But in some instances, where the acknowledgment of one joint debtor is held to be admissible evidence of the promise of the others, the question is still reserved, whether it be sufficient evidence. As where one made an acknowledgment of a barred debt, due from him and another, under circumstances which showed that the acknowledgment was made for the sake of a personal benefit to himself, the evidence was admitted, but the jury were told that it was insufficient (b) As to partners after dissolution, there is in this country much conflict; but, as we have already stated, we think the prevailing authorities are

Van Keuren v. Parmelee, is upon the ground that no agency ever existed, not that an agency once existing has been revoked. The law is the same in New Hampshire. Exeter Bank v. Sullivan, 6 N H. 124; Kelley v Sanborn, 9 id. 46; Whipple v. Stevens, 2 Foster, 219. And in Tennessee. Belote v Wynne, 7 Yerg. 534; Muse v. Donelson, 2 Humph. 166.

(x) Whitcomb v. Whiting, 2 Doug. 652; Burleigh v. Stott, 8 B. & C. 36; Channel v. Ditchburn, 5 M. & W. 494.

(y) Tappan v. Kimball, 10 Foster, 136.

(z) Dowling v. Ford, 11 M. & W. 329. In this case, one Nodin having applied to the plaintiff for a loan of £300 on mortgage, the plaintiff, doubting the sufficiency of the security, refused to advance it without having, in addition, a joint and several promissory note for £50, from Nodin and the defendant, payable on demand. The note and mortgage were accordingly given, the latter containing a covenant by Nodin to pay the sum of £300 and interest at 5 per cent. Several half-yearly payments of £7 10*. each, for interest, having been made by Nodin: held, in an action against the defendant upon the note, that such payments by Nodin kept all the securities alive and prevented the operation of the statute of limitations as to the note.

(a) Goddard v Ingram, 3 Q. B. 839. In this case the debt was originally contracted with J. W. & S.; and S. more than six years afterwards, and within six years of the action being brought, made a payment in respect of it to the plaintiff S. became bankrupt shortly after; and the jury found that he made the payment in fraud of J. & W., and in expectation of immediate bankruptcy Held, nevertheless, that the payment barred the operation of the statute.

(b) Coit v Tracy, 8 Conn. 268. In this case there was a joint indebtedness by the defendant and one Coit, to the plaintiff, growing out of an agency conducted by the defendant and Coit jointly; and more than twenty years after such agency was ended, Coit made an acknowledgment of the debt, and then, at his own expense, and with a view to obtain an advantage to himself, by a recovery against the defendant, procured a suit to be brought, in the name of the plaintiff, against the defendant and himself: and it was held, that the acknowledgment of Coit, under such circumstances, was not sufficient to remove the bar of the statute of limitations. set up by the defendant against the power of one to bind others who were formerly partners with him, by his acknowledgment of a barred partnership debt (c)

This whole question, so far as regards the effect of a new promise or acknowledgment, by one of several joint debtors, has been set at rest in England by Lord Tenterden's act, which declares, in substance, that no joint contractor shall lose the * benefit of the statute, so as to be chargeable by reason only of any written acknowledgment or promise, made and signed by any co-contractor.(d)l But in order to preserve unimpaired the remedy against the joint debtor who makes the promise or acknowledgment, the act provides that in actions to be commenced against two or more joint contractors, if it shall appear that the plaintiff, though barred by the statute as to one or more of such joint contractors, is entitled to recover against another, or others of them, by virtue of a new acknowledgment, or promise, " judgment may be given, and costs allowed, for the plaintiff, as to such defendant or defendants against whom he shall recover, and for the other defendant or defendants against the plaintiff."

Formerly, the acknowledgment might be made to any one, as it had the full force of an admission of a fact.(e) Thus if A said to B, "I cannot pay you for I owe C, and must pay him first," this in an action brought by C against A, to which the statute was pleaded, supported a replication that the cause of action accrued within six years. (f) But such doctrine would not be generally maintained now;(g)2 and it has been supposed that Lord

(c) Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351; Van Keuren v. Parmelee, 2 Comst. 523; Rep-pert v. Colvin, 48 Pa. 248. And see other cases cited supra, n. (v).

(d) There is a similar statutory provision in Massachusetts. See Mass Pub. Stats. c. 197, § 17; Pierce v. Tobey, 5 Met. 168; Balcom v. Richards, 6 Cash. 360. And in Maine. See Maine Rev. Stats. c 146, § 24; Quimby v. Putnam, 28 Me. 419. And perhaps in some other States.

(e) Monntstephen v. Brooke, 3 B. & Ald. 141; Peters v. Brown, 4 Esp. 46; Halliday v. Ward, 3 Camp. 32 ,- Clark v. Hougham, 2 B. & C. 149; Soulden v.

Van Rensselaer, 9 Wend. 293; Whitney v. Bigelow, 4 Pick. 110; St. John v. Gar-row, 4 Port. (Ala.) 223; Oliver v. Gray, 1 Harris & G. 204; Watkins v. Stevens, 4 Barb. 168; Carshore v. Huyck, 6 id. 583; Bloodgood v. Bruen, 4 Sandf. 427.

(f) Peters v. Brown, 4 Esp. 46.

(g) It is now clearly established law, in Pennsylvania, that a new promise or acknowledgment, to take a case out of the statute of limitations, must be made to the creditor or his authorized agent. See Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Wilson, 10 Watts, 261; Morgan v. Walton, 4 Pa. 323; Christy v. Flemington, 10

1 But under a similar statute it was held that where A. and B. were jointly indebted on two separate debts to C. and D., a payment by A. on D.'s debt before the statute had barred it, in pursuance of an agreement that B. should pay a certain sum on C.'s debt, and A. a like sum on D.'s debt, removed the statute bar as against B. Delavan Bank v. Cotton, 53 Wis. 31. - K.