(d) Hall v. Ashurst, 1 Cr. & M. 714; Iveson v. Conington, 1 B. & C. 160; Bur-rell v. Jones, 3 B. & Ald. 47; Scrace v. Whittington, 2 B. & C. 11; Watson v. Murrell, 1 C. & P. 307. - In New Hampshire, it is held that where a plaintiff resides within that State, and employs an attorney in his behalf, to commence an action for him, such attorney is authorized by the employment to place the name of the plaintiff upon the writ as indorser, and to bind him as such; and in such case, if the indorsement be thus: " A, plaintiff, by his attorney, B," the plaintiff is regarded as the indorser, and the attorney is not personally bound; but if the plaintiff reside out of the State, the attorney having no authority to bind the plaintiff, is himself personally bound by such indorsement, and the writ accordingly is properly and sufficiently indorsed. Pettingill v. McGregor, 12 N. H. 179; Woods v. Blod-gett, 15 N. H 569.

(dd) Hill v. Barner, 18 N. H. 607.

(de) Sampson v. Ohleyer, 22 Cal. 200. For a case strongly asserting the right of an attorney to manage a case, see Board of Commissioners v. Younger, 29 Cal. 147.

Paschal, 10 Wall. 483; McPherson v. Cox, 96 IT. S. 404; Cooke v. Thresher, 51 Conn. 105; Bowling Green Bank v. Todd, 52 N. Y. 489; Ward v. Craig, 87 N. Y. 550; Weed v. Boutelle, 56 Vt. 570, on the ground that they are the fruits of his own labor or expense. Ex parte Yalden, 4 Ch. D. 129. See Pilcher v. Arden, 7 Ch. D. 318; Gen. Trust Co. v. Chapman, 1 C. P. D. 771. He may also have a lien on his client's real estate. Perkins v. Perkins, 9 Heiskell, 95, Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. (Ch.) 618. Contra, Garner v. Garner, 1 Lea, 29. See Twiggs v. Chambers, 56 Ga. 279. But an attorney has no such lien before judgment as will prevent his client from making a settlement. Simmons v. Almy, 103 Mass. 33; Wright v. Wright, 70 N. Y. 96. - K.

1 An attorney has implied authority to release an attachment before judgment. Benson v. Carr, 73 Me. 76; Moulton v. Bowker, 115 Mass. 36. He has not implied authority to release property from the lien of a judgment. Phillips v. Dobbins, 56

According to most Amercian authorities, an attorney employed in the usual way to conduct a suit, has, in general, no authority to enter into a compromise without the sanction of his client, express or implied;1 but it is said that a compromise so made will not be set aside, unless for reasons arising from the character or circumstances of the compromise. (df) An attorney cannot sell or assign his client's claim.(dg) In an important case before the English Court of Exchequer it was held that no action lies against a counsel who, being employed to conduct a cause, enters into a compromise of the matter at issue, even though contrary to his client's instructions, provided it is done bona fide. (e) He cannot release an interested witness without special authority from his client. (ee)

If an attorney cannot by virtue of his general authority bind his clients by bargains, as, for compromise or settlement of a case, still less can he enter into agreements quite independent of any action. (/) He cannot indorse for his client a note left with him for collection. (ff) Nor can he receive anything but money for a debt left with him for collection. (fg)

It is said, in many cases, that an attorney has the right to submit his client's case to arbitration.(g) But in other cases this

(df) Potter v. Parsons, 14 Ia. 286; Christie v. Sawyer, 44 N. H. 298.

(dg) Rowland v. State, 58 Penn. St. 196.

(e) Swinfen v. Lord Chelmsford, 5 H. & N. 590. See Fray v. Voules, 1 Ell. & E. 839.

(ee) Succession of Weigel, 18 La. An. 49.

(/') This subject is fully considered in Swinfen v. Swinfen, 1 C. B. (N. s.) 364. See also Smith's Heirs v. Dixon, 3 Met. (Ky.) 438, for the discussion of the extent of an attorney's power to bind his client.

(ff) Child v. Eureka Works, 44 N. H. 354.

(fg) Wright v. Daily, 26 Tex. 730.

(g) Eilmer v. Delber, 3 Taunt. 486 , Faviel v. Eastern Co. R. Co. 2 Exch. 344; Wilson v. Young, 9 Barr, 101; Holker v. Parker, 7 Crunch, 436; Talbot v. M'Gee, 4 Monr. 375; Morris v. Grier, 76 N. C. 410; Lee v. Grimes, 4 Col. 185; Connett v. Chicago, 114 Ill. 233; Sargeant v. ( lark, 108 Pa. 588; contra is McPherson v. Cox, 86 N. Y. 472.

Ga. 617; Horsey v. Chew, 65 Md. 555. Nor to agree to postpone execution after judgment in favor of his client. Lovegrove v. White, L. R. 6 C. P. 440. Nor to confess judgment. Pfister v. Wade, 69 Cal. 133; Wadhams v. Gay, 73 Ill. 415. He has implied authority to consent not to appeal. In re West Devon, etc. Mine, 38 Ch. D. 51; Rhodes v. Swithinbank, 5 T. L. R. 253. But see Daniels v. City of New London, 58 Conn. 156. Or to withdraw a motion for new trial. In re Heath's Will, 4s N. W. Rep. 1037 (Ia. 1891). Or to agree that only one of several cases involving the same principle should he tried, and that the result of that one should determine all. Ohl-quest v. Farwell, 71 Ia. 231.

1 Whipple v. Whitman, 13 R. I. 512; Mandeville v. Reynolds, 68 N. Y. 528; Ambrose v. McDonald, 53 Cal. 28; Fritchey v. Bosley, 56 Md. 94; Levy v. Brown Miss. 83; Walden v. Bolton, 55 Mo. 405; Pickett v. Memphis Bank, 32 Ark. 346; Roller v. Wooldridge, 46 Tex. 485; Isaacs v. Zugsmith, 103 Pa. 77; Kelly v. Wright, 65 Wis. 236; Granger v. Batchelder, 54 Vt. 248; Hall Safe Co. v. Harwell, 88 Ala. 441. That in England and Massachusetts an attorney may in good faith compromise a claim, see Butler v. Knight, L. R. 2 Ex. 109; Matthews v Munster, 20 Q. B. D. 141; (cf. Lewis v. Lewis, 45 Ch. D. 281); Wieland v. White, 109 Mass. 392 - K.

power, for what seem to us good reasons, is confined to suits actually commenced. (h)

The right of a party to change his attorney in an action has of late passed under adjudication in some cases. The lien of the attorney on the papers for past services must of course be preserved. But otherwise, the right of the client to change his attorney is sometimes asserted very strongly. (hh) The weight of authority would seem, however, in favor of the rule that the consent of the court must be obtained, and will not be given but for reason (hi)