This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
(f) 2 Vict. c. 11, §7.
(g) Carrington v. Brents, 1 McLean, 167."
* only a means of publicity, and does not affect the sufficiency of the notice arising from the contents of the bill, to charge a purchaser, (h) l
There is also an equitable lien in favor of the assignee of a debt, on the money in the hands of the debtor. In a case like this, the assent of the debtor to the assignment is necessary, to enable the assignee to sue at law; but not so in equity, (i)2 A consignor has also an equitable lien on money unapplied by an agent, or goods consigned to him for some special unexecuted object. Here the lien depends upon privity of property; and, to establish it, the property must be clearly identified, or its proceeds exist or be accessible in separate money, securities, or a new investment, (j)
(h) Griffith v. Griffith, Hoff. Ch. 153.
(i) Row v. Dawson, 1 Ves. 331; Adams v. Claxton, 6 Ves. Jr. 226.
(j) Taylor v. Plumer, 3 M. & S. 562. This was an action of trover brought by the assignees of a stock-broker against the defendant, who had intrusted the broker with money to be invested in exchequer bills. The broker, with a design to embezzle a large portion of the money so intrusted to him, invested that portion in foreign securities, and left his home with the purpose of fleeing the country. He was pursued and overtaken, and surrendered the certificates of the securities so obtained to an agent of the defendant. The latter caused them to be sold, and retained the proceeds in lieu of the money of which he had been defrauded. A commission of bankruptcy was taken out against the defaulting broker, and this action was brought by the assignees to recover the value of the securities thus surrendered to the defendant, as assets of the bankrupt estate. The case came before the Court of King's Bench upon the question whether the plaintiffs were entitled wholly or in part to recover, and if neither, then a nonsuit to be entered. The counsel for the defendant admitted that specific property in the possession of an agent, who becomes bankrupt, which was intrusted to him for a special purpose, belongs to the principal, and not to the representatives of the bankrupt agent; also, that where the property is not the same, but has been acquired by the bankrupt in lieu of the trust property, and in pursuance of the trust, the same rule applies to it, provided such property is capable of being ascertained But he took this distinction, that where the property had been tortiously acquired by the agent, in fraud of the trust, there the lien of the principal was at an end; because he could not, for his own private advantage, and to the prejudice of all the other creditors, aver what has been done in fraud of his trust, to have been done in execution of it. On the other side, this distinction was denied, and the rule asserted to be general, that nothing passed by the assignment, but what was in equity, as well as law, the property of the bankrupt. The court held, that no change in the form of the property, so long as it could be identified, and no act of the agent, could divest the owner of his right thereto, whether it was in the hands of the agent, or of those who represent him in right. Lord Ellenborouqh, in giving the judgment of the court in favor of the defendant, said "And, indeed, upon a view of the authorities, and consideration of the arguments, it shows that if the property, in its original state and form, was covered with a trust in favor of the principal, no change of that state and form can divest it of such trust, or give the factor, or those who represent him in right, any other more valid claim in re* spect to it, than they respectively had before such change. An abuse of trust can confer no rights on the party abusing it, nor on those who claim in privity with him. The argument which has been advanced in favor of the plaintiffs, that the property of the principal continues only so long as the authority of the principal is pursued in respect to the order and disposition of it, and that it ceases when the property is tortiously converted into another form for the use of the factor himself, is mischievous in principle, and supported by no authorities of law." '* It makes no difference, in reason or law, into what other form, different from the original, the change may have been made, whether it be into that of promissory notes for the security of the money which was produced by the sale of the goods of the principal (as in Scott p. Surman, Willes, 400), or into other merchandise (as in Whitcomb v Jacob, Salk. 160); for the product of, or substitute for, the original thing, still follows the nature of the thing itself, as long as it can be ascertained to be such, and the right only ceases when the means of ascertainment fail, which is the case when the subject is turned into money, and mixed and confounded in a general mass of the same description." A nonsuit was ordered to be entered.
1 The doctrine of lis pendens has been applied to personal property, McCauley v. Rogers, 104 111. 578 (buildings on leased land and property therein);" Carr v. Lewis Coal Co 96 Mo. 149 (steam-tug). It has been doubted, however, whether it applied to "articles of ordinary commerce," Warren County v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96, 105. See also Carr w. Lewis Coal Co. supra. It was held not to apply to corporate stock, in Holbrook v. N. J. Zinc Co. 57 N. Y. 616. See also Dovey's Appeal, 97 ra. 153; and it is well settled that it does not apply to negotiable paper. Enfield v Jordan, 119 U S. 680; Mayberry v. Morris, 62 Ala. 113; Jeffres v. Cochrane, 48 N. Y. 671.
2 Either a written or oral agreement to pay a debt out of a designated fund does not create an equitable lien on the fund, or operate as an equitable assignment. Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N. Y. 508.
* Another equitable lien, which depends upon privity of parties, is recognized in favor of one for whom directions have been given to an agent or consignee, to retain money or goods. In this case, equity as well as law requires the assent of the holder and the beneficiary, in order to enable the latter to assert a lien or to sue. For the holder of the property is not the debtor but the bailee of the owner, (k) An acceptor or indorser of a bill of exchange for accommodation of the drawer, has an equitable lien on any property of the latter that may be in his hands. (I) Trustees have a lien upon the trust estate for their expenses, but not their agents, (m)
 
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