(a) 2 Sugd. on Vend. 7 Am. ed. 387; and see Collin son v. Owens, 6 Gill & J. 4; Stansell v. Roberts, 13 Ohio, 148; and McKay v. Green, 6 Johns. Ch. 56, as to advancing money to enable a purchaser to complete the purchase; Glascock v. Glascock, 17 Tex. 480. The plaintiff's intestate and the defendant having taken a bond for a deed of real estate, and the defendant having subsequently procured the deed to be made to him alone, the plaintiff and an assignee of the intestate sued to recover the portion of the estate which, by mutual agreement between the covenantees of the bond was to be the share of the intestate. The defendant claimed to have paid all the purchase-money, and that he had a lien on the portion of the estate demanded, for the amount advanced by him for the intestate, as also for moneys expended by him in the improvement of the estate. The Supreme Court, upon appeal from the court below, held, that the defendant had no lien for the purchase-money advanced by him for the intestate; that he had a lien for advances made by him for improvements made by the authority of the intestate, but none for expenditures subsequently made for improvements, when he was forbidden to make the improvements by the rightful claimants of the property. The decree of the court below, to put the plaintiffs in possession of the portion of the estate claimed, and making the defendant's demand for the purchase-money advanced a simple administration debt against the intestate's estate, was accordingly affirmed.

(b) Dart on Vend. 434. Am. ed.; Lake v. Gibson, 1 Eq. C. Abr. 291. In a decree at the Rolls, Trin. 1729, the Master of the Rolls held, that, "if two or more make a joint purchase of lands, and afterwards one of them lays out a considerable sum of money in repairs or improvements, and dies, this shall be a lien on the land, and a trust for the representative of him who advanced it; and that, in all other cases of joint undertaking or partnership, either in trade or in any other dealing, they were to be considered as tenants in common, or the survivors as trustees for those who died." This doctrine as to advances creating a lien on the land, was acted upon in Glascock v. Glascock, 17 Tex. 480; also in Kennedy v. Kennedy, 3 Ala. 434, where it was held, that a defendant, decreed to reconvey one undivided moiety of land to the Complainant, had a lien upon the land, by virtue of the legal estate with which he was invested, for his advances for improvements, and that the court should not enforce the execution of the conveyance decreed without protecting this lien. See also Hamilton n. Denny, 1 Ball & B. 199, which maintains the same principle in the case of joint lessees, where the whole expenditure for renewals is paid by one, and the other reaps the benefit of the payment.

(c) Freemoult v. Dedire, 1 P. Wms. 429.

1 In Leigh v. Dickeson, 12 Q. B. D. 194, it was held that one tenant in common of a house who expends money on ordinary repairs not being such as are necessary to prevent the house from going to ruin, has no right of action against his tenant for contribution. And it was so held in Calvert v. Aldrich, 99 Mara. 74; Wiggin v. Wiggin, 43 N. H. 568. But where houses were falling to decay it was held that a tenant who made repairs had both a right of contribution and a lien on the share of his co-tenant. Alexander v. Ellison, 79 Ky. 148. There is no lien in favor of a joint tenant against his co-tenant for rents collected by the latter in excess of his share. Burch v. Burch, 82 Ky. 622.

Lis pendens, which has something of the effect of an equitable lien, operates in favor of a party to a suit, by preventing his antagonist from conveying his estate by a valid title during the pendency of the suit This protection of the litigant from * the act of alienation of his adversary, is sometimes based upon the fiction of law, that every person has notice of what is passing in the courts of the country, (d) It may, however, with more propriety, be said that it rests upon public policy; for, in some cases where it operates, there is no possibility that the party should have notice of the pendency of the suit, (e) The lien is not available in England at the present day, except against persons having actual notice, unless a record of the particulars of the suit be made in a registry established for that purpose by statute. (f) The doctrine of notice pendente lite is also applied to the special subject of the suit, whether real or personal property.

This doctrine does not apply in a case where the court has no jurisdiction over the thing in controversy; as where the court has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but not over the land which is the subject-matter of the contract, (g) It has been decided that the statute notice required in New York is

(d) Worsley v. Scarborough, 3 Atk. 392; Preston v. Tubbin, 1 Vera. 286.

(e) Newman v. Chapman, 2 Rand. 93, per Green, J.: " The rule as to the effect of a lis pendens is founded on the necessity of such a rule to give effect to the proceedings of courts of justice. Without it the administration of justice might, in all cases, be frustrated by successive alienations of the property which was the object of litigation pending the suit, so that every judgment and decree would be rendered abortive where the recovery of specific property was the object. This necessity is so obvious, that there was no occasion to resort to the presumption that the purchaser really , or by inquiry might have had, notice of the pendency of the suit, to justify the existence of the rule. In fact, it applied in cases in which there was a physical impossibility that the purchaser could know, with any possible diligence on his part, of the existence of the suit, unless all contracts were made in the office from which the writ issued, and on the last moment of the day. For, at common law, the writ was pending from the first moment of the day on which it was issued and bore teste; and a purchaser, on or after that day, held the property subject to the execution upon the judgment in that suit, as the defendant would have held it if no alienation had been made. The Court of Chancery adopted the rule, in analogy to the common law, but relaxed, in some degree, the severity of the common law." "Again, a bill of discovery, or to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses, ought, if all persons are bound to take notice of what is going on in a court of justice, to be notice to all the world, as much as a bill for relief. But these are decided to be no notice to any purpose; a proof that the rule as to the effect of a lis pendens is one of mere policy, confined in its operation strictly to the purposes for which it was adopted, - that is, to give effect to the judgment and decrees of courts of justice; and that it is not properly a notice to any purpose whatsoever. The English judges and elementary writers have carelessly called it a notice, because, in one single instance, it had the same effect upon the interests of a purchaser as a notice had, though for a different reason. But the courts have not, in any case, given it the real force and effect of a notice." Woodfolk v. Blount, 3 Hey. 147.