(j) The Minerva, 1 Hagg. Adm. 368; Prince Edward v. Trevellick, 4 Ellis & B. 59; Ward v. Ames, 9 Johns. 138; Relf v. Ship Maria, 1 Pet Adm. 198; Steele v. Thatcher, Ware, 94.

(k) Savary v. Clements, 8 Gray, 156; Bray v. Ship Atlanta, Bee, Adm. 48; Bucker v. Klerkgeter, Abbott, Adm. 402.

(l) If no provisions are furnished, a desertion is justifiable. The Castalia,

1 Hagg. Adm. 69; Dixon v. Ship Cyrus,

2 Pet Adm. 407. To justify a desertion on account of bad provisions, it must be shown that the food is not merely not of the best, but positively bad, and unfit for the support of the crew. Ulary v. Ship Washington, Crabbe, 204.

(m) The Cambridge, 2 Hagg. Adm. 243; Moran v. Baudin, 2 Pet Adm. 416; Ingraham v. Albee, Biatchf. & H. Adm. 289; United States v. Matthews, 2 Sumner, 470; The Mary Ann, Abbott, Adm. 270.

(n) Act of 1790, c. 29, § 6, 1 U. S. Stats, at Large, 133. This section provides, that if the seaman absents himself without permission, and an entry thereof is made in the log-book, if he returns to duty within forty-eight hours, he forfeits three days' pay for every day he is absent, and if absent for a longer time, der the statute of 1790, it must be a continued absence for forty-eight successive hours; and there must be an exact entry of the facts and circumstances, made in the log-book at the time. (o) Although there may not be a statutory desertion, still there may be a desertion according to the maritime law. (p) And although by this law desertion generally works a forfeiture of wages, (q) yet the court is not obliged to pronounce an entire forfeiture in all cases, but may take into consideration palliating circumstances not amounting to an excuse. (r) A desertion of a part of the crew must make the duties of the remainder more burdensome; but it does not diminish their duty to perform their obligations to the extent of their ability. (s)

It may be added, that officers, or mates, as they are commonly called, although distinguished from the seamen in important respects, not only by usage, but by the statutes, are for the most part regarded as seamen.

*C - Of Pilots. *348

The office of a pilot is one of so much importance, that his appointment, his duties, and his rights, are now regulated by law in most civilized countries. With us, an act of Congress authorizes the several States to make their own pilotage laws. (t) he forfeits all wages due, all his property on board, or lodged in any store at the time of the desertion, to the use of the owners of the ship, and pays them all damages they may sustain by being obliged to hire other seamen. This has been materially changed by the 26th section of the Act of 1856, c. 127, 11 U. S. Stats, at Large, 62, which provides, that in the case of a desertion in a foreign country, the fact and date thereof shall be noted by the commander on the list of the crew, and the same shall be officially authenticated at the first port or place of consulate, or commercial agency, risked after such desertion; and if no such place is visited, or if the desertion occurred in this country, the time and place shall be officially authenticated before a notary-public immediately at the first port or place where such vessel shall arrive after such desertion. The wages of the seaman, and his interest in the cargo, are forfeited to the use of the United States, and are to be paid over to the collector of the port where the crew are to be accounted for. The owners of the vessel may deduct any expenses they hare necessarily incurred in consequence of such desertion, and money actually paid, or goods at a fair price supplied, or expenses incurred to or for such seamen.

(o) Cloutman v. Tunison, 1 Sumner, 381; The Hercules, Sprague, 584 ; Ulary v. Ship Washington, Crabbe, 204; The Rovena, Ware, 313; 8pencer v. Eustis, 21 Maine, 619; The Cadmus, Blatchf. & H. Adm. 189.

(p) Cloutman v. Tunison, 1 Sumner, 380; Coffin v. Jenkins, 8 Story, 108; Ship Union v. Jansen, 2 Paine, C. C. 277; The Rovena, Ware, 809.

(q) Cloutman v. Tunison, 1 Sumner, 878; Coffin v. Jenkins, 8 Story, 108; Spencer v. Eustis, 21 Maine. 519; The Brig Cadmus v. Matthews. 2 Paine, C. C 229.

(r) Lovrein v. Thompson, Sprague, 866; Swain v. Howland, id. 424 ; Gifford v. Kolloch, 19 Law Reporter, 21.

(s) Harris v. Watson, Peake, Cas. 72; Harris v. Carter, 8 Ellis & B. 669; The Araminta, 1 Spinks, Adm. 224.

(t) Act of 1789, c. 9, § 4,1 U. S. Stats. as Large, 64. By the Act of 1887, c. 22,

Any person may undertake to guide either his own or any other vessel anywhere, and may make a valid contract for that purpose. But one who renders such services without a commission, or, as it is technically termed, "a branch," cannot claim the compensation provided by law for pilotage. And if he falsely pretends to have such commission or branch, he is liable criminally; and also in damages, for losses or injuries resulting from his falsehood. If a regular pilot offers, and is ready to pilot a vessel into or out of a harbor, the ship may refuse; but must then pay the pilotage fees due by law in that case, (u) which are usually half the regular pilotage fees.

By the general law-merchant, a commissioned pilot, as soon as he stands on the deck, has the control of the ship; nor is the master responsible for an accident which then happens. (v) But his powers do not wholly supersede the master's; for the master not only may, but should, observe the pilot, and if he be obviously incompetent, disregard his commands, and dispossess him of his authority. (w)

The pilot is always in law the servant of the owner, and the * owner is, in general, responsible for injuries resulting from the pilot's default. (x) This, however, would not be the case if the owner were obliged by the law of the place to take the pilot on board; and although the law seems settled in England, (y) yet

5 U. S. Stats, at Large, 163, the master of any vessel coming into or going out of any port situate upon waters which are the boundary between two States, may employ a pilot duly licensed by either State. The United States Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the State Courts over pilotage suits. Hobart v. Drogan, 10 Pet. 108. The grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce did not deprive the States of the power to regulate pilots. Cooley v. The Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299.

(u) Nickerson v. Mason, 13 Wend. 64; Commonwealth v. Ricketson, 5 Met 412; Smith v. Swift, 8 id. 329; Hunt v. Carlisle, 1 Gray, 257.

(v) See Snell v. Rich, Johns. 306; Aldrich v. Simmons, 1 Stark. 214; Bowcher v. Noidstrom, 1 Taunt 568; Yates v. Brown, 8 Pick. 24; Denison v. Seymour, 9 Wend. 9.

(w) The Duke of Manchester, 2 W. Rob. 480, affirmed on appeal. Shersby v. Hibbert, 6 Moore, P. C. 90; The Christiana, 7 Notes of Cases, 2; Hammond v. Rogers, 7 Moore, P. C. 160; The Joseph

Harvey, 1 Rob. Adm. 311. See 1 Parsons' Mar. Law, 483, n. 1, for a full consideration of the question of the respective rights and duties of the pilot and master.

(x) Attorney-General v. Case, 3 Price, 302; The Neptune, 1 Dods. 467; The Carolus, 3 Curtis, C. C. 69; The Bark Lotty, Olcott, Adm. 329; The Julia M. Hallock, Sprague, 639; Smith v. The Creole, 2 Wallace, C. C. 486.

(y) By statute in England no owner or master is liable for any loss or damage which shall happen by reason of any neglect, incompetency, or incapacity of any licensed pilot, in charge of the vessel in pursuance of the provisions of the act. But this act does not extend to ports in relation to which special provisions have been made in any particular act or acts of parliament This would exclude the ports of Liverpool and Newcastle, the acts relating to which provide, as do ours, that a master shall take a pilot on board, or pay pilotage. This is construed in England to be such compulsion as to exonerate the owner or master it is uncertain, in this country, (z) whether the pilotage statutes create such a compulsion as to exonerate the owner.

If a ship neglects or refuses to take a pilot, when it may and should, and the cargo is injured thereby, the owners are responsible to the shippers; (a) and pilots are always answerable personally for their own negligence or default. (b) for the acts of the pilot Carruthers v. Sydebotham, 4M.& 8. 77; Rodrigues v. Melhuish, 10 Exch. 110; The Montreal, 24 Eng. L. & Eq. 680; The Maria, 1 W. Rob. 95; The Agricola, 2 W. Rob. 10.

(x) In The Carolus, 2 Curtis, C. C. 69, Mr. Justice Curtis said, if the vessel had been homeward bound, so that the master would hare been obliged to have taken the first pilot that offered, or have paid full pilotage, that the owners would not be liable for a collision. This is opposed to the opinion of Mr. Justice Story, Story on Agency, § 456 a, note 1, and to a dictum of Grier, J., in Smith v.

The Creole, 2 Wallace, C. C. 485. The point has not yet been decided. In the Bark Lotty, Olcott, Adm. 829, it was contended, that the exemption from liability continued after the vessel was moored to the wharf by the pilot. But the court decided otherwise.

(a) M'Millan v. Union Ins. Co. 1 Rice, 248; Keeler v. Fireman's Ins. Co. 8 Hill, 250; The William, 6 Rob. Adm. 816.

(b) Yates v. Brown, 8 Pick. 24; Heri-dia v. Ayres, 12 id. 884; Lawson v. Dumlin, 9 C. B. 54.