1 So it was held in Castellain v. Preston, 8 Q. B D. 613, in the case of an unpaid vendor who received insurance money for damage to a house by fire after the date of the contract of its sale, but before the date of the completion of the sale, that the insurance company could not recover it either for its own benefit or as trustees for the purchaser. See Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. 55 N. T. 343; Honore v. Lamar Ins. Co 51 I1L 409.

One who has an interest in a building only as a tenant for years, or from year to year, can insure only that interest; and whatever he insures, he would recover, not the value of the whole property, but only the value of his interest. (v) 1 A trustee, an agent, or a consignee, is generally under no obligation to insure against fire; but may do so at his discretion. (w) If policies provide that property held only in trust, or on commission, must be so stated and insured, such a provision may be extended by its own terms, and otherwise perhaps by construction, * *to include everything in which the insured has but a qualified interest, the ownership being in: another person. (x)

If a consignee insures against fire, in his own name, goods in his possession to their full value, there is good reason as well as authority for saying, that he will be regarded as having an implied authority to insure them for the benefit of the owner, and he will recover their full value for his own benefit, as far as his own interest extends, and beyond that for the benefit of the owner. (y) 2 At the same time, the intention of the parties operates upon the construction of a fire policy, much as it does upon that of a marine policy; therefore, if a fair and reasonable con(u) Thomas v. Vonkapff, 6 Gill & J. 372; Vernon v. Smith, 5 B. & Ald. 1. But if there is no obligation on the part of the mortgagor to insure for the benefit of the mortgagee, the latter has no equitable lien upon the property. Carter v. Rockett, 8 Paige, 437. See Colombia Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 10 Pet. 507, 512; McDonald v. Black, 20 Ohio, 193. It seems that an order indorsed by the insured on a policy issued by a mutual insurance company "to pay the within, in case of loss," to a mortgagee, and assented to by the company, will enable the mortgagee to sue on the policy in his own name. Barrett v. Union Ins. Co. 7 Cush. 175.

(v) Niblo v. North American Ins. Co.

1 Sandf. 551. If the tenant owns the building, and not the land under it, with the right of removing the building, he may recover the value of the building, if insured to that extent. Laurent v. Chatham Ins. Co. 1 Hall, 41. See Fletcher v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 18 Pick. 419.

(w) Lucena v. Craufurd, 3 B. & P. 95; De Forest v. Fulton Fire Ins. Co. 1 Hall, 103.

(x) Turner v. Stetts, 28 Ala. 420. See also, Stilwell v. Staples, 6 Duer, 63, 19 N. Y. 401.

(y) De Forest v. Fulton Ins. Co. l Hall, 84, 116; Siter v. Morn, 13 Penn. State, 220; Goodall v. New England Ins. Co. 5 Foster, 169, 186.

1 Where lessees held machinery which they were to return in good order, it was said that their interest was the value of the property they were bound to replace, in Imperial Ins. Co. v. Murray, 73 Penn. St 13.

2 A policy of insurance taken oat by warehouse-keepers against loss or damage by fire on "merchandise, their own or held by them in trust, or in which they have an interest or liability, contained in" a designated warehouse, covers the merchandise itself and not merely the interest or claim of the warehouse-keepers. Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore Warehouse Co. 93 U. S. 527.

struction of the words and facts in the case, leads to the conclusion that it was not the intention of the parties to insure more than the consignee's interest, no more than that will be recovered. (z)

It is now common for a commission-merchant to cover by a policy, taken out in his own name, all the goods of his various consignors. (a) And it has been held, that the phrase "goods held on commission," has a similar effect with the phrase "for whom it may concern," in marine policies. (b) *A person having a lien on buildings under a State lien law has an insurable interest in the buildings. (c)

Any bailee having any legal or equitable interest in the goods, may insure that interest. Hence a common carrier, who has a lien on the goods for his compensation, and also insures them himself to a considerable extent, may insure his interest. (d) We should doubt, however, whether he would be held to have the implied authority of a consignee, which, as we have seen, is to insure the whole value and recover it for the owner. Still, this authority might be given him by ratification, if it was his intention to insure as agent of the owner. And if the principle applied to marine policies should be held applicable to fire policies

(z) Parks v. Gen. Interest Ass. Co. 5 Pick. 34. An insurance upon merchandise in a warehouse, "for account of whom it may concern," protects only such interests as were intended to be insured at the time of effecting the insurance. Steele v. Insurance Co. 17 Penn. State, 290, 298. Lewis, J.: "All the authorities go to show, that the intention of the party effecting an insurance, at the time of doing so, ought to lead and govern the future use of it, and that no one can, by any subsequent act, entitle himself to the benefit of it, without showing that his interest was intended to be embraced by it when it was made. This rule has especial application to insurances made 'for account of whom it may concern;' and where these terms are used in the policy, it is not sufficient for the party who claims the benefit of the insurance, to show merely that he is the owner of, or has an insurable interest in, the goods. He must show that he caused the insurance to be effected for his benefit, or that it was intended, at the time, for his security. These terms in the policy will not, in general, dispense with this evidence. And where the party claiming the benefit cannot show that he caused or directed the insurance to be effected, it will not serve him to rest upon some supposed secret intention not manifested by a single word or act, at the time of the transaction, to mark its character, and indicate the person or interest intended to be insured. That which is not manifested by evidence, is to be treated as having no existence. The nature of the transaction must be fixed at the time of insurance, and cannot be changed by subsequent consent of the insured, without the authority of the underwriters. If this were not law, all the mischiefs arising from gambling policies might ensue." See also Brichta v. New York Ins. Co. 2 Hall, 372.

(a) Millaudon v. Atlantic Ins. Co. 8 La. 557.

(b) De Forest v. Fulton Ins. Co. 1 Hall, 124.

(c) Franklin Ins. Co. v. Coates, 14 Md. 285.

(d) In Crowley v. Cohen, 3 B. & Ad. 478, it was held, that an insurance "on goods " was sufficient to cover the interest of carriers in the property under their charge, and that their particular interest need not be specified. Van Natta v. Mutual Ins. Co. 2 Sandf. 490; Chase v. Washington Ins. Co. 12 Barb. 595.

(and we know no reason why it should not be), this ratification might be made after the loss. (e)

The rale of delectus personarum, and the right of insurers to choose whom they will insure, and therefore to know whom they insure, applies to fire policies in the same way that it applies to marine policies; (f) and so do the general principles and rules which determine agency, authority, and ratification. (g)

There is, however, one important difference, arising from the provision in many of our fire policies, which is indeed required by some of the charters of the companies, by force of which the company has a lien to the amount of the premium note on all the property insured. It is obvious, that, in all such cases, it would be a misrepresentation or a concealment discharging the insurers, if the insurers were not informed of any previous liens or incumbrances by mortgage or otherwise, which would encumber or prevent the lien to. which the insurers are entitled. (h)