It has been made a question whether the words "debt, default, or miscarriage," extend to a liability for a mere tort But it is now well settled that they do.(e)

*The third clause in this section, which declares that " no action shall be brought upon any agreement made in consideration of marriage, unless," etc., is not generally adopted in this country.1 It has already been said that promises to marry are not within the statute, (g) But all promises in the nature of settlement, advancement, or provision in view of marriage, are ant, upon the defendants jointly undertaking to pay the plaintiff the rent due; and the goods were accordingly delivered to the defendants. Held, that the case was not within the statute. And Lord Ellenborough said: "Perhaps this case might he distinguished from that of Williams v. Leper, if the goods distrained had not been delivered up to the defendants. But here was a delivery to them in trust, in effect, to raise by sale of the goods sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's demand; the goods were put into their possession subject to this trust. So that in substance this was an undertaking by the defendants that the fund should be available for the purpose of liquidating the arrears of rent." And see Bampton v. Paulin, 4 Bing. 264.

(d) See Thomas v. Williams, 10 B. & C. 664. See ante, vol. ii. pp. * 62, * 63.

(dd) Ledlow v. Beeton, 36 Ala. 596. See Dexter v. Blanchard, 11 Allen, 365.

(e) The case of Read v. Nash, 1 Wilson, 305, for some time gave countenance to a contrary opinion. But the doctrine stated in the text was clearly established by Kirkham v. Marter, 2 B. & Ald. 613. There, one T. E. Marter had wrongfully and without the license of the plaintiff ridden the plaintiff's horse, and thereby caused its death. Held, that a promise by the defendant to pay the damages thereby sustained, in consideration that the plaintiff would not bring any action against the said T. E. Marter, was within the statute of frauds, and must be in writing. And per Abbott, C. J.: " The word 'miscarriage' has not the same meaning as the word ' debt,' or ' default;' it seems to me to comprehend that species of wrongful act, for the consequences of which the law would make the party civilly responsible. The wrongful riding the horse of another, without his leave and license, and thereby causing his death, is clearly an act for which the party is responsible in damages; and therefore, in my judgment, falls within the meaning of the word ' miscarriage.'" Holroyd, J.:"I think the term miscarriage is more properly applicable to a ground of action founded upon a tort, than to one founded upon a contract; for in the latter case the ground of action is, that the party has not performed what he agreed to perform; not that he has misconducted himself in some matter for which by law he is liable. And I think that both the words miscarriage and default apply to a promise to answer for another with respect to the non-performance of a duty, though not founded upon a contract." Best, J.: "The question is, whether the words of the act are large enough to embrace this case. There is nothing to restrain these words, default or miscarriage; and it appears to me that each of them is large enough to comprehend this case." And see Turner v. Hubbell, 2 Day, 457.

(g) See ante, vol. ii. pp. * 62,* 63. And see further, Clark v. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 495; Ogden v. Ogden, 1 Bland, 287; Cay-lor v. Roe, 99 Ind. 1.

1 It is adopted in all of the United States, except Louisiana, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. Stimson Am. Stat. Law, § 4140.

within the statute, and must be in writing, (h) And a promise to marry after a period longer than one year, has been held to be within the last clause of this section, (i)

A parol promise in a marriage settlement, although not itself enforceable by reason of the statute, has been held to be a sufficient consideration, either to sustain a settlement made after marriage in conformity with the promise, (j) or a new promise made in writing after marriage, (k) And where instructions are given and preparations made for marriage settlements, and the woman is persuaded by the man to marry, trusting to his verbal promise to complete them, it has been thought that equity ought to relieve and compel performance. (l)

*The principal questions which have arisen under this clause relate to the sufficiency of the written promise. It is enough if contained in a letter; (m) or in many letters, which may be read together as parts of a correspondence on one subject (n) But it must be a promise to the other party; and therefore a letter from a father to his daughter, promising her an advancement, which is not shown to the intended husband, nor known to him until after marriage, is denied to be a promise to him within the meaning of the statute. (o) So, if in such a letter the writer objects to, and endeavors to dissuade from, the proposed marriage, (p) Whatever be its form, it must amount, substantially, to a prom-ise made to the party, in consideration that he or she will marry a certain other party, (q)1 * The fourth clause provides that " no action shall be brought upon any contract or sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them," unless, etc. These words are very general, and obviously intended to have a wide operation; but they have been somewhat controlled by construction. Thus, if the question be, whether a contract for the sale of growing crops be a contract or sale of "any interest concerning lands," it seems to be answered in conformity with the intention of the parties. If grain be reaped, and stacked or stored in barns, it becomes certainly a chattel. And if it be growing when it is sold, yet if the sale contemplates its severance when grown, and a delivery of it then, distinct from the land, it is in the contemplation of the parties a mere chattel, and is therefore so in the view of the law, so far at least as this statute is concerned, (r)2 And we think it is the same with