Ins. Co. 8 id. 268, Brooks v Marbury, 11 id. 78; Pearpoint v. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C. 232; United States v. King, Wallace, 13; Grover v. Wakeman, 11 Wend 187. In England, Estwick v. Caillaud, 5 T. R. 420, Nunn v. Wilsmore, 8 id. 521; Small v Oudley, 2 P. Wms. 427: Cock v. Good-fellow, 10 Mod 489. It is, however, to be borne in mind, that in most of the States the common-law privilege was taken away, and such preferences forbidden by statute The validity of assignments, not to a third person in trust, but directly to the creditor, by way of payment or security, was maintained in several of the above cases, and in Ford v. Williams, 3 B. Mon. 550; Stover v Her-rington, 7 Ala. 142; Bruce v Smith, 3 Harris & J. 499; King v. Trice, 3 Ired. Eq. 568; Stevens rv. Bell, 6 Mass 339; Johnson v. WhitweU, Wilde, J. 7 Pick. 71; Bates v. Coe, 10 Conn. 280; Waters v. Comly, 3 Harring 117; Davis v. Anderson, 1 Kelly, 176; Leitch v. Hollister, 4 Comst. 211; Fastet v. Traher, 20 Ohio, 540. In the following cases, the transfer was by the voluntary confession of a judgment: Wilder v Winne, 6 Cowen, 284, Williams v Brown, 4 Johns. Ch. 682; Blakev's Appeal, 7 Barr, 449. In Holbird v. Anderson, 5 T. R 235, a preference was effected in this manner, and Lord Kenyon said: "There was no fraud in this case. The plaintiff was preferred by his debtor, not with a view of any benefit to the latter, but merely to secure the payment of a just debt to the former, in which I see no illegality or injustice." It need hardly be observed, that, in all the above cases, the right to make assign-ments for the eoual benefit of all creditors is fully admitted, unless such assignments are prohibited by statute.

(f) In the case of Riggs v. Murray, 2 Johns. Ch. 565, Chancellor Kent, though reluctantly admitting the doctrine which is sustained by the numerous authorities in the preceding note, strongly set forth the dangerous tendency of such a doctrine. That was a case where an assignment had been made by a debtor of all his property in trust, to pay the trustees and such other creditors as the debtor, in one year by deed, might direct and appoint, ana reserving a power to appoint new trustees, and to revoke, alter, add to, or vary the trusts at his pleasure. The Chancellor, while pronouncing this assignment, with such reservations, void, went on to say. "As we have no bankrupt system, the right of the insolvent to select one creditor and to exclude another is applied to every case, and the consequences of such partial payments are extensively felt and deeply deplored. Creditors, out of view, and who reside abroad or at a distance, are usually neglected. This checks confidence in dealing, and hurts the credit and character of the country. These partial assignments are no doubt founded, in certain cases, upon meritorious considerations. Yet the temptation leads strongly to abuse and to the indulgence of improper motives. The Master of the Rolls, in SmaU v. (Dudley, 2 P. Wms. 427, and the Lord Chancellor in Cock v. Good fellow, 10 Mod. 489, admit that such preferences by a sinking debtor may, and in some cases ou^rht to, be given, and are called for by gratitude and benevolence; yet at the same time it is acknowledged, that the power may be abused, and be rendered subservient to fraud. Experience shows, that preference is sometimes given to the very creditor who is the least entitled to it, because he lent to the debtor a delusive credit, and that, too, no doubt, under assurances of a well-grounded confidence of priority of payment, and perfect indemnity in case of failure. How often has it happened, that that creditor is secured who was the means of decoying others, while the real business creditor, who parted with his property on liberal terms, and in manly confidence, is made the victim! Perhaps some influential creditor is placed upon the privileged list, to prevent disturbance, while those who are poor, or are minors, or are absent, or want the means or the spirit to engage in litigation, are abandoned." In Hurd v. Smith, 4 Dall. 76, Brackenridge, J., said: " It has been said that a debtor may favor particular creditors. The right has been allowed, perhaps on a principle of humanity; or, in favor of just debts, to exclude debts in law not strictly ex debito Just it ice. But I do not think that the practice is to be encouraged. It is calculated to create confusion, uncertainty, and collusion. I see nothing that will prevent the mischiefs of voluntary settlements and conveyances, but a general declaration that they are all void as against creditors." In Cunningham v. Freeborn, 11 Wend. 240, Mr. Justice Nelson earnestly enters a protest against the doctrine of preference of creditors. So also Wilde, J, in Pingree v. Comstock, 18 Pick. 46; Wright, J., in Atkinson v, Jordan, 5 Ohio, 293. The inadequacy of the common law to cases like these, and considerations in the nature of those advanced in 2 Johns Ch. 565, have induced the adoption of provisions in'the insolvent laws of many States, suppressing altogether assignments with preferences, or preferences of creditors, even without assignment. Of these provisions, those of the Massachusetts insolvent law of 1838 and 1841, may serve as an illustration. In §10 of the law of 1838, it is said, that "if, after this act shall go into operation, a debtor shall, in contemplation of his becoming insolvent, and of obtaining a discharge under the provisions of this act, make any payment, or any assignment, sale, or transfer, either absolute or conditional, of any part of his estate, with a view to give a preference to any creditor, or to any person who is or may be liable as an indorser or surety for such debtor, or to any other person who has or mar have any claim or demand against him. It is further provided, in the same section, the money so paid the preferred creditor may be recovered by the assignees, for the use of the other creditors. The 3d section of the act of 1841 contains even more stringent provisions upon this subject. A similar prohibition will be found in the English statute 12 & 13 Vict law, to signify debt It holds the property of a debtor not to be his own, but, to the amount of the debt, it is "aes alienum," or the money of another, (g) And if he owes more than he can pay, all his property belongs to all his creditors; not to any one more than * to any other: but to all alike, without reference to his wishes or their efforts; and, by a process similar to the civil-law cessio bonorum, (h) the statutes of bankruptcy take from him all his property, give it to those who will act as trustees for all his creditors, and require that it should be divided, in exact proportions to their several debts, among all.