Hurl. 339 In this case there was not an appropriation by the owner of a specific cargo already consigned, nor were the bills of lading remitted to the factor prior to the arrival, so that, though the latter got possession of the cargo, yet, as it was against the intention of the owner, he acquired no lien for his advances. The facts were as follows Coombe, a merchant in Ireland, was in the habit of consigning cargoes of grain to the plaintiff, a corn-factor in Bristol England, and the plaintiff was in the habit of accepting bills on the faith of the cargoes, and Bailing the goods on account of Coombe On the 12th of December, 1836, Coombe wrote to plaintiff, he intended to ship a cargo of oats to him by first opportunity, and might probably draw on him in anticipation of the shipment On the 20th December he wrote, that he had drawn for £550, in conformity with his previous intimation, and hoped In a few days to ship him a cargo of good oats The draft was accepted by the plaintiff, and returned to Coombe, who again wrote, on the 6th of January, that he had engaged a vessel which would commence loading in a day or two, and asking plaintiff to get £600 insured on the cargo. Another letter followed, stating that the loading was nearly completed, and then one, dated the 23d of January, stating that he was under the necessity of suspending payment On the same day, Coombe sent the bill of lading of the oats to another corn-factor of Bristol, named Harris, with a letter requesting him to sell the cargo on his (Coombe's) account; but saying nothing of his previous engagement with the plaintiff, or of the embarrassed state of his affairs. Upon receipt of the bill of lading, Harris sent it to the plaintiff, and requested the latter to act for him The plaintiff received the cargo, and paid the freight upon it The defendants, creditors of Coombe, attached the corn for debt, and took possession of it The plaintiff sued them in trover, but the Court of Exchequer Chamber held, that he could not maintain the action. In the opinion of the court no property had been transferred up to the time when the cargo was put into the plaintiff's hands by Harris, the transaction between Coombe-and the plaintiff resting merely in agreement; and the plaintiff subsequently held as the agent of Harris, and not of Coombe - Desha v Pope, 6 Ala 691; Dow v Greene, 16 Barb. 72. The plaintiffs were commission-merchants in the city of New York, and had agreed balance of *the party owning and depositing them with him; and an assumption of some of the securities to himwith A, a merchant of Rochester, to advance a certain rate per bushel on corn to be consigned to them by him, upon the deposit of the shipping-bills of the cargoes with their agent at Rochester, and the agent's approval on the drafts to be drawn on them by A for the advances. Upon this A procured shipping-bills of four cargoes of corn, ladeu on board canal boats at Buffalo, and presented them to the plaintiff's agent These bills stated that the corn was shipped on the account of A, and consigned to the plaintiffs Drafts for the stipulated amount of the advance were drawn by A upon the plaintiffs, approved by the indorsement of the agent, duly accepted by them, and paid at maturity. A had procured the shipping-bills from the owners of the corn at Buffalo (who were also the proprietors of the canal-boat line by which the corn was shipped) by the fraudulent practice of an agent in his employ, who had negotiated with the owners for the purchase of the corn, and for its shipment to New York by their boats; the shipping-bills being signed by their clerk in their names. The plaintiffs were entirely ignorant of the fraud, and accepted the drafts in good faith A got the drafts discounted, as soon as they were indorsed by the agent of the plaintiffs, and absconded with the proceeds, leaving the owners of the corn unpaid. As soon as the owners discovered that the shipping-bills had been delivered by their clerk, without payment for the corn being made, they telegraphed to the plaintiffs at New York, that the cargoes had not been paid for by A, and required them to hold* the corn for their account Previously to the receipt of this message, the plaintiffs had received the shipping-bills from their agent, and accepted the drafts. Upon hearing that A had absconded, the owners sold the corn, then on its passage, to other parties, giving them new shipping-bills signed by themselves and indorsed by the respective captains of the boats. By these new bills the corn was to be delivered to the agent of these new parties, at Albany This agent sold and delivered the corn to the defendants, at Albany The plaintiffs demanded the corn of the defendants, who refused to give it up, claiming it as their own property. This action was brought to recover possession At the trial at the Albany circuit, in October, 1849, a verdict was found for the defendants, and the case was carried by appeal to the

General Term of the Supreme Court for the Third Judicial District At the hear ing on the appeal, the court decided, that the only question which should have been submitted to the jury was, whether the clerk of the owners and transportation proprietors had authority to sign the shipping bills; and that the jury should have been instructed to find for the plaintiff or the defendants, as they should determine this question. Upon the question of law, whether the plaintiffs had any property in the cargoes, the court held, that, assuming the clerk's authority to sign the shipping bills, the plaintiffs were by those documents clothed with prima facie evidence of ownership ; that the vendors of the corn thus made themselves bailees, either of the shipper. A, or of the consignees, the plaintiffs, according to the right of property between those two parties; that, as between the latter, the plaintiffs, when they received the bills consigning the goods to them, and accepted the drafts of the shipper upon the credit of the consignment, became factors del credere, and acquired an interest in the corn which-could not be defeated by the vendor nor by the vendee; that the consignment, and the advances made upon the credit of the consignment, vested in the plaintiffs the right of property, and the constructive possession - Davis v Bradley, 28 Vt 118. The plaintiffs were commission-merchants in Boston; and in pursuance of a general business arrangement to receive consignments of wool from B. & H. Boynton, a business firm in Hinesburgh, Vermont, and upon the receipt of the invoices and forwarding receipts of any parcels of wool, to accept drafts to the amount of two-thirds or three-quarters of the value of the goods so sent, they had accepted drafts drawn against several parcels which had been intrusted by the Boyntons to the defendants, to be forwarded to them. The defendants were forwarding merchants at Burlington, and had given receipts for the wool in question, setting forth that it was to be shipped to the plaintiffs, which receipts were forwarded by the shippers to the plaintiffs. Subsequently to giving these receipts, the defendants caused the wool to be attached as the property of the Boyntons, taken on execution, and sold, for claims held by them against the Boyntons. The plaintiff sued in trover for thirty-one bales thus withheld from them. A verdict was found for the plaintiffs, and the defendants carried the case up to the Supreme self, by discounting * them, will not invalidate the lien upon the others, (x)l And he may receive a pledge of negotiCourt, upon exceptions, that the plaintiffs did not have constructive possession upon the alleged state of facts. The opinion of the Supreme Court was given by Red field, C. J., and fully sustained the ruling of the court below. Upon the requisites to give a factor a lien upon goods consigned, but not actually received, the Chief Justice says: "These incidents must occur. First, the consignment must be in terms to the factor. That was so in the present case, as much as if a formal hill of lading had been made in his name, omitting assigns. 80 that the undertaking of Bradley & Co. is, in terms, to forward them to the plaintiffs, and for their benefit. They are, upon the face of the forwarder's receipt (which is in fact a bill of lading, as far as one can properly exist in these inland transactions), the party entitled to sue, and the instrument binds the defendants to forward the goods to the plaintiffs, and equally binds the carriers to deliver them, and prima fane, the plaintiffs are the only party entitled to receive the goods upon the face of the transaction. B. & H. Boynton had parted with their control over them. Second, but to the conclusiveness of such a contract, against creditors and subsequent purchasers, it is requisite that the consignee should have made advances or acceptances, upon the faith of these particular consignments That too, we think, is shown by the testimony and found b\ the jury. In addition to this which seems commonly sufficient to give the factor a lieu, and is all that existed in Holbrook r. Wight, 24 Wend. 169, and which seems to us to be a sensible, an J we see no reason to doubt, a sound case, in addition to all this, the present case does contain what all the cases and all the hooks upon this subject, so far as I can learn, have ever regarded as a symbolical delivery of the goods, - the sending to plaintiffs the shipper's receipt, which is in effect and in terms a consignment, or bill of lading to the plaintiffs " - "The case of Holbrook v. Wight, 24 Wend 168, is a full authority for the decision of the county court in this case. There the plaintiffs were commission merchants in New York, and their correspondents, manufacturers at Middlebury, Vermont. They advised the plaintiffs of the goods being in readiness to be forwarded to them, and that they would be sent to a house in Troy, with instructions to forward them to the plaintiffs upon the opening of navigation The consignors about this time drew upon the plaintiffs for $6,000, at different dates, which the jury found, as they did in the present case, the plaintiffs accepted, relying upon the consignments. The consignors being pressed by other creditors, made a different disposition of the goods, while remaining in the hands of the forwarder at Troy, and ordered them into other hands, and to be delivered to other parties But the court held. that the lien of the first consignees was perfected, aud the subsequent disposition of the property could not defeat their rights In this case there was nothing like a symbolical delivery, which does exist in most of the English cases upon this point, and equally in the present case, and which seems to be regarded by most jurists and merchants, as an essential element in a consignment to a factor, in order to perfect bis lien for advances made upon the faith of such consignment, and which fact is regarded as amounting, in all cases, to a substantia] change both of title and possession.'