As an infant is not permitted to enter into general contracts, because his immature judgment would expose him to injury, and as he is nevertheless permitted to contract for necessaries, because otherwise he might suffer for the want of them, so this * exceptional permission is qualified in an important par- ticular, for the same purpose of protecting him from wrong. He cannot contract to pay even for necessaries, in such wise as to bar an inquiry into the price and value. The law permits persons to supply him with necessaries, and have a valid claim against him therefor for their fair worth; but it does not permit them to make a bargain with him as to the price, which shall bind him absolutely, because it does not permit him to determine this juice for himself, by reason of his presumed inability to take proper care of his own interests; but the value and the price may be determined by a jury. And a seal to the instrument would give it no additional force in this respect, but the infant would still be bound only for a fair value. For the same reason an infant cannot be bound for the amount in an account stated; (b) nor for the sum mentioned in his note, although given for necessaries; (c) nor for the amount due on his bond, for the ancient distinction which held him on a bond without a penalty, but not on a bond with penalty, would probably be now disregarded. (d) If, howfa) See Lord Alvanley's remarks on this power of the father, in Rawlins v. Goldfrap, 5 Ves. 444.

(b) Ingledew v. Douglas, 2 Stark. 36; Trueraan v. Hurst, 1 T. R. 40; Hedgeley v. Holt, 4 C & P. 104; Oliver v. Woodroffe, 4 M. & W. 650; Williams v. Moor, ever, an infant gives his note, his bond, or any other instrument, for necessaries, he may be sued upon the instrument, but the plaintiff shall recover only the value of the necessaries. (e)l

11 id. 256; Beeler v. Young, 1 Bibb, 519.

(c) McCrillis v. How, 3 N. H. 348; Bouchell v. Clary, 3 Brevard, 194; Swa-sey v. Vanderheyden, 10 Johns. 83; Fen-ton v. White, 1 Southard, 100; McMinn v. Richmonds, 6 Yerg. 9; Hanks v. Deal, 3 McCord, 257. Some of these cases declare an infant's note, though given for necessaries, void, hut it is conceived they mean voidable only, and not that such note is not susceptible of ratification.

(d) The older cases hold that an infant's bond, at least if given with a penalty, is absolutely void, not voidable merely, although given for necessaries. Avliff v. Archdale, Cro.. E 920; Fisher v. Mowbray, 8 Bast, 300, Baylis v. Dinely, 3 M. & Sel. 147; Hunter v Agnew, l Fox & S. 15; Allen v. Minor. 2 Call, 70; Col-cuck v. Ferguson, 3 Desans. 482. - It is conceived, however, that in this country, bonds, like other contracts, are only voidable, and may be ratified. Conroe v.

Neither can an infant enter into contracts of business and trade; for this is not necessary, and might expose him to the misfortune of entering upon adult life with the burden of bankruptcy resting upon him. (/) But if he uses, as necessaries for himself or his family, the goods furnished to him for the purposes of trade, he is so far liable. (g) This liability to pay even for necessaries seems to be founded only on his actual necessities, and if he had already supplied himself with sufficient clothing, it was held that he was not bound to pay for similar articles subsequently purchased, although they might be suitable in themselves,2 and although he had avoided payment for the

Birdsall, 1 Johns. Cas. 127. The marginal note to this case erroneously uses the word void, in relation to such bond; the court said it was only voidable.

(e) Earle v. Reed, 10 Met. 387; Dubose v. Wheddon, 4 McCord, 221. See also Stone v. Dennison, 13 Pick. 1; Breed v. Judd, 1 Gray, 455, that wherever the form of an infant's contract for necessaries is such that the consideration is open to inquiry, he may be sued upon the contract itself. And in Bradley v. Pratt, 23 Vt. 378, interest was allowed on a promissory note given by an infant, and it is declared that there is no general rule exempting infants from a liability to pay interest on their just debts.

(f) Whittingham v. Hill, Cro. J. 494; Whywall v. Champion, 2 Stra. 1083; Dilk v. Keighley, 2 Esp. 480; Latt v. Booth, 3 Car. & K. 292. But if with his guardian's consent he is carrying on a certain business, it has been held that he might bind himself to pay for articles suitable and necessary for that business. Rundell v. Keeler, 7 Watts, 237. Sed quoere. Although an infant cannot trade, and would not be bound to execute any contract of trade he may have entered into, yet if he has in part executed such contract himself he may sue the adult for non-performance on his part, and this while he is yet an infant. Warwick v. Bruce, 2 M. & Sel. 205. As to bankruptcy of an infant see post, Chapter on Bankruptcy and Insolvency in Third Volume. (g) Turberville v. Whitehouse, 1 C. & P. 94; s. C. 12 Price, 692.

1 An infant " is held on a promise implied by law, and not, strictly speaking, on his actual promise. The law implies the promise to pay from the necessity of his situation, just as in the case of a lunatic. In other words, he is liable to pay only what the necessaries were reasonably worth, and not what he may improvidently have agreed to pay for them." Trainer v. Trumbull, 141 Mass. 527. 530.

It seems, therefore, that an action for necessaries should properly be brought on this quasi contractual liability, or promise implied by law, rather than on an express promise or note or bond. See cases of notes in note (e), supra. Also Ayers v. Burns, 87 Ind. 245. In In re Soltykoff, (1891), 1 Q. B. 413, it was held that the "acceptance of a bill of exchange is not binding on an infant, though given for necessaries, Lord Esher saying: "He is not liable upon a bill of exchange or promissory note under any circumstances."

But as no injustice is thereby done to the infant, recovery is generally, though not universally, allowed on the express contract or note or bond, the amount of the recovery being restricted to the real value of the necessaries. See cases in note (e), supra. Also Hay v. Tubbs, 50 Vt. 688; Walter v. Everard, (1891), 2 Q. B. 369. In the latter case it was held that art infant was liable on a bond (without penalty) to pay £300 for instruction as an apprentice.