The reckless and improvident habits of seamen, and their inability to protect themselves against the various parties with whom they deal, have induced courts both of law and equity to extend to them a certain kind of disability for their protection; that is, certain contracts with seamen, taking away their rights, or laying them under wrongful obligations, are annulled. A number of statutes have been enacted both in England and in this country in relation to the shipping articles, as they are termed, or the contracts by which seamen engage their services for a voyage. The Act by which this subject is principally governed at this time is that of 1813, c. 2.1 And it has been very distinctly decided, that any stipulations in shipping articles * which derogate from the general rights and privi- leges of seamen, will be held void in admiralty, and to a certain extent at common law, unless it shall be made apparent by proof on the part of the owner, that the nature and effect of such stipulations were explained to and understood by the seaman, and an additional compensation allowed him, fully adequate to all that he lost by the stipulation. (q) In the case of The of 1818, c. 60, which, in case a guardian shall be appointed to a spendthrift, avoids " every gift, bargain, sale, or transfer of any real or personal estate," made by the spendthrift after the complaint of the selectmen to the judge of probate, and the order of notice thereon shall have been filed in the registry of deeds, does not apply to promissory notes. But this case is explained by Shaw, C. J., in Mason v. Felton, 13 Pick. 208, as depending wholly upon the construction of the statute of' 1818.

(p) Mason v. Felton, 13 Pick. 206; Shearman v. Atkins, 4 Pick. 283; and see Pittam v. Foster, 1 B. & C. 248; Ward v. Hunter, 6 Taunt. 210.

(q) Brown v. Lull, 2 Sumner, 443; Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mason, 541; 3 Kent, Com. 193; The Juliana, 2 Dodson, 504. In Brown v. Lull, supra, Story, J., speaking of the effect of a stipulation in the shipping articles, which in that case was relied upon as controlling the right of the seaman to wages, said: " It is well known that the shipping articles, in their common form, are in perfect coincidence with the general principles of the maritime law as to seamen's wages It is equally well known that courts of admiralty are in the habit of watching with scrupulous jealousy every deviation from these principles in the articles as injurious to the rights of seamen, and founded

1 See U S. Rev. Stat. § 4509 et seq.

Juliana, referred * to by Judge Story in Harden v. Gordon, the true doctrine on this subject is set forth by Lord Stowell with great clearness and force. The general principle in all these decisions is, that where a man has made a promise to one who has taken a wrongful advantage of his circumstances or his necessities, he shall not be bound by such promise. And the same principle has been enforced against seamen; as where in the course of a voyage they compelled the master to make a new contract with them for higher wages, by threats of desertion. (r) And contracts made with pilots or salvors, under circumstances of necessity, for exorbitant or unjust compensation, have been set in an unconscionable inequality of benefits between the parties. Seamen are a class of persons remarkable for their rashness, thoughtlessness, and improvidence. They are generally necessitous, ignorant of the nature and extent of their own rights and privileges, and for the most part incapable of duly appreciating their value. They combine, in a singular manner, the apparent anomalies of gallantry, extravagance, profusion in expenditure, indifference to the future, credulity, which is easily won, and confidence, which is readily surprised. Hence it is that bargains between them and shipowners, the latter being persons of great intelligence and shrewdness in business, are deemed open to much observation and scrutiny; for they involve great inequality of knowledge, of forecast, of power, and of condition. Courts of admiralty on this account are accustomed to consider seamen as peculiarly entitled to their protection; so that they have been, by a somewhat bold figure, often said to be favorites of courts of admiralty. In a just sense they are so, so far as the maintenance of their rights and the protection of their interests against the effects of the superior skill and shrewdness of masters and owners of ships are concerned. Courts of admiralty are not by their constitution and jurisdiction confined to the mere dry and positive rules of the common law. But they act upon the enlarged and liberal jurisprudence of courts of equity, and in short, so far as their powers extend, they act as courts of equity. Whenever, therefore, any stipulation is found in the shipping articles which derogates from the general rights and privileges of seamen, courts of admiralty hold it void, as founded upon imposition, or an undue advantage taken of their necessities and ignorance and improvidence, unless two things concur: first, that the nature and operation of the clause is fully and fairly explained to the seamen; and secondly, that an additional compensation is allowed, entirely adequate to the new restrictions and risks imposed upon them thereby. This doctrine was fully expounded by Lord Stowell, in his admirable judgment in the case of The Juliana (2 Dodson, 504); and it was much considered by this court in the case of Harden v. Gordon (2 Mason, 541, 556, 557); and it has received the high sanction of Mr. Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries (iii. § 40, p. 193). I know not, indeed, that this doctrine has ever been broken in upon in courts of admiralty or in courts of equity. The latter courts are accustomed to apply it to classes of cases far more extensive in their reach and operation; to cases of young heirs selling their expectancies; to cases of reversioners and remaindermen dealing with their estates; and to cases of wards dealing with their guardians; and above all, cases of seamen dealing with their prize-money, and other interests. If courts of law have felt themselves bound down to a more limited exercise of jurisdiction, as it seems from the cases of Appleby v. Dodd (8 East, 300), and Jesse v. Roy (1 C. M. & R. 316, 329, 339), that they are, it is not that they are insensible of the justice and importance of these considerations, but because they are restrained from applying them by the more strict rules of the jurisprudence of the common law, which they are called upon to administer." In the case of the Betsy & Rhoda, in the District Court of Maine, 3 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 215, it was held that a negotiable note taken by a seaman for wages, will not extinguish his claim for wages, nor his lien on the ship, unless he be informed of this effect, and have additional security given him by way of compensation.

(r) Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. 261.

aside on the same principle. But, in general, contracts respecting the wages of seamen will be construed liberally in their favor, in all cases where there may be room for such construction. As where by the usual clause no seaman was entitled to his wages, or any part thereof, until the arrival of the ship at the port of discharge, the words italicized are not construed as a condition precedent to the earning of wages, but only as determining the time and place of payment. (s)