(s) Taylor v. Robinson, 2 Moore, 730, Bruce v. Wait, 3 Mees. & W. 15 Mur & H. 439; infra, n. (o).

(t) Nicholas v. Clent, 3 Price, 547; and see Madden v. Kempster, 1 Camp. 12.

(tt) Bruce v. Andrews, 36 Mo 593.

(tu) Wade v. Hamilton, 30 Ga. 450.

1 An agent who advances money or incurs liabilities on the faith of his principal's solvency, who becomes insolvent while the proceeds or fruits of such advances or liabilities are in the possession or within the reach of the agent, and before they come to the principal's actual possession, has a lien upon such proceeds for his indemnity. Muller v Pondir, 55 N. X 325. In Nudd v Burrows, 91 U. 8. 426, it was held that a factor's attempt to set up a lien to satisfy a prior indebtedness, when he knew that his principal was on the eve of bankruptcy, and thus secure a preference over other creditors, was a fraud under the Bankrupt Act. - K.

The charges for which the lien is asserted must be reasonable, and warranted by necessity, or the customary course of dealing between principals and agents. Under this head, law expenses incurred in obtaining possession of the goods, where wrongfully withheld by the carrier, have been allowed as proper, (u) The right to pledge goods consigned to a factor for sale does not exist at common law; (v) but this right is conferred by statutes in England as well as in this country, so that the pledgee will have a valid lien upon the goods, provided he has no notice that the pledgor is not the true owner. Though, as we have already stated, a factor's lien depends upon possession, he may by special arrangements be a consignee, and thus acquire rights prior to the possession of the property; but the arrangements must amount to a specific appropriation of particular property already consigned, (w)

(u) Curtis v. Barcley, 5 B. & C. 141, 7D.&R. 539.

(v) Graham v. Dyster, 6 M. & S. 1, Quieroz v. Trueman, 3 B. & C. 342, 5 D. & R. 192.

(w) Fisher v. Miller, 1 Bing. 150, 7 Moore, 527. The defendant, a factor, had received a consignment of a cargo of fish from a merchant who subsequently became bankrupt, with specific instructions to remit the proceeds in liquidation of another factor's account, who had ad vanced money to the merchant upon a distinct pledge of the proceeds of this cargo. The merchant had afterwards instructed the defendant that the proceeds of the cargo in question were not to be applied as at first directed; but the defendant, following the first instructions, remitted the proceeds to cover'the advances made upou the cargo. The assignees of the bankrupt sued the defendant for the amount of these proceeds, and he defended by showing the actual appropriation of the fund by the plaintiff's bankrupt, and the advances made by the second factor on the faith of that appropriation. The court held, that as there had been an appropriation of the cargo in question, to secure the advances, the money was rightly paid by the cou-siguee, and gave judgment for the defendant. Mr. Justice Park, in his judgment concurring with the other judges, says: "A person who obtains money under an agreement cannot afterwards go behind the back of the lender, so as to deprive him of the security stipulated for and agreed on at the time of the advance; and although it is an established rule that a principal may countermand an order given to an agent to pay money, before it is actually paid over, yet, if the principal receive the sum from a third person in the first instance, and directs the agent to pay it over to him, and informs the third person that he has done so, this appears to me to be an appropriation which cannot afterwards be altered or rescinded."- Anderson v. Clark, 2 Bing. 20. This was an action of assumpsit against the defendant, a shipmaster, to recover damages for the non-delivery of a quantity of butter shipped by a merchant in Ireland, by the defendant's vessel, and consigned to the plaintiff at Liverpool. This cargo, like others before it, was shipped by the merchant to the plaintiff, to be sold on account of the shipper; and the latter had been in the habit of drawing against his shipments, and frequently in anticipation of future consignments. The plaintiff was largely in advance by his acceptances at the time the cargo in question was shipped. Upon this shipment the merchant sent the plaintiff a bill of lading and an invoice of the cargo, amounting to £592, and drew on him for £500, The plaintiff refused to accept the draft, and the shipper, by indemnifying the defendant, induced him to re-deliver the goods to him. The full court held, that though the plaintiff might not have an absolute property in the goods, he had at all events a sufficient Qualified interest in them, in the way of security, to entitle him to sue on a breach of contract for non-delivery. Haile v. Smith, 1 B & P. 563. A merchant of Liverpool, wishing to draw on a banking house in London to a large amount, agreed, among other securities given, to consign goods to a mercantile house, consisting of the same

* A banker's lien is both particular and general He has a lien upon all securities in his hands for the general partners as the banking-house, though doing business under a different firm name. He accordingly remitted the Invoice of a cargo and the bill of lading indorsed in blank, to the mercantile house, consigning the cargo for sale on his account The cargo was prevented from leaving Liverpool by an embargo; the merchant became bankrupt, being con-siderably indebted to the banking house for advances made in pursuance of the agreement, and the assignees of the bankrupt took possession of the cargo, with the consent of the captain of the vessel. The mercantile house brought trover against the captain for the conversion of the cargo, and the Court of King's Bench held, that the action could be maintained. Eyre C. J., in giving judgment for the court, regarded the effect of the arrangement between the parties to be a transfer of the property in the cargo, to the plaintiffs, upon a trust in which the merchant and the banking-house were concerned; that trust being, that the proceeds of the cargo, whatever they might be, should remain with the consignees, applicable to the debt of the merchant for advances made by the banking house Says his lordship: "From the moment then, that the goods were set apart for this particular purpose, why should we not hold the property in them to have been changed, it being In perfect conformity to the agreement and such an execution thereof as the justice of the case requires ? One difficulty had indeed occurred to me, namely, that if this bill of lading so indorsed was at all events to change the property; if, of its own force, without reference to any particular agreement, it was to operate as a transfer, -then, if the banking-house had become debtors to the consignor, and had become insolvent, the effects of the consignor would have gone to pay their debts. The injustice of this seemed so flagrant, that I felt great difficulty in acceding to a proposition attended with such consequences. But 1 see no reason why we should not expound the doctrine of transfer very largely upon the agreement of the parties, and upon their intent to carry the substance of that agreement into execution. This will lead to the conclusion, that the moment the goods were put on board the vessel, and the bill of lading was indorsed and remitted to the mercantile house, the property was changed, and was to remain in their hands clothed with the trust expressed in the agreement."-Bruce v. Wait, 3 M & W. 15, Mur. &