2 Foster v. Redgrave, L. R. 4 Ex. 35; Barnes v. Toye, 13 Q. B. D. 410; Johnstone v Marks, 19 Q. B. D. 509; McKanna v. Merry, 61 Ill. 177, 180; Trainer v. Trumbull, 141 Mass. 527, 530; Decell v. Lewenthal, 57 Miss. 331; Nichol v. Steger, 6 Lea, 393.

" It is immaterial whether the plaintiffs did or did not know of the existing supfirst purchase on the ground of his infancy. (h) As he cannot trade, neither can he subject himself to the incidents of trade, as bankruptcy or insolvency, (i) nor is he liable as a partner of a mercantile firm. (j)1 Nor can he be sued on his covenant as an * apprentice. (k) Nor is his contract for labor and * 315

(h) Burghart v. Angersteiu, 6 C & P. 690.

(i) For no man can be a bankrupt fur debts which he is not obliged to pay. Rex v. Cole, 1 Ld. Raym. 443, per Holi, C. J.; Ex parte Sydebotham, 1 Atk. 146; Ex parte Jones, 18 Ch. D. 109. - And a com mission of bankruptcy against an infant is void, and not merely voidable. Belton v. Hodges, 9 Biug. 365; O'Brien v. Currie, 3 C. & P. 283. This is the English rule; but in this country it has been held that an infant is entitled to the benefit of the bankrupt law of the United States of 1841, and that the proceedings might be in his own name. In re Samuel Book, 3 McLean, 317.

(j) If, however, an infant engages in a partnership, he must, at or within a reasonable time after the period of his coming of age, notify his disaffirmance thereof; otherwise he will be deemed to have confirmed it, and will be bound by subsequent contracts made on the credit of the partnership. Goode v. Harrison, 5 B. & Ald. 147. Bayley, J., in this case, said: " It is clear that an infant may be in partnership. It is true that he is not liable for contracts entered into doling his infancy; but still, he may be a partner. If he is in point of fact a partner during his infancy, he may, when he comes of age, elect if he will continue that partnership or not. If he continues the partnership, he will then be liable as a partner; if he dissolves the partnership, and if, when of age, he takes the proper means to let the world know that the partnership is dissolved, then he will cease to be a partner. But the foundation of my opinion is the negligence of service generally binding.1 But enlistments in the navy, though made without the consent of the parent or guardian, are binding, and the infant cannot avoid them; (m) and it is the same as to the army. (n) Neither can he avoid a contract whereby he

Bennion at the time he became age

Suppose an infant is nut really a partner, and that, during his infancy, he never in fact enters into any joint purchase, bat that he holds out to different people,'I am a partner with A,' and then comes of age. Suppose also that the person to whom he made the representation furnishes A with goods, A representing himself to be a partner with the infant, and the latter having done nothing to correct the mistake and apprehension in the mind of the seller of those goods, 1 should think, in such a case as that, the infant, the person who, when he was an infant, had represented himself as being a partner with A, would, by suffering that delusion to continue when he becane of age, and neglecting to set the matter right, be liable to all those persons upon whom the delusion operated. That is the justice, and as it seems to me, the law, of the case." So in Miller v. Sims, 2 Hill (S C.), 479, it was held that an infant partner, who afterwards continued the contract of partnership, by transacting the basic and receiving the profits, became thereby liable on all the previous liabilities of the firm, even such as were not known to him. But as to the last point, see contra, Crab-tree v. May, 1 B. Mon. 289. See also Adams v. Beall, 67 Md. 53; Osburn v. Farr, 42 Mich. 134; Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt. 503; Tobey v. Wood, 123 Mass. 88.

(k) It is clear that an infant cannot be sued on his covenants of indenture See Gylbert v. Fletcher, Cro. C 179; Jennins v. Pitman, Mutton, 63: Lylly's case, 7 Mod. 15; Whitley v Loltus, 8 Mod. 190; Frazier v. Rowan, 2 Brevard, 47, Mcply, just as it is immaterial whether they did or did not know that the defendant was a minor." Per Lopes, J., Barnes v. Toye, 13 Q B D. 410, 414. And see Trainer V. Trumbull, supra.

1 An infant cannot be held personally liable on the contracts of a partnership of which he is a member. Mason v Wright, 13 Met. 306; Folds v Allardt, 35 limn. 488; and see Kerr v. Bell, 44 Mo 120. And he may avoid his contract of partnership while still an infant Shirk v. Shultz, 113 Ind. 571; Adams v. Beall, 67 Md. 53. Contra is Dunton v. Brown, 31 Mich 182. But it is held that if an infant actually enters into partnership, he cannot withdraw a share of the partnership property, on the insolvency of the firm, the law devoting the assets of the firm to the discharge of partnership obligations. Shirk v. Shultz, supra; Bush v. Linthicum, 59 Md 344 Yates v. Lyon, 61 N. Y. 344. So, on dissolution of the partnership, as between himself and his partners an infant must bear his share of the loss of capital actually invested in the business. Moley v. Brine, 120 Mass. 324. But see Sparman v. Keim, 83 N V. 245.

Knight v. Hogg, 3 Brevard, 44, Clark v. Goddard, 39 Ala. 164 -But if the infant is a party to the indenture, or his consent is expressed in it, many cases have held that the contract of apprenticeship is binding absolutely upon him, and that he cannot dissolve the relation thus created. See Rex v. Great Wigston, 3 B. & C. 484; Walter v. Everard, (1891), 2 Q. B. 369. - And a right of action necessarily results to the injured party for a breach thereof. Woodruff v. Logan, 1 Eng. (Ark.) 276. - And this, because it was said that such contracts must be for the infant's benefit, and therefore he should not avoid them. But analogy and principle would seem to require that, independent of any statutory provisions regulating this matter, this contract, like all others, should be voidable at his election. See the cases cited in the next note. Where a statute allows a parent to bind his son as an apprentice, undoubtedly an indenture executed in pursuance of such statute would bind all the parties to it, and the infant could not dissolve the relation thus created, but it would not necessarily follow that the remedy of the adult, for the desertion of the apprentice, would be an action against him on his covenants. See also Harper v. Gilbert, 5 Cush. 417.

(m) Commonwealth v. Gamble, 11 S. & R. 93; Commonwealth v. Murray, 4 Binn. 487; United States v. Bainbridge, 1 Mason, 71; United States v. Blakeney, 3 Gratt. 405.

(n) The statutes of the United States provide that the enlistment of a minor without the consent of his parent or guardian cannot be avoided. But no person under the age of eighteen shall be mustered into the United States service, and the oath of enlistment taken by the recruit shall be conclusive as to his age. 12 Stat. at Large, 339.

1 Peters v. Lord, 18 Conn. 337; Moses v. Stevens, 2 Pick 332; Nickerson v Easton, 12 Pick. 110, Vent v. Osgood, 19 Pick. 572; Francis v. Felmit, 4 Dev. & B. 498; Thomas v Dike, 11 Vt. 273. And if an infant avoids such a contract when partly performed, he may recover on a quantum meruit for the labor actually performed under it. Ray v Haines, 52 Ill. 485; Dallas v. Hollingsworth, 3 Ind. 537; Van Pelt v. Corwine, 6 Ind. 363; Judkins v. Walker, 17 Me. 38; Vehue v. Pinkham, 60 Me. 142; Gaffney v Hayden, 110 Mass. 137; Lowe v. Sinklear, 27 Mo. 308; Danville v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. 62 N. H. 133; Medbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill, 110 (overruling the contrary cases of Weeks v. Leighton, 5 N. H. 343, McCoy v. Hoffman, 8 Cow. 84); Hoxie v. Lincoln, 25 Vt. 206. Compare Spicer v. Earl, 41 Mich. 191.

It has been held that any injury the adult may have sustained by such avoidance should be deducted. Judkius v. Walker, 17 Me/38; Moses v. Stevens, 2 Pick. 332; Lowe v. Sinklear, 27 Mo. 308; Thomas v. Dike, 11 Vt. 273; Hoxie v. Lincoln, 25 Vt. 206. But this is in effect allowing the adult a cross action on the contract against the infant, and the better view is that such a deduction cannot be made. Derocher v. Continental Mills, 58 Me. 217; Danville v. Amoskeag Mfg Co. 62 N. H. 133; Whitmarsh v. Hall, 3 Denio, 375. See also Shurtleff v. Millard, 12 R. I. 272.

If an infant has been fully paid for his services in money or necessaries, he has no further claim. Waugh v. Emerson, 79 Ala. 295 , Breed v. Judd, 1 Gray, 455; Spicer v. Earl, 41 Mich. 191; Hagerty v. Nashua Lock Co. 62 N. H. 576. But he may recover the value of his services without deduction if he has received property other than necessaries in payment during infancy. Morse v. Ely, 154 Mass. 458.

In Spicer v. Earl it was held that if a contract of service was apparently fair and reasonable and was executed on both sides, the infant was bound, Cooley, J., saying, " So long as the employer who is acting in good faith is not notified of any dissent, he has a right to understand that his responsibility is measured by his agreement."

In Dube v. Beaudry, 150 Mass 448, an infant with the" consent of his mother agreed to work for a creditor of his deceased father, half of his wages to be applied in payment of the debt. The jury found that the agreement was " not so unreasonable as to raise any suspicion of fraud," and that the plaintiff had not been overreached. The agreement was fully executed, but it was held that the infant might subsequently sue for the value of his services, less what he had been paid in cash.

undertakes to do what he is under a legal obligation to do: as a bond executed under a statute, to indemnify a town for the support of an illegitimate child; for which an order of filiation has been made upon him. (o) He is not responsible as an innkeeper for * losses sustained by his guests. (p) Nor will joining her husband in a conveyance bar an infant feme covert of her right of dower. (q)

It may be added, that an infant may be an attorney or agent to execute a new power, or, indeed, to perform any act which he has physical and mental capacity to perform. (r)