1124. See also Concord Coal Co. v. Form, 71 N. H. 33, 36, 61 Atl 283, 93 Am. St. 496.
96 Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & Ald. 681.
97Dunlopp. Higgins 1H. L.C.381; Household Fire Ins. Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. D. 216; Henthorn v. Eraser,  2 Ch. 27. In re London A Northern Bank,  1 Ch. 220.
98Tayloe p. Merchants' F. Ins. Co., 9 How. 390, 13 L. Ed. 187; Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411, 37 L. Ed. 790, 13 S. Ct. 811, 866; Burton v. United states, 202 U. 8. 344, 50 L. Ed. 1057, 28 S. Ct 688; Winterport, etc., Co. v The Jasper, 1 Holmes, 99; Re Dodge, 9 Ben. 480; Darlington Iron Co. v.
Foote, 16 Fed. 646; Schultz v. Caledonia Insurance Co,, 77 Fed. 375; Sea Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 105 Fed. 286, 291, 44 C. C. A. 477; Levisohn v. Waganer, 76 Ala. 412; Linn v. McLean, 80 Ala. 360; Kempner v. Cohn, 47 Ark. 519,1 S. W. 869, 58 Am. Rep. 775; Porter v. Gossell, 112 Ark. 380, 166 S. W. 533; Mercer Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Connecticut Else. Mfg. Co., 87 Conn. 691, 89 Atl. 909; Levy v. Cohen, 4 Ga. 1; Bryant v. Boose, 55 Ga. 438; Haas v. Myers, 111 111. 421,53 Am. Rep.634; Chytraus v. Smith, 141 111. 231, 257, 30 N. E. 450; Kentucky Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jenks, 5 Ind. 96; Moore v. Pier-son, 6 Iowa, 279, 71 Am. Deo. 409;
Canada.99 No distinction seems to have been taken in the cases between unilateral and bilateral contracts; yet a very clear distinction in theory exists. If an offer for a unilateral contract calls for the performance of an act by the offeree and that act can be performed by dispatching something through the mall, on well-recognized principles of the law of sales, title will pass and the act of the offeree will be complete as soon as the thing requested is sent. It has been settled since an early day that where goods are ordered from a distance, the delivery of them to a carrier, in accordance with the express or implied terms of the offer, transfers title to the buyer; that is, a unilateral contract is completed in which the performance by the offeree is the transfer of title at the moment of shipment, and the promise of the offeror to pay the price becomes a binding obligation at that time.1 If goods are ordered to be sent by mail there can be no doubt that the same principle applies and that a unilateral contract is complete when the goods are mailed. If instead of goods the offeree is requested to send money, the result also is the same. As soon as the money is sent it becomes the property of the offeror,2 and he is bound to perform his promise for which the money was the consideration. So if the offer requested the sending of a formal document by mail, title to the document would pass as soon as mailed.3
Ferrier v. Storer, 63 Iowa, 484,19 N. W. 288, 50 Am. Rep. 762; Siebold v. Davis, 67 Iowa, 660, 26 N. W. 778; Hunt v. Higman, 70 Iowa, 406, 30 N. W. 769; Gipps Brewing Co. v. De-France, 91 Iowa, 108, 112, 58 N. W. 1087, 28 L. R. A. 386, 61 Am. St. Rep. 329; Chiles v. Nelson, 7 Dana, 281; Shaw v. Ingram-Day Lumber Co., 152 Ky. 329,153 S. W. 431, L. R. A., 1915, D. 145; Bailey v. Hope Ins., Co. 66 Me. 474; Emerson Co. v. Proctor, 97 Me. 360, 54 N. E. 849; Wheat v. Cross, 31 Md. 99; Peck v. Freeae, 101 Mich. 321, 59 N. W. 600; Lungtraas v. German Ins. Co., 48 Mo. 201, 8 Am. Rep. 100; Egger v. Nesbitt, 122 Mo. 667, 674, 27 S. W. 385, 43 Am. Rep. 596; Horton v. New York Life Ins. Co., 151 Mo. 604, 52 S. W. 356; Lancaster v. Elliot, 42 Mo. App. 603; Abbott p. Sbepard, 48 N. H. 14; Davis v. Aetna Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 67 N. H. 218, 34 Atl. 464; Hallock v. Commercial Ins. Co., 26 N. J. L. 268; Commercial Ins. Co. v. Hallock, 27 N. J. L. 646, 72 Am. Dec. 379; Northampton, etc., Ins. Co. v. Tuttle, 40 N. J. L. 476; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103, 21 Am. Dec. 262; Vassar v. Camp, 11 N. Y. 441; Trevor v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 307, 93 Am. Dec. 511; Watson v. Russell, 149 N. Y. 388, 391, 44 N. E. 161; Wester v. Casein Co., 206 N. Y. 506, 100
N. E. 488; Hacheny p. Leary, 12 Ore. 40, 7 Pac. 329; Williams v. Burdick, 63 Ore. 41, 125 Pac. 844; Hamilton p. Lycoming M. I. Co., 5 Pa. St. 339; McClintock v. South Penn. Oil Co., 146 Pa. 144, 161, 23 Atl. 211, 28 Am. St. Rep. 785; Otis v. Payne, 86 Tenn. 663, 8 3.W. 848; Blake v. Hamburg-Bremen F. I. Co., 67 Tex. 160, 2 S. W. 368,60 Am. Rep. 15; Scottish American Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 96 Tex. 504, 74 S. W. 17, 97 Am. St. Rep. 932; Kenedy Mercantile Co. p. Western Union Tel. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 167 S. W. 1094; Haaretick v. Fox, 9 Utah, 110, 33 Pac. 261; Durkee v. Vermont Central R. R. Co., 29 Vt. 127; Hartford Ins. Co. v. Lasher Stocking Co., 66 Vt. 439, 29 Atl. 629, 44 Am. St. Rep. 869; Malloy v. Drumheller, 68 Wash. 106, 122 Pac. 1005; Washburn v. Fletcher, 42 Wis. 152. The only con. trary decision not overruled seems to be McCulloch p. Eagle Ins. Co., I Pick. 278. Whether this case would now be followed in Massachusetts may be doubted. See Brauer v. Shaw, 168 Mass. 198, 46 N. E. 617, 60 Am. St. Rep. 387; Commonwealth Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Knabe & Co., 171 Mass. 266, 60 N. E. 516.
99 McGiverin v. James, 33 Up. Cam. Q. B. 203.
In an offer to make a bilateral simple contract, however, the offeror requests a promise and not an act, and our law does not regard the mere delivery of an unsealed informal writing, such as a letter, as of itself creating an obligation.4 Accordingly in bilateral contracts made by correspondence, the question is, when has the offeree made the promise requested in the offer? It may be forcibly argued that making a promise is something which necessarily requires communication, and that sending a letter which never arrives is no more making a promise to the person addressed than talking into a telephone when there is no connection with the person addressed;5 and the rule that a bilateral contract is completed by mailing acceptance has been ably criticised, and contention made that actual communication should be required.6 But it is certainly in accordance with all analogies in the formation of contracts that some outward indication of assent and of promises should be regarded by the law as essential rather than the actual communication which is necessary for mental assent. If the law is open to criticism for taking the moment of mailing a letter as important, it is because that outward act is not so certain an outward indication that a promise has been made as a receipt of the letter by the offeror would be, and the law should select such an outward act as normally and ordinarily connotes the actual mqlring of a promise by communication.
1 Williston on Sales, Sec. 278.
2Buell v. Chopin, 99 Mess. 594, 97 Am. Dec 68; Currier v. Continental Life Ins. Co, 53 N. H. 638; Palmer v. Phoniz Mut. L. Ins. Co., 84 N. Y. 63; Edgetton v. Hodge, 41 Vt. 676; cp. Campbell v. Knights of Pythias, 168 Mass. 397,47 N.E. 109. But the mere requert to "remit" a large sum though it authorizes the use of the post, does not authorize mailing the amount in negotiable treasury notes, and if the money is lost in the mail, it is the sender's km Mitchell-Henry v. Nor-sich &. Ins Co. , 1 K. B. 124.
3Thus in Tayloe v. Merchants' For Ins. Co., 9 How. 390, 13 L. Ed.
187; Pennsylvania Lumbeimans' Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 126 Fed. 352, 61 C. C. A. 254; Canterbury v. Bank of Sparta, 91 Wis. 53, 64 N. W. 311, 30 L. R. A. 845, 51 Am. St. Rep. 870. the offer requested that a check or draft be sent and ownership of the document was held to pass as soon as it was mailed. See also Sichel v. Borch, 2 H. & C. 954, 956; Mitchell v. Byrne, 6 Rich. L. 171; Kirkman v. Bank of America, 2 Coldw. 397. Cp. Ex ports Cote, L. R. 9 Ch. 27.
4See supra, J 12.
5 But see 2 Col L. Rev. 5, by Dean Ashley.