And it may perhaps still admit of doubt whether an innocent person who receives from a partner for value partnership property in ignorance that it is such, does not acquire a good title. See Moriarty v. Bailey, 46 Conn. 592; Clarke v. Farrell, 80 Ga. 622; Warren v. Martin, 24 Neb. 273; Chase v. Bean, 58 N. H. 183.

Where the transaction is such that it does not bind the firm, a difficulty of procedure frequently arises, when the firm seeks redress It is held that as the fraudulent partner would have to be joined as plaintiff, no action at law can be maintained for adebt released or property transferred by a partner in fraud of the firm. Sparrow v. Chisman, 9 B. & C. 241; Jones v. Yates, 9 13. & C. 532; Cochran v. Cunningham, 16 Ala. 448; Church v. First Nat. Bank, 87 Ill. 68; Blodgett v. Sleeper, 67 Me. 499; Homer v. Wood, 11 Cush. 62; Farley v. Lovell, 103 Mass. 387; Chase v. Bean, 58 N. H. 183; Craig v. Hulschizer, 34 N. J. L. 363; Cornels v. Stanhope, 14 R. I. 97.

But in many jurisdictions this technical doctrine is rejected. Johnson v. Crichton, 56 Md. 108; Stegall v. Coney, 49 Miss. 761; Forney v. Adams, 74 Mo. 138; Thomas v. Pennrich, 28 Ohio St. 55; Liberty Savings Bank v. Campbell, 75 Va 534 , Cotzhausen v. Judd, 43 Wis. 213. See also Heilbut v. Nevill, L. R. 4 C. P. 354, 5 id. 4 78.

Where an action at law by all the partners is not allowed, the proper remedy is a bill in equity by the defrauded partners. Piercy v. Fynney, L. R. 12 Eq. 69, and cases cited, supra.

1 A firm is not liable for such torts, unless done in the course of the firm business. Abraham v. Hall, 59 Ala. 386; Gwynn v. Duffield, 66 Ia. 708; Rosenkrans v. Marker, 115 Ill. 331; Wbodling V. Knickerbocker, 31 Minn 268; or with the copartners' knowledge and assent, Loomis v. Barker, 69 Ill. 360; or unless it receives the benefit of the transaction. Durant v. Rogers, 87 Ill. 508.

*been held that one partner might bind the firm by a guaranty or letter of credit given in their name; (v) but it seems to be now settled that there must be a special authority for that purpose; (w) but this may be implied from the common course of business or previous transactions between the parties, or from subsequent adoption by the firm. (x) And if the word "surety" be added to the signature of the firm, this casts upon the holder the burden of proving the assent of the firm. (y) And if the signature or indorsement be in the usual form but the party receiving it knows that it is given by way of suretyship, he must prove by direct evidence or equivalent circumstances the assent of the partners. (z) partner, represented that he had made the purchases, and that he had sold a part of the wines so purchased at a profit; the proceeds of such supposed sales he paid to A, and rendered accounts, in which he stated the purchases to have been made at a certain rate per pipe. In fact, C had neither bought nor sold any wine. The transactions were wholly fictitious, but B was wholly ignorant of that. Upon the whole account a larger sum had been repaid to A, as the proceeds of that part of the wine alleged to be resold, than he had advanced; but the other part of the wine, which C represented as having been purchased, was unaccounted for. Held, that B was liable for the false representations of his partner, and that A was entitled to retain the money that had been paid to him upon these fictitious transactions, as if they were real. Rapp v. Latham, 2 B. & Ald. 795. See Stone v. Marsh, 6 B. & C. 551 (Fauntleroy's case); Hume v Bolland, Ry. & M. 371; Kilby v. Wilson, Ry. & M. 178; Edmonson v. Davis, 4 Esp. 14; Moreton v. Hardern, 4 B. & C. 223; Babcock v. Stone, 3 McLean, 172. -The conversion by one partner of property which came into the possession of the firm on partnership account is the conversion of all. Nisbet v. Patton, 4 Rawle, 120. The partnership is liable to the innocent indorsee of a promissory note signed by one of the members in the name of the firm, without the knowledge or consent of his partner: although the note was given for a debt unconnected with the business of the partnership. Boardman v. Gore, 15 Mass. 331. So the partnership is liable for the fraudulent representations of a partner relative to matters in the course of its business, although without the knowledge of his copartners. Doremus v. McCormick, 7 Gill, 49; Beach v. State Bank, 2 Cart. (Ind.) 489; Hawkins v. Appleby, 2 Sandf.

421; Wiley v. Griswold, 41 Ia 375; Hens-lee v. Cannefax, 49 Mo. 295; Smith v. Collins, 115 Mass. 388; McKee v. Hamilton, 33 Ohio St. 7 , Talbot v. Wilkins, 31 Ark. 411. See Schwabacker v. Riddle, 84 Ill. 517. It is held that the implied authority of a partner does not extend to illegal contracts, as the borrowing of money at usurious interest, and will not bind his copartners without their knowledge or consent. Hutchins v. Turner, 8 Humph. 415. The court in this case said: " An agency or authority to a partner to violate the provisions of a public statute cannot be implied; nor can it be implied that such illegal act is within the scope of the partnership, which could only exist for lawful purposes." See Pierce v. Jackson, 6 Mass. 245; Sherwood v. Marwick, 5 Greenl. 295; Coomer v. Bromley, 12 E. L. & E. 307; State v. Neal, 7 Foster (N. H.), 131; Graham v. Meyer, 4 Blatch. 129.

(v) Hope v. Cust, cited in 1 East, 48; Ex parte Gardom, 15 Ves. 286.

(w) Sweetser v. French, 2 Cush. 309; McQuewans v. Hamlin, 35 Penn. St. 517.

(x) Crawford v. Sterling, 4 Esp. 207; Sutton v. Irwine, 12 S. & R. 13; Ex parte Nolte, 2 Glyn & J. 295; Hamill v. Purvis, 2 Penn. 177; Cremer v. Higginson, 1 Mason, 323; Foote v. Sabin, 19 Johns. 154; Laverty v. Burr, 1 Wend. 531; N. Y. Fire Insurance Co. v. Bennett, 5 Conn. 574; Andrews v. Planters' Bank, 7 Sm. & M. 192; Langan v. Hewett, 13 Sm. & M. 122; Sweetser v. French, 2 Cush. 309. See In re West of England Bank, 14 Ch. D. 317; Moran v. Prather, 23 Wall. 492; Dubuque Bank v. Carpenter, 34 Ia. 433; S. c. 41 Ia. 518.