A release though general in terms will be reformed so as to cover merely the right with regard to which the parties were dealing and exclude rights of which they were ignorant.61 This principle has sometimes been extended so as to exclude from the operation of a release unknown or unexpected consequences of a known right to which the release applied and was intended to apply. Thus where a release is given by one injured in an accident and more serious injuries develop than were supposed to exist at the time of the settlement, it is a question of fact whether the parties assumed as a basis of the release the known injuries, or whether the intent was to make a compromise for whatever injuries from the accident might exist whether known or not. On a fair interpretation not only of the language of the instrument, but of the intention of the parties, the latter supposition is more likely, but presumably out of tenderness for injured plaintiffs some courts have gone very far in finding the facts in accordance with the former possibility.62

92; Hataway v. Carnley, 196 Ala. 39, 73 So. 382; Fuller v. Hawkins, 60 Ark. 304, 30 S. W. 34; Seegelken v. Corey, 93 Cal. 92, 28 Pac. 849; Palmer v. Hartford Co., 54 Conn. 488,9 Atl. 248; Taylor v. Glens Falls Co., 44 Fla. 273, 32 So. 887; Kerchner v. Frazier, 106 Ga. 437,32 S. E. 351; Way v. Roth, 159 11l. 162, 42 N. . 321; Benner v. Dove, 283 111. 318, 119 N. E. 349; Walls v. State, 140 Ind. 16, 38 N. E. 177; Earl v. Van Natta, 29 Ind. App. 532, 64 N. E. 901; Hallam v. Corlett, 71 Iowa, 446, 32 N. W. 449; Stead v. Sampson (Ia.), 155 N. W. 978; Bodwell v. Heaton, 40 Kane. 36, 18 Pac. 901; White v. Curd, 86 Ky. 191, 5 S. W. 553; Thomas v. Conrad, 114 Ky. 841, 71 S. W. 903, 74 S. W. 1084; Levy v. Ward, 33 La. Ann. 1033; Frantom v. Nelson, 142 La. 850, 77 So. 867; Phil-pott v. Elliott, 4 Md. Ch. 273; Hodge v. Cole, 140 Mass. 116, 2 N. E. 774; Chambhss v. Person, 77 Miss. 806, 28 So. 21; Henderson v. Beasley, 137 Mo. 199, 38 S. W. 950; Palmer v. Wood, (Mo. 1918), 201 S. W. 857; Gwyer v. Spaulding, 33 Neb, 573, 50 N. W. 681; Hitchins v. Pettingill, 58 N. H. 386; Lewis v. Ferris (N. J. Eq.), 50 Atl. 630; Steanbaoh v. Prudential Ins. Co., 172

N. Y. 471, 65 N. E. 281; Manheimer v. Kuhn, 173 N. Y. App. D. 135, 159 N. Y. S. 437; Davenport v. The Widow, and Heirs of Sovil, 6 Oh. St. 459; Brad-shaw v. Provident Trust Co., 81 Or. 55, 158 Pac. 274; McLeod v. Kirkland (Tex. Civ. App.), 184 S. W. 721; Dar-den v.Vanlandingham (Tex. Civ. App.), 189 S. W. 297; Lord v. Horr, 30 Wash. 477, 71 Pac. 23; Croft v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 40 W. Va. 508, 21 S. E. 854, 52 Am. St. Rep. 902; Smith v. McCune, 78 W. Va. 307, 88 S. E. 846; Silbar v. Ryder, 63 Wis. 106, 23 N. W. 106; Gimbel v. Tolman, 161 Wis. 382, 154 N. W. 628.

60 Jeakins v. Frazier, 64 Kans. 267, 67 Pac. 854.

61 Ramsden v. Hylton, 2 Ves. Sr. 304; Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Mer. 171, 352; Lindo v. Lindo, 1 Beav. 496, 506; Lyall v. Edwards, 6 H. & N. 337, 348; London & South Western Ry. Co. v. Blackmore, L. R. 4 H. L. 610, 623; Gaudy v. Macaulay, 31 Ch. Div. 1; Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. 112,19 Am. Dec. 353; Reggio v. Warren, 207 Mass. 525, 93 N. E. 805, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 340; Dambmann v. Schulting, 75 N. Y. 55, 62. See also infra, Sec.1825.

62 Thus in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 245 Fed. 86, 89, 157 C. C. A. 382, the court said: "The release itself is as broad as it could be made, acquitting the company of all liability arising on account of the injuries received by appellee, whether then appearing or growing out of the same by development in the future, or arising or to arise out of any and all personal injuries sustained at any time or place while in the employ of the railway company prior to the date of the release. In such a release, however, the general language will be held not to include a particular injury, then unknown to both parties, of a character so serious as clearly to indicate that, if it had been known, the release would not have been signed. This was the conclusion reached in Lumley v, Wabash R. Co. (C. C. A. 6th Circuit), 76 Fed. 66, 22 C. C. A. 60. See, also, Tatman v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. (Del. Ch.), 85 Atl. 716."

"The rule unquestionably applies to settlements of the kind here involved that they neither can nor ought to be impeached and set aside for fraud or mistake, except upon clear and convincing proofs. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, 116 Fed. 913, 54 C. C. A. 147."

"We agree with the court below that it should not be disturbed as it respects the injury to his foot. Lumley v. Wabash R. Co., 76 Fed. 66, 22 C. C. A. 60, is authority for the partial impeachment of the release. Upon the general question of annulling such a release, see, further, Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Fowler, 136 Fed. 118, 69 C. C. A. 106, where the authorities are aptly and clearly discussed and distinguished; also Tatman c. Phil. B. & W. R. Co., supra." See also Gold Hunter Min. Ac. Co. v. Bowden, 252 Fed. 388, 164 C. C. A. 312; Alabama Ac. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 73 Miss. 110, 19 So. 105. Cf. Seymour v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 181 Iowa, 218, 164 N. W. 352, 357, where in a similar case the court said: "There was stall no mutual mistake which entitles to relief. That must be a mutual mistake of fact and not error in opinion, and relief must be had in equity, or at all events, upon terms approved by equity. Tatman v. Railway (Del. Ch.), 85 Atl. 716, 720, is a suit in equity and deals with what is beyond all question an honest mutual mistake. A settlement was held not to be binding, but the relief granted is made to depend upon a return of what had been received in settlement. This is, in effect, a description of Great Northern R. Co. v. Fowler, 136 Fed. 118,69 C. C. A. 106,