A party who has himself been guilty of a substantial breach of contract cannot rescind the contract because of subsequent refusal or failure to perform by the other party.93 This principle, however, is only accepted with much qualification in many States. The right of one who is himself in default to recover compensation for what he has done must necessarily be considered, for if one who has unjustifiably failed to perform his contract fully, can nevertheless recover the value of what he has done, though no breach of promise has been committed by the other party, a fortiori the same redress may be had where the latter has subsequently refused to perform. But even in such jurisdictions, as elsewhere, the original wrongdoer remains liable in damages for breach of his contract. This liability he cannot escape.94 Where an intolerable hardship would otherwise be caused a court of equity may likewise decree rescission in spite of the plaintiff's breach.95

91 The preceding sentence, originally published in an article in 14 Harv. L. Rev. was quoted and applied in Raf tery v. World Film Corp., 180 N. Y. App. D. 475,479,167 N. Y. S. 1027. In further support of the proposition see Panama, etc., Co. v. India, etc., Co., L. R. 10 Ch. 515, 532 (semble); Phillips, etc., Co. v. Seymour, 91 U. S. 646, 23 L. Ed. 341; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Galesburg, 133 U. S. 156, 33 L. Ed. 573; Watson v. Ford, 93 Fed. 359, 35 C. C. A. 345; Powell v. Sammons, 31 Ala. 552; Ferris v. Hoglan, 121 Ala. 240, 25 So. 834; Porter v. Arrowhead Reservoir Co., 100 Cal. 500, 35 Pac. 146; San Francisoo Bridge Co. v. Dumbarton Co., 119 Cal. 272, 51 Pac. 335; Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Marsh, 20 Col. 22, 36 Pac. 799; Bacon v. Green, 36 Ha. 325; Code of Georgia, Sec. 3712; Harrison Machine Works v. Miller, 29 111. App. 567; Wolf v. Schlacks, 67 El. App. 117; Cromwell v. Wilkinson, 18 Ind. 365; Anderson v. Haskell, 45 la. 45; Wernli v. Collins, 87 la. 548, 54 N. W. 365; Canfield Lumber Co. v. Kint Lumber Co., 148 la. 207, 127 N. W. 70; Home v. Richards, 113 Me. 210, 93 AtL 290; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Carter, 133 Md. 651, 105 Atl. 760; Bullard v. Eames, 219 Mass. 49,106 N. E. 584; Palmer r. Guillow, 224 Mass. 1, 112 N. E. 493, 494; Stahelin v. Sowle, 87 Mich. 124, 49 N. W. 529; Bobsono. Bonn, 27 Minn. 333, 7 N. W. 357; Nelson v. Hanson, 45 Minn. 543, 48 N. W. .410; Gullich v. Alford, 61 Miss. 224; Mugan v. Regan, 48 Mo.

App. 461; Oliver v. Goets, 125 Mo. 370, 28 S. W. 441; Drew v. Claggett, 39 N. H. 431; Foster v. Bartlett, 62 N. H. 617; Pattridge v. Gildermeister, 1 Keyes, 93; Welsh v. Gossler, 89 N. Y. 540; Hill v. Blake, 97 N. Y. 216, Oallanan v. Keeseville, etc., R. Co., 199 N. Y. 268, 92 N. E. 747; North Dak. Civ. Code, Sec. 3932; Rummington v. Kelley, 7 Ohio, pt. 2, 97; Higby v. Whittaker, 8 Ohio, 198; Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 326, 59 Am. Dee. 677; Oklahoma Stat., Sec. 866; Miller v. Phillips, 31 Pa. 218; Greene v. Haley,

5 R. I. 260; Bennett v. Shaughnessy,

6 Utah, 273, 22 Pac. 156; Fletcher v. Cole, 23 Vt. 114; Preble v. Bottom, 27 Vt. 249; Brown v. Aitken, 88 Vt. 148, 92 Atl. 22; Meeker v. Johnson, 5 Wash. 718, 32 Pac. 772, 34 Pac. 148; School District v. Hayne, 46 Wis. 511,1 N. W. 170. Many earlier decisions are cited in the cases above.

In New York Brokerage Co. v. Wharton, 143 Iowa, 61, 69, 119 N. W. 969, the court said; "Whether plaintiff by his language really intended to assent to such rescission or whether the defendants understood him as so assenting may be a question of fair dispute; but, if he furnished a legal ground of rescission by his breach of the contract, his assent to it was not neces-sary."

92 Green v. Sevin, 13 Ch. Div. 589; Cover v. McLaughlin, 18 N. S. Wales, L. R. (Eq.) 107, and decisions, supra, Sec. 852.