It would be within the province of State legislation to determine the rights and interests of either husband or wife, in the property of either. And wherever State statutes give to the wife exclusive property in either her personalty or realty, or provide that it should not be under the control of the husband, or liable for his debts, to that extent her property would be out of the reach of, and unaffected by, his bankruptcy. By the 14th section, declaring the property which the assignee takes,"choses in action" are mentioned. But these must be his choses in action, and his wife's choses in action are not his until he reduces them to possession. Nor do we see that the general language used in this section would extend to his right to reduce them.

* All the money in the bankrupt's hands, or in deposit at any bank or elsewhere for him, or in the hands of any agent or attorney, passes at once to the assignee; and his order or check for it, after notice as assignee, is valid, and the bankrupt's check is not valid. (j)1

Bowen, 20 id. 563 See the remarks of Shaw, C. J., in Davis v. Newton, 6 Met. 537, defining the extent of the doctrine of the last two cases. Miles v. Williams, 1 P. Wms. 249; Bosvil v. Brander, id. 458; Mitchell v. Hughes, 6 Bing. 689. On the conflict of opinion in the earlier and later English cases as to the effect of assignment, see the note to p. 119 of the second volume of Kent's Commentaries 8th ed., and the following additional cases: Chan-dos v. Talbot, 2 P. Wms. 601; Hawkyns v. Obyn. 2 Atk. 549; Bates v. Dandy, id. 207; "Hornsby v. Lee, above cited; Pur-dew v. Jackson, 1 Russell, 70; Honner v. Morton, 3 id. 65; Wright v. Morley, 11 Ves. 12; Ellison v. Elwin, 13 Simons, 309; Elliott v. Cordell, 5 Madd. 149; Stanton v. Hall, 2 Russ. & M. 175; Tidd v. Lister, 10 Hare, 140, 17 Eng. L. & Eq. 567; Shaw r. Mitchell, 5 Law Reporter, 453. The right in equity of the wife to a provision ont of her choses in action, when the assignee asks the aid of equity to aid him in enforcing his remedies, seems clearly settled at this day. In addition to the cases above cited, the doctrine will be found elaborately and clearly set forth in 2 Kent's Commentaries, p. 121 et seq.y where numerous authorities on the point are examined.

(j) This seems necessarily to follow from, the cases already cited, showing that all the property of the bankrupt is, by the decree in bankruptcy, transferred to the assignees. Hill v. Smith, 12 M. & W. 618- In all such cases, the simple test question would seem to be, "Can the money, in whosesoever hands it may be, be clearly recognized as the bankrupt's ? " Godfrey v. Furzo, 3 P. Wms. 185; Ex parte Rowton, 17 Ves. 426; Ex parte Sol-lers, 18 id. 229. In Scott v. Surman, Willes, 400, it was held, that if goods be consigned to a factor for sale, and he sell and receive the money before his bankruptcy, and do not purchase with it any specific thing capable of being distinguished from the rest of his property, the consignors cannot recover the whole money from the assignees, but must come in under the commission. But that if the goods remain in specie in the factor's hands at the time of the bankruptcy, the consignors may recover the goods in trover from the assignees. Or if a factor sell goods for his principal, and become bankrupt before payment, and his assignees afterwards receive the money for them, the principal may recover it from them in an action for money had and received. The court, with regard to the particular facts before them, held, that the money which had been received by the factor in payment for goods sold, could not be recovered in full, because here it could not

1 Payment to a bankrupt after the filing of the petition although bona fide made and without actual notice, is not valid. Howard v. Crompton, 14 Blatchford, 328; Mays 9. Manufacturer's Bank, 64 Pa. 74. - K.

* So the assignee claims all debts; and if there be mutual accounts or claims between the bankrupt and another, the assignee takes only the balance due the bankrupt, with full right of set-off in the creditor, (k) If the other party has a right, as be distinguished from other money of the bankrupt factor. Money has no earmark, and therefore cannot be followed. Willes, C. J., in thin case. But in the modern practice of factors, where money is deposited to the particular account of each consignor, it is conceived that such money may well be held to possess an earmark. And to the same point are Burdett v. Willett,,2 Vera. 638; Tooke v. Hollingworth, 5 T. R. 215. Lord Kent/on, C. J.: "If goods be sent to a factor to be disposed of, who afterwards becomes a bankrupt, and the goods remain distinguishable from the rest of his property, the principal may recover the goods in specie, and is not driven to the necessity of proving his debt under the commission of bankruptcy. Nay, if the goods be sold, and reduced to money, provided that money be in separate bags, and distinguishable from the factor's other property, the law is the same." Hall v. Boardman, 14 N. H. 38; Price v. Ralston, 2 Dall. 60; Taylor v. Plumer, 3 M. & S. 562; Denston v. Perkins, 2 Pick. 86; Chesterfield Manuf. Co. v. Dehon, 5 id. 7; Scrimshire v. Alderton, 2 Stra. 1182. So in the case of an executor, - Howard v. Jemmett, 3 Burr. 1369, note. Lord Mansfield said: "If an executor becomes bankrupt, the commissioners cannot seize the specific effects of his testator, not even in money which specifically can be distinguished and ascertained to belong to such testator, and not to the bankrupt himself." Ex parte Chion, cited supra. And where the bankrupt's wife is an executrix, the property shall be preserved entire to the testator's representatives. Viner v. Cadell, 3 Esp. 88.

(k) It is an error to suppose, as has sometimes been supposed, that the right of set-off, or the law of mutual credits in bankruptcy, originated in statute provisions. It had been adopted by the courts of law, without any legislative interference. They permitted a creditor to set off his debts against the bankrupt debtor, and pay over to the assignees, or prove for the balance, as the adjustment of accounts might require. Anonymous, 1 Mod. 215; Chapman v. Derby, 2 Vera. 117; 1 Christ. Bankrupt Law, 278-499; 1 Gooding, Bankrupt Law, 190; and later cases cited below recognize this right as existing at the common law. The first English statute which alluded to this right was the 4 & 5 Anne, c 17. The operation of this statute was continued by 7 Anne, c. 25, § 4. This last statute was re-enacted by 5 Geo. I. c. 24, which was restricted in point of time; and after its expiration still more effectual provision was made on the subject of mutual debts and credits, in that of 5 Geo. II. c. 30. Further provision was added in 46 Geo. III., and these statutes form the basis of the English statutes of the present day, relating to this matter. From the English, this doctrine has been introduced into the American bankrupt law. The cases on this subject are very numerous. Many of them will be found collected and examined in 1 Deacon on the Law of Bankruptcy, 698 et seq. We cite those cases which seem most clearly to set forth the doctrine. The opinion of Tindal, C. J., in Gibson v. Bell, 1 Bing. N. C. 743. In Ex parte Deeze, I Atk. 228, Lord Hard-wicke said: "Notwithstanding the rules of law as to bankrupts reduce all creditors to an equality, yet it is hard when a man has a debt due from a bankrupt, and has at the same time goods of the bankrupt in his hands, which cannot be got from him without the assistance of law or equity, that the assignee should take them from him without satisfying the whole debt, and therefore the claim in the statute relating to mutual credit has received a very liberal construction; and then there have been many cases which that clause has been extended to, where an action of account would not lie, nor could the Court of Chancery upon a bill decree on account." Murray v. Riggs, 15 Johns. 571; Bize v. Dickason, 1 T. R. 285; Smith v. Hodson, 4 id. 211; Tucker v. Oxley, 5 Cranch, 34; Ex parte Prescot, 1 Atk. 230; Brown v. Cuming, 2 Caines, 33, and reporter's note; Bigelow v. Folger, 2 Met. 255; Holland v. Nash, 8 B. & C. 105; Boyd v. Mangles, 16 M. & W. 337; Marks v. Barker, 1 Wash. C. C. 178; Demmon v. Boylston Bank, 5 Cush. 194, and cases cited; Sarratt v. Austin, 4 Taunt. 199; Humphries v. Blight's assignees, 4 Dall. 370; Bemis v. Smith, 10 Met. 194; Hew-ison v. Guthrie, 3 Scott, 298; Russell v. Bell, 1 Dowl. (n. S.) 107; Hulme v. Muggleston, 3 M. & W. 30; Young v. Bank of Bengal, 1 Deacon, 622; Rose v. Hart, 8 Taunt. 499. See the learned note on this case, 2 Smith's L. C. 172, wherein the cases upon this point are collected against the insolvent, to retain the whole and settle the whole account, until a final balance is struck, he would have the same right as against the assignee. Thus, if a member of a partner-ship became insolvent, his interest in the property of the firm would pass to his assignee, subject to the rights of the other partners, much as it would by attachment or levy, as has been described in our chapter on Partnership. (I)1 and discussed; Rose v. Sims, 1 B. & Ad. 521; Abbott v. Hicks, 7 Scott, 715; Groom v. West, 8 A. & E. 758; Tamptin v. Die-gins, 2 Camp. 312; Ridout v Brough, Cowp. 133. The debts must be due in the same right. Forster v. Wilson. 12 M. & W. 191; Ex parte Blagden, 2 Rose, 249; Yates v. Sherrington, 11 M. & W. 42, 12 id. 855; Belcher v. Lloyd, 10 Bing. 310.