A ratification may be conditional and, if so, on the happening of the condition, but not before, a liability will arise.50 It is also possible to ratify part of a unilateral liability incurred in infancy without ratifying the whole obligation;51 but where a contract involves mutual obligations, the former infant cannot by partial ratification bind the other party to accept partial performance in return for all or part of the performance which the latter undertook to give.52 A promise or admission of liability made by the former infant to a third person creates no liability.53
1 Pick. 202; Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Miss. 457; Baker a. Kennett, 54 Mo. 82; Hale v. Gerrish, 8 N. H. 374; Rob-bons v. Eaton, 10 N. H. 561; Goodsell v. Myers, 3 Wend. 479; International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 205 N. Y. 188, 90 N. E. 722, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115; Hurely v. Margaritz, 3 Pa. St. 428; Rapid Transit Land Co. v. Sanford (Tex. Civ. App.), 24 S. W. 687; Hatch v. Hatch's Estate, 60 Vt. 160, 13 Atl. 791. See also Hesly v. Kellogg, 145 N. Y. S. 943.
49See American Mortgage Co. v. Wright, 101 Ala. 658, 14 So. 399; Phil-pot v. Sandwich Mfg. Co., 18 Neb. 54, 24 N. W. 428; Paraons v. Teller, 111 N. Y. App. Div. 637, 97 N. Y. Supp. 808 (but see the reversal of this decision, on changed findings of fact in 188 N. Y. 318, 80 N. E. 930); Little v. Duncan, 9 Rich. (S. C.) 55,64 Am. Dec. 760. By statute in Missouri a part payment is an effective ratification. See infra, Sec. 239, also Koerner v. Wilkinson, 96 Mo. App. 510, 70 S. W. 509; Snyder v. Gericke, 101 Mo. App. 647, 74 S. W. 377. Where a payment was made after her majority by an infant, but it appeared to be made as a matter of bounty, not in pursuance of an obligation, it was rightly held no ratification in Parsons v. Teller, 188 N. Y. 318, 80 N. E. 930.
50Kendrick v. News, 17 Colo. 506, 30 Pac. 245; Procter v. Sears, 4 Allen, 95; Thompson v. Lay, 4 Pick. 48, 16 Am. Dec. 325. See also Minock v. Shortridge, 21 Mich. 304; Peacock v. Binder, 57 N. J. L. 374, 31 Atl. 215; Everson v. Carpenter, 17 Wend. 419; Chandler v. Glover, 32 Pa. 509; Bobo a. Hansell, 2 Bailey (S. C), 114.
51 Edgerly v. Shaw, 25 N. H. 514, 57 Am. Dec. 349. The court said further: "A new promise may he qualified in various ways. It may bind the promisor to pay the debt at a different time or place from those originally stipulated. It may be a promise to pay, not in money, but in specific articles, or in personal services. These cases cannot be distinguished, in principle, from that last stated. They are new contracts, not ratifications of the old ones." See also Tolar v. Marion County Lumber Co., 93 S. Car. 274, 75 S. E. 545.
The effect of a lunatic's bargain is the subject of considerable difference of judicial opinion, and this question has been elsewhere considered;54 but in all jurisdictions except the few which may hold the contract of an insane person absolutely void, a subsequent promise made after the lunatic has become sane is an effective ratification.55