Met. 597. The following authorities, in addition to those above, tend to show that if the contract is made, or is to be performed abroad, such a discharge cannot be held a bar. Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Smith, 6 Wheat. 131, 2 Kent, 293, note; Story on Bills, sect. 165; Story on Conflict of Laws, sect. 342; 3 Burge, Col. & For. L. 925; Lewis v Owen, 4 B. & Ald. 654; Phillips v. Allan, 8 B. & C. 477; Smith v. Buchanan, I East, 6, Sherrill v. Hopkins, 1 Cowen, 103; Ory v. Winter, 16 Mart. (La.) 277; Watson v. Bourne, 10 Mass. 337; Baker v. Wheaton, 5 id. 509, Van Raugh v. Van Arsdaln, 3 Caines, 154. See the foot-note to this case. Green v. Sarmiento, 3 Wash. C C, 17. This case is an authority for the proposition, that such a discharge will not be considered a bar, if the contract has been sued and reduced to a judgment elsewhere. Nor if the contract was made before the passage of the insolvent act, and that undertakes to release the debt, and thus impair the obligation of contracts. Sturges v. Crowninshield. Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Smith, cited supra. The following cases may here be not inappropriately cited to the point that insolvent laws affect only the remedy, which have been cited ante, to other points Suydam v. Broaduax, 14 Pet. 75; Watson v. Bourne, 10 Mass 337; Beers v Haughton, 9 Pet. 329. See also, Proctor v. Moore, 1 Mass. 199, and the cases cited in the preceding note. The doctrine is laid down in the following cases as applying only when the actions are brought on contracts made or to be performed elsewhere. Millar v Hall, 1 Dall. 229; Emorv v. Grenough, 3 id 369. The courts of Pennsylvania adopt the same rales of comity towards other nations which govern them in their dealings with Pennsylvania discharges. Van Raugh v. Van Arsdaln, 3 Caines, 154; Smith r. Smith, 2 .Johns. 235; Hicks v. Brown, 12 id. 142; Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1» cited supra; Baker v Wheaton, 5 id- 509 '* Pitkin v. Thompson, 13 Pick. 64; LeRoy v. Crowninshield, 2 Mason, 151-175, together with Mr. Justice Story, in his Con-flict of Laws, sections 281, 284, and Mr. Burge, in his Colonial and Foreign Law, vol. 3, 876-925, and 2 Kent, 390, set forth the doctrine that insolvent laws relating in terms to the contract, are to be considered a part of the lex loci contractus, and govern wherever the creditor may live. A most valuable case relating to this whole subject is Towne v. Smith, 1 Woodb, & M. 115, where the view of the text is confirmed by Mr. Justice Woodbury, in an elaborate and learned opinion. Wood bridge v. Allen, 12 Met. 570; Tebbetts v. Pickering, 5 Cush. 83; Clark v. Hatch, 7 Cush. 455; Palmer v. Goodwin, 32 Me. 535; Larrabee v. Talbot, 5 Gill, 426: Evans v. Spriggs, 2 Md. 457. See Perry Mannf. Co. v. Brown, 2 Woodb. & M. 440.

(y) The reason of this doctrine is well set forth by Marshall, C. J, in Sturges v. Crowninshield, above cited; " Every bankrupt or insolvent system in the world must partake of the character of a judicial investigation. Parties whose rights are affected, are entitled to a hearing. Hence, any bankrupt or insolvent system professes to summon the creditors before some tribunal, to show cause against granting a discharge to the bankrupt. But on what principle can a citizen of another State be forced into the courts of a State for this investigation ? The judgment to be passed is to prostrate his rights; and on the subject of those rights, the Constitution exempts from the jurisdiction of the State tribunals, without regard to the place where the contract may originate." To this point see Ogden v. Saunders, above cited; Dinsman v. Bradley, 5 Gray, 487; Houghton v. May-nard, id. 522. See also, on this question. Brown v. Collins, 41 N H. 405, and Whitney v. Whiting, 35 N. H. 457.

1 The creditor might sue successfully even in Massachusetts in the case supposed. Phenix Nat. Bank v. Batcheller, 151 Mass. 589; Regina Flour Mill Co. v. Holmes, 156 Mass. II; Stirn v. McQuade (N. H.), 22 Atlantic Rep. 451.

(z) Green v. Sarmiento, 3 Wash. C. C. 17, and other cases cited in the preceding notes.

1 This statement may formerly hare been accurate. Brown v. Collins, 41 N H. 405. But now, it would doubtless be generally held in the case supposed, not only that the New York creditor might successfully sue in New York, New Market Bank v. Butler, 45 N. H. 236 (overruling Brown v. Collins, supra), but also in Massachusetts. Pullen v. Hillman, 84 Me. 129: Pratt v. Chase, 44 N. Y. 597. Since the decision of Baldwin c. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, it has been generally held broadly that insolvent laws are wholly inoperative as to citizens of another State (unless they consent to be bound), although the contract is to be performed within the State granting the discharge. The persons bound by a State insolvent law are briefly summed up by Fuller t Co., delivering the opinion of the court in Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 115: "It may be considered as settled that State insolvent laws are not only binding upon such persons as were citizens of the State at the time the debt was contracted, hut also upon foreign creditors if they make themselves parties to proceedings under these insolvent laws, by accepting dividends, becoming petitioning creditors, or in some other way appearing ana assenting to the jurisdiction." The question whether the citizenship at the time the debt was contracted, or that at the time of the insolvency, is to be regarded, has been raised in two recent cases. In Pullen v. Hillman, 84 Me. 129, the action was upon a note made in Maine, and by its terms payable there. Both maker and payee were citizens of Maine when the note was given, but before the insolvency the payee moved to another State. It was h'ld, that a discharge granted the maker in Maine did not bar the right of the payee. This decision is directly contrary to that in Stoddard v. Harrington, 100 Mass. 87. It also seems inconsistent with the remark of Chief Justice Fuller quoted above, and with the reason generally given to show that an insolvency law is not in violation of the provision of the United States Constitution forbidding the impairment of contracts, namely, that contracts made in a State where such a law exists, by citizens of that State, must be deemed to be made with reference to the law, the provisions of the law, so far as they affect contracts, becoming by implication part thereof. In Lowenberg v. Levine, 93 Cal. 216, it was held that a discharge in insolvepcy did not bar the claim of one who, though a citizen of the State where the discharge was granted at the time of the insolvency, was a non-resident when the contract was made. The numerons decisions as to the effect of a discharge in insolvency on non-residents, are collected in 6 Harv. L. Rev. 349.