There is an important difference between these trustees and private trustees, in respect to their personal responsibility for their contracts. Where one acts distinctly for the public, and in an official or quasi official capacity, although he engages that * certain things should be done, he is nevertheless not liable on this engagement, unless there be something in the contract, or some admissible evidence respecting it, which shows that the parties understood and intended the promisor to make his promise personally, and to be bound himself, instead of the State, or in addition to the State, for the due performance of the promise. (h) trators, who omit or neglect to put trust-funds out at interest.

(9) In Karr v. Karr, 6 Dana, 3, two years were allowed for periodical rests, at the end of which periods the interest should be made principal. In Dunscomb v. Dunscomb, 1 Johns. Ch. 508, six months after receipt of the moneys was thought a reasonable time, after which interest should be charged. In Merrick's Estate, 1 Ashm. 304, six months was allowed. And see Worrell's App. 23 Penn. St. 44. In De Peyster v. Clarkson, 2 Wend. 77, six months was allowed. In Fox v. Wil-cocks, 1 Binn. 194, the administrator was held chargeable with interest after twelve months had elapsed from the death of the intestate. In Boynton v. Dyer, 18 Pick. 8, one year was considered the proper period. In Schieffelin v. Stewart, 1 Johns. Ch. 620, the plaintiff was administrator, and was allowed from the 8th September,

1803, when administration was granted, to the 6th July, 1805, when the last debt of any magnitude was paid to the estate; then interest began, and the account was computed afterwards with annual rests.

(gg) See also Morris v. Joseph, 1 W. Va. 256; Renew v. Butler, 30 Ga. 954; Sypher v. McHenry, 18 Ia. 232. But see contra, Bird well v. Cain, 1 Cold. 301.

(gh) Jones's Adm'r v. Shaddock, 41 Ala. 262.

(h) Macbeath v. Haldimand, 1 T. R. 172. This was an action on promises against a defendant (who was Governor of Quebec), for work, labor, etc. Buller, J., said: " It is true that he [the defendant] gave the orders to Sinclair, and that every thing which the plaintiff did was pursuant to directions from the latter, whom he was instructed to obey; but these orders did not flow from the defendBut trustees and other officers are sometimes held personally upon their contracts, as for payment of wages, materials supplied, etc., where they have charge of public works, and have funds which they may use for these purposes, and especially where the nature of the transaction shows that the party dealing with them may well have supposed that he was dealing with them on their own account, or that they intended, although acting for the public, to be responsible for the materials they bought or the labor they hired. (i) Such trustees * know the state of the means in their hands, and how far they may rely upon a public provision of funds, and may contract accordingly, while those who deal with them cannot know this at all, or certainly not so well. (j)

The true principle which runs through all of these cases, and applies alike to private and public trustees, is this. To whom did the promisee give credit, and to whom did the promisor ant in his own personal character, but as governor and agent for the public; and so the plaintiff himself considered it. And in any case where a man acts as agent for the public, and treats in that capacity, there is no pretence to say that he is personally liable." Unwin v. Wolseley, 1 T. R. 674. Ashhurst, J., said: " It would be extremely dangerous to hold that governors and commanders-in-chief should make themselves personally liable by contracts which they enter into on the part of the government. It would be detrimental to the king's service, for no private person would accept of any command on such terms. The case of Macbeath v. Haldimand seems to govern the present. It was there determined that a commander was not answerable for contracts entered into by him on behalf of government. And whether the contract be by parol or by deed, it makes no difference as to the construction to be put on it. That indeed was a stronger case than the present; because there it was left open to evidence, from whence it was to be inferred that the contract was made by the defendant as the agent of the government, but here it appears in express terms that the defendant entered into this contract on the behalf of government." See also Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch, 345; Tucker v. Justices, 13 Ired. L. 434; Stephenson v. Weeks, 2 Foster (N. H.), 257.

(i) Horsley v. Bell and others, Ambl. 769. An act of parliament was passed to make a certain brook navigable. The defendants, with many other persons, were named commissioners to put the act in execution. Certain tolls were to be paid by vessels which should navigate the brook, and the commissioners were empowered to borrow money on these tolls. The commissioners employed the plaintiff to do different parts of the works, and such of the commissioners as were present at the several meetings made orders relative thereto. Every one of them was present at some of the meetings, but no one was present at all the meetings. The fund proving deficient, it was held that all the acting commissioners were personally liable to the plaintiff. The Lord Chancellor and the judges agreed in opinion. " The commissioners had power to borrow money, and ought to take care to be provided. That the workmen who engaged to do the work could not know the state of the fund, nor was it their business to inquire; they gave credit to the commissioners." Cullen v. Duke of Queensberry, 1 Bro. Ch. 101, and notes.

(j) Higgins v. Livingstone, 4 Dow, 341, 355. Lord Eldon, in this case, said: " As to the general liability of parliamentary trustees, if I were to give an opinion, I would say that when persons act under a parliamentary trust, and state themselves as so acting, they are not to be held personally liable. But this also, I think, rests on strong principle, that as the trustees must know whether there are funds to answer the purpose, they, when they contract with others, who do not know, act as if representing that they had a fund applicable to the object, and are then personally bound to provide funds to pay the contractors." understand him to give credit? If the promisee gave credit to the promisor personally, and was justified in so understanding the case, and the promisor as a rational person knew or should have known that the promisee trusted to him personally, and he did not guard the promisee from so trusting him, then he cannot afterwards turn him over to those whom he represents, because he must abide his responsibility. On the other hand, if the promisor supposed the promisee to trust only to those for whose benefit he acted, or rather to the funds and means possessed by him as trustee, and if he had a right to suppose so, and the promisee did not demand and receive the assurance of his personal liability, then no such liability exists, and he is bound only to act faithfully as a trustee in the discharge of his promise.

An agent who exceeds his authority and fails to bind his principal, becomes liable himself. On this familiar principle public trustees or officers, as town or parish officers, who enter into contracts in their official capacity, and on behalf of the corporations which they represent, if they so deviate from or exceed their authority as not to bind these corporations, are themselves liable. (k) But whether they are liable on the contract, * or in case, must depend on the character and circumstances of the transaction. (l)

(k) Sprott v. Powell, 3 Bing. 478; Leigh v. Taylor, 7 B. & C. 491; Heude-bourek v. Langton, 3 C. & P. 571; Kirby v. Bannister, 5 B. & Ad. 1069; 8. c. 3 Nev. & M. 119: Burton v. Griffiths, 11 M. & W. 817; Bay v. Cook, 2 N. J. 343; Husbands v. Smith's Adm'r, 14 B. Mon. 211. - Uthwatt v. Elkins, 13 M. & W. 772. Church-wardens and overseers of a parish having taken a lease of land in their official capacity, which they were not authorized by the statute 59 Geo.

III., c. 12, to hold in the nature of a corporation, it was held to be a personal undertaking of their own, on which they were individually responsible for the payment of rent. - " If an overseer of the poor contract with tradesmen upon account of the poor, and upon his own credit, as soon as he receives so much of the poor's money, it becomes his own debt." Holt, C. J., Anon. 12 Mod. 559. (l) See ante, p, * 68, note [to).