The precise limits of liability in damages for honest misrepr-sentation are not fixed at the same place by all the courts which hold that such liability may exist. Two qualifying principles may claim some support in authority or reason. The first of these finds support in the early law, in the dissenting opinion in Pasley v. Freeman, and in sundry expressions in modern decisions, as in Michigan.42 This principle would confine liability to cases where the misrepresentation was made to induce another to enter into a contract with the person making the misrepresentation, and would be consistent with the modern law of seller's warranty, and indeed would find its chief support in cases relating to sales. On the other hand, the principle, though not inconsistent with most decisions relating to the implied warranty by an agent of his authority, since most of them relate to cases where the agent purported to enter into a contract, has been expressly repudiated by the House of Lords as a limitation on the agent's liability.45 Further, there is no such limitation to liability for misrepresentation created by means of an estoppel, and in the action of deceit the authority, both of courts which approve of Deny v. Peek 44 and of courts which do not, gives little support for a distinction between representations which induce a contract with the person making them and representations which induce a contract with another person, or indeed any other detrimental action. Nor is it easy to see on logical or ethical grounds why such a distinction should be made.

42 Aldrich v. Scribner, 164 Mich. 23, 117 N. W. 681,18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 379.

43 Starkey v. Bank of England, [1903] A. C. 114.