A question, not the same with those we have considered, yet closely akin to them, has been much discussed. It is, What *does the term "obligation" in this clause, include? The importance of the question rests mainly on the distinction which has been drawn between the laws of a State which were in force at the time the contract was made, and those which are subsequently enacted. The latter may certainly impair this "obligation," while the former, as it is contended, certainly cannot; because all existing laws enter into contracts made under them, and define and determine that contract Upon this principle, the insolvent laws of a State, which on certain terms discharged all remedies on contracts made, after its passage, between the citizens of the State, have been held to be constitutional. Those who hold to the distinction maintain, that the "obligation " of the contract consists in the municipal law existing at the time the contract is made, (s) or perhaps in a

5 Md. I; Anderson v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 613; Felch v. Bugbee, 9 Amer. Law Reg. 104; Demeritt v. Exchange Bank, U. S. C. C., Mass. 1857, 20 Law Reporter, 606; Hale v. Baldwin, U. S. C. C, Mass., 1861, 24 Law Rep. 270. See chapter on Bankruptcy.

(s) "A contract is an agreement in which a party undertakes to do or not to do a particular tiling. The law binds him to perform his undertaking, and this is, of course, the obligation of his contract." Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122. Marshall, C. J.: "What is it, then, which constitutes the obligation of a contract ? The answer is given by the Chief Justice, in the case of Sturges v Crowniushield, to which I readily assent now, as I did then; it is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement. The law, then, which has this binding obligation, must govern and control the contract, in every shape in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affects its validity, construction, or discharge. It is, then, the municipal law of the State, whether that be written or unwritten, which is emphatically the law of the contract made within the State, and must govern it throughout, wherever its performance is sought to be enforced." Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 257, 259, per Washington, J.; Thompson, J., p. 302, citing the extract from Sturges v. Crowninshield, said: "That is, as I understand it, the law of the contract forms its obligation; and, if so, the contract is fulfilled and its obligation discharged, by complying with whatever the existing law required in relation to such contract; and it would seem to me to follow, that if the law, looking to the contingency of the debtor's becoming unable to pay the whole debt, should provide for his discharge on payment of a part, this would enter into the law of the contract, and the obligation to pay would, of course, be subject to such contingency." And per Trimble, J., p 318: "From these authorities, and many more might be cited, it may be fairly concluded, that the obligation of the contract consists in the power and efficacy of the law which applies to and enforces performance of the contract, or the payment of an equivalent for non-performance. The obli-gation does not inhere and subsist in the contract itself, proprio vigorc, but in the law applicable to the contract. This is the sense, I think, in which the Concombination of the moral, natural, and municipal law,(t) * while those who deny the distinction insist that the "obligation" consists in the universal law of contracts which is unaffected by municipal law, and is not itself conferred or created by positive law but derived from the agreement of the parties, (u)

The question has also been raised, whether this clause of the Constitution limits or affects the power of the State to enact general police regulations for the preservation of the public health and morals. Thus, if a legislature grant a charter to a corporation to hold land for the purpose of burying the dead within the limits of a city, can a subsequent legislature, for the purpose of preserving the health of the city, prohibit all persons from burying the dead within the limits of the city, and by this prohibition render their former grant useless and inoperative? Or can a legislature, having authorized an individual or a company to raise a certain sum of money by lotteries, or after having licensed individuals to sell spirituous liquors for a certain period, afterwards, for the purpose of preserving the public morals, recall such authority or license, by a general law prohibiting lotteries or the sale of spirituous liquors? And if this can be done where the grant or license was gratuitous, can it also be done if a certain price or premium was paid for it? While the authorities are not uniform, we consider the prevailing adjudication of this country to favor the rule that such general laws are not, in either case, within the purview or prohibition of the Constitution, (v)1 If stitntion uses the term obligation.*' In Johnson v. Higgins, .3 Met. (Ky.) 566, it is laid down as the settled law of Kentucky, that "the legal obligation of a contract consists in the remedy given by law to enforce its performance, or to make compensation for the failure to perform it. Also, that laws prescribing the terms and jurisdiction of courts, relate not to the remedy for enforcing the contract, but to the tribunals by which the remedy is to be administered. Courts, in a legal sense, comprise no part of the remedy.

(t) "Right and obligation are considered by all ethical writers as correlative terms. Whatever I by my contract give another a right to require of me, I by that act lay myself under an obligation to bestow. The obligation of every contract will then consist of that right or power over my will or actions, which I, by my contract, confer on another. And that right and power will be found to be measured, neither by moral law alone, nor universal law alone, nor by the laws of society alone, but by a combination of the three, - an operation in which the moral law is explained and applied by the law of nature, and both modified and adapted to the exigencies of society by positive law." 12 Wheat. 281, per Johnson, J.

(u) "Contracts have consequently an intrinsic obligation. . . . No State shall ' pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.' These words seem to us to import that the obligation is intrinsic; that it is created by the contract itself, not that it is dependent on the laws made to enforce it." Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 350, 353, per Marshall, C. J.

(v) Phalen's case, 1 Rob. (Va.) 713; Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 263; Him v. The State of Ohio, 1 Ohio State, 15; Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. 194; Vander-bilt v. Adams, 7 Cowen, 349; Coates v. The Mayor, etc of New York, id 585; Bee 24 Am. Jurist, 279, 280.

1 That a statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors is in the nature of a police regulation, and applies equally to the sale of such liquors by individuals or nothing is paid for the license or the authority, the authorities are quite uniform that it may be taken away by such general law. But where a fee or * premium has been paid, there are cases which hold this to constitute a contract that is binding on both parties, (w)

It is certain that a State may pass an act limiting the time within which existing rights of action shall be barred. But a reasonable time must be given after its passage, within which these rights may be enforced, (x)

Cases have also arisen under the clause of the Constitution of the United States which relates to the regulation of commerce by Congress. In these cases the Supreme Court appear to recognize the validity of police regulations or statutes which indirectly affect the exercise of powers, which, by the Constitution, belong exclusively to Congress, (y) We do not refer to these questions, however, particularly, as they do not seem to come within the scope of the Law of Contracts.

(w) State of Missouri v. Hawthorn, 9 Mo. 389. See Freleigh v. The State, 8 id 606; State v. Sterling, id 697; State v. Phalen, 3 Harring. (Del) 441.

(x) Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 207. Marshall, C. J.: "If, in a State where six years may be pleaded in bar to an action of assumpsit, a law should pass declaring that contracts already in existence, not barred by the statute, should be construed to be within it, there could be little doubt of its unconstitutionality." Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 290; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hay-ward, 2 id. 608; Society, etc. v. Wheeler, 2 Gallis. 141; Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 423; Blackford v. Peltier, 1 Blackf. 36; Proprietors of Ken. Purchase v. Laboree, 2 Greenl. 293; Beal v. Nason, 14 Me. 344; Griffin v. McKenzie, 7 Ga. 163; West Feliciana R. R. Co. v. Stockett, 13 Smedes & M. 395; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 328; Pearce v. Patton, 7 B. Mon. 162; James v. Stull, 9 Barb. 482. See Story, Com. Const. § 1379; Edwards v. McCaddon, 20 la. 520, Cusic v. Douglas, 3 Kansas, 123; Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318.

(y) Smith v. Turner, 7 How. 283. as to the State taxes on passengers. Thur-low v. Massachusetts, 5 How. 504, as to the laws of Massachusetts, of Rhode Island, and of New Hampshire prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquors. New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, as to statute of New York prescribing sundry regulations as to passengers brought to that State. Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, as to State pilotage laws.

Corporations chartered to manufacture and sell the same, whether the legislature has reserved the right to alter or repeal the charter of such a corporation or not, see Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25. See also Lake Hill v. Rose Hill Cemetery, 70 111. 191. In 1867 the legislature, of Mississippi chartered a lottery in consideration of a cash payment, an annual sum to be paid and a percentage on the tickets sold. 1 he constitution of 1868 declared that the legislature should never authorize a lottery or the sale of lottery tickets, nor allow an existing lottery to be drawn. It was held, that such a charter, being in legal effect nothing more than a license to enjoy the privilege conferred for the time and on the terms specified, subject to future legislative or constitutional control or withdrawal, the provision of the constitution of 1868 did not impair the obligation of a contract. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S 814. - K.