* It has been held in England that a father was under no legal obligation to educate his child, and could not be made liable for the expenses of his instruction, where the wife, being cruelly treated at the husband's house, left it, taking the children with her. This precise question has not occurred in this country, but the weight and tendency of authorities would not require us to believe that the decision would be the same here as in England. It has been held in Massachusetts that where a wife leaves a husband from his cruelty, taking her child, he is liable not only for her maintenance, but for that of the child, if he makes no effort to reclaim it; and this liability is not disch rged by her return to his house. (nn) If the wife be divorced, with alimony, and the care of the children be given to her, the father has been held liable not only to her for the expenses she incurs in their support and education, but also to a stranger whom she marries, and who continues to support the children; but the authority of this case has been, to say the least, weakened. (o) And where the father and

(n) We are unable to discriminate these cases, on principle, from any which may occur, in which compensation is sought from a father for things supplied to an infant, which were absolutely needed for his subsistence, and which the child would not have had unless they were supplied by a stranger. Where the infant has unnecessarily andl in his own wrong left his parent and renounced the filial relation, it seems to he held that the liability of the parent ceases. Hut in the principal case in which this is directly decided (Angel v. McLellan, 16, Mass. 28), the child had absconded to avoid arrest for felony, and although the case finds that

"he was in distress in a foreign country," it does not appear that be might not have supported himself by labor, or, in other words, that the things supplied were strict and absolute necessaries. We have some doubts, therefore, whether even this exception would always be allowed, Indeed, we are disposed to regard the rale of law, in this country generally, if not universally, as imposing a liability on the father for all supplies to an infant, which were so absolutely needed that he must have them or perish. The liability may he put on different grounds in different courts,

- in some on the ground of contract and of implied authority, and in others on the legal obligation growing out of the moral obligation, - but on some ground or other we think it would generally be enforced

(nn) Reynolds v, Sweetser, 15 Gray, 78. And see Bazely v. Forder, L. R. 3Q B. 559.

(o) Stanton v. Willson, 3 Day, 37. This mother separate, and the father permits the mother to take the children with her, then the father constitutes the mother his agent to provide for his children, and is bound by her contract for necessaries for them. (p) There is, indeed, authority in England and in this country, for holding that if a parent of sufficient ability to provide suitably for his children neglect to do so he is guilty of an indictable offence. (q)

It becomes a different question when the child has an independent property sufficient for his own maintenance; what then is the father's obligation? It would seem that the rule of law * formerly was, that if the parent had abundant means himself, he was bound to provide for his children, even if they had independent property. (r) And this rule is enforced even now in some instances. (s) It is, however, in general, relaxed; and courts go far in appropriating the means of the child to his own support, although the father may also be entirely able to maintain him. (t) And where the father is without means to educate and support his children in a manner which is rendered suitable by their position and expectations, courts of equity will not only make an allowance out of the estate of the children, but will, if necessary, take from the principal of a vested legacy for the proper maintenance and education of the legatee. (u) Such decrees are usually made for the future maintenance of the child; but it cannot be said that there is a positive rule preventing retrospective allowances. (v) But a court will not, unless for very strong and special reasons, make an allowance to the father, out of the infant's estate, for the past maintenance of his child. (w)

Whether the mother is under an equal obligation with the father to maintain the child, the father being dead, seems not to be quite certain; but the weight of authority, both in England case was commented upon and denied in Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn. 411, and it was decided by a majority of the court that a divorced wife could not maintain an action against her former husband to recover for the support of their infant children, the custody of whom was awarded to her. Two of the five judges, however, adhered to the decision of Stanton v. Willson.

(p) Rawlyns v. Vandyke, 3 Esp. 251; Holt v. Holt, 42 Ark. 495; McMillen v. Lee, 78 Ill. 443; Gilley v. Gilley. 79 Me. 292; Pretzinger v. Pretzinger, 45 Ohio St. 452. But see Wallace v. Ellis, 42 Ind. 582; Husband v. Husband, 67 Ind. 583; Harris v. Harris, 5 Kan. 46.

(q) Rex v. Friend, Russ. & R. 20. See also, in the matter of Ryder, 11 Paige, 185.

(r) Dawes v. Howard, 4 Mass. 97; Hines v. Mullins, 25 Ga. 696; Evans v. Pearce, 15 Gratt. 513.

(s) In the matter of Kane, 2 Barb. Ch. 375.

(t) Jervoise v. Silk, Cooper, Ch. 52; Maberly v. Turton, 14 Ves. 499; Simon v. Barber, 1 Tamlyn, 22.

(u) Newport v. Cook, 2 Ashm. 332: Ex parte Green, 1 Jac. & W. 253. See also Carter v. Rollard, 11 Humph. 339.

(v) In the matter of Kane, 2 Barb. Ch. 375.

(w) Presley v. Davis, 7 Rich. Eq. 105; and see Carmichael v. Hughes, 6 E. L. & E. 71; Starkey v. Perry, 71 Cal. 495; Kinsey v. State, 98 Ind. 351; Tanner v. Skinner, 11 Bush, 120; Walker v. Crow-der, 2 Ired. Eq. 478; Beardsley v. Hotch-kiss, 96 N. Y. 201.