and in this country, might justify the conclusion that she is not under a legal obligation, (x)1 or that it is very greatly qualified in important particulars. Thus, if the * child has property, the mother is not bound for the child's maintenance where the father would be.(y) And a court of equity has refused to compel a mother to furnish the means of educating a child, even where she was entirely able to do so; and it is even said that the court has no power to do this. (z) A husband is not responsible for the child of his wife by a former husband, unless he takes him into his house; but if he does, he assumes the responsibility for his maintenance, so long as he retains him as one of his family. (a) But, on the other hand, the relation which he in this case sustains to the child rebuts any presumption which might otherwise exist, of a promise or obligation to pay the child for his services, (b) as it does in the case of his own children. (c)

Where the parent is thus obliged to provide for the child a home, and a sufficient maintenance, so, on the other hand, he has a right to the custody of the child during his minority, and is entitled to all his earnings. (d) And a husband taking the children of his wife by a former marriage into his family, has, prima facie, a right to their custody and their earnings. (dd) On

(x) The chancery cases which assert this obligation, appear to do so, on the ground of the ability of the mother and the need of the children. See Hughes v. Hughes, 1 Bro. Ch. 387. In Benson v. Remington, 2 Mass. 113, the court say: "The law is very well settled that parents are under obligations to support their children, and that they are entitled to their earnings." In Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. 274. Parker, C. J., says: "Generally the father, and in case of his death the mother, is entitled to the earnings of their minor children. This right must be founded upon the obligation of the parents to nurture and support their children." But it is only a dictum in either case; and in neither do the court refer to any authority whatever for this rule; nor are we aware of any direct adjudication, in which it is determined as the point of the case, that the mother and the father stand on the same footing in this respect. See. against the mother's obligation, Tilton v. Russell, 11 Ala. 497;

Raymond v. Loyl, 10 Barb. 483; Pray v. (id-ham, 31 Me. 241; Commonwealth v. Murray, 4 Binn. 487; Passenger R. Co. v. Stutlen, 54 Penn. St. 375.

(y) In Dawes v. Howard, 4 Mass. 97, it is said that where minor children have property of their own, the father is, notwithstanding, bound to support them, if of ability; but it is otherwise with the mother.

(z) In the matter of Ryder, 11 Paige, 185.

(a) Stone v. Carr, 3 Esp. 1; Cooper v. Martin, 4 Mast, 82; Tubb v. Harrison, 4 T. R. 118; Freto v. Brown, 4 Mass. 635; Minden v. Cox, 7 Cowen, 235, this ground it has been held that the father might recover the wages of the son, even for services which it was a violation of law to render, if the father did not know of this violation. (e) For these two things, this obligation and this right, go together. Thus, if the father separates from the mother, and permits the child to leave him and go with her, he is no longer entitled to the earnings of the child, and has no power to avoid his reasonable contracts; (f) and therefore the son may in such case make a special contract with his employer, which is valid against the father's will. And if the parent be himself an insane person and a pauper, and therefore under no obligation to maintain the child, he is not entitled to the child's earnings, nor is the town which supports the parent entitled to receive the child's wages, so long as the child himself is not a pauper. (g) And it has been said that * wherever the son is not living with the father, the son may of necessity be entitled to receive the wages of his labor, and that the father's consent to the son's receipt and appropriation of them would be inferred in such case from very slight circumstances. (h)

(b) Williams v. Hutchinson, 5 Barb. 122; s. c. 3 Comst. 312.

(c) See post, Book III., Ch. IX.,Sectionl. (d) See note (x) supra, and State v.

Baird, 3 Green, 196; McBride v. McBride, I Bush, 15.

(dd) Mulhern v. McDavitt, 16 Gray, 404.

1 By statute in some States, as California and Louisiana, she is under such obliga-tion. Cal. Civ. Code, §§ 196-208; La. Civ. Code, Art. 227. See also Harris v. Han 5 Kan. 46.

It is certain that a father may, by an agreement with his minor child, relinquish to the child the right which he would otherwise have to his services, and may authorize those who employ him to pay him his wages, and will then have no right to demand those wages, either from the employer or from the child. (i) And such an agreement may be inferred from circumstances; as where a father left his child to manage his own affairs, and make and execute his own contracts for a considerable time. (j) Or even if the father knew that the son had made such a contract for himself, and interposed no objection. (k) And it has been held that an infant whose father is dead, and whose mother is married again, is entitled to his own earnings. (l)

It is very common in this country to see in the newspapers an advertisement signed by a father, stating that he has given to his minor son "his time," and that he will make no future claim on his services or for his wages, and will pay no debts of his contracting. Such a notice would undoubtedly have its full force in reference to any party to whom a knowledge of it was brought home. And if a stranger, not knowing this arrangement, should employ the son, he might still interpose it as a defence, if the father claimed the son's wages. But if a stranger supplied a son, at a distance from his home, with suitable necessaries, in ignorance of such arrangement, there is no sufficient reason for holding that it would bar his claim against the father. And we think that he might recover from the father for strict neces-saries, even if he knew this arrangement. * On what ground could the father discharge himself from his liability by such a contract? Even if the father had paid the son a consideration for the release of all further obligation, it would be a contract with an infant, and void or voidable, because certainly not for necessaries. And the whole policy and reason of the law of infancy would seem to be opposed to permitting a father to cast his son in this way upon the public, and relieve himself from the obligation of maintenance.