, his agreements about continuances, about evidence, or the conduct of the trial, or, perhaps, about costs and the like, would, in general, bind the client. (de)l

Wilson v. Burr, 25 Wend. 386; Stevens v. Adams, 23 id. 57; Newman v. Washington, Mart. & Y. 79; Wells v. Hatch, 43 N. H. 246. And see Van Atta v. Mc-Kinney, 1 Harr. 235. An attorney has, in some States, a lien upon his client's papers left with him, for any general balance due him. Dennett v. Cutts, 11 N. H. 163; Walker v. Sargeant, 14 Vt. 247; aliter in Pennsylvania. Walton v. Dick-erson, 7 Barr, 376. So by statute in many States he has a lien upon a judgment actually recovered in favor of his client, for his fees and disbursements. Dunklee v. Locke, 13 Mass. 525; Potter v. Mayo, 3 Greenl. 34; Gammon v. Chandler, 30 Me. 152; Ocean Ins. Co. v. Rider, 22 Pick. 210; Hobson v. Watson, 34 Me. 20. And even without statute provisions. Sexton v. Pike, 8 Eng. (Ark.) 193. A counsel, who, with his client's consent, withdraws from a case after having tendered beneficial services, does not thereby lose his right to compensation for the services rendered, unless at the time of his withdrawal he waives or abandons his claim to compensation. Coopwood v. Wallace, 12 Ala. 790; Stephens v. Farrar, 4 Bush, 13.