If the new promise whether express, or implied from an acknowledgment, is itself the cause of action, the indebtedness should be extended by such a promise for the period allowed by law for the enforcement of simple contracts, and such is believed to be the proper rule, unless the natural construction of a statute governing the matter leads to a different result.74 Largely because of the construction put upon particular statutes, there are decisions which hold that the new promise operates to set aside the defence of the Statute, and to allow the enforcement of the claim during a new period equal to that allowed by law for the enforcement of the original indebtedness. Under this view, if the Statute allows ten years for the enforcement of a note, a new promise starts a new period of ten years, although the period allowed for the enforcement of simple contract obligations is shorter.75 A somewhat analogous question is whether the terms of the old obligation are revived; as, for instance, the rate of interest fixed in the original obligation. It has been held that by implication the new promise adopts the terms of the old;76 but if the new promise should state a different rate, it would be controlling.77 A mere acknowledgment under seal of a simple contract debt will not operate as a new sealed promise, and will at most revive the debt for the statutory period applicable to simple contracts.78

72 See supra, Sec. 139.

73 See infra, Sec. 680.

74 McCormick v. Brown, 36 Cal. 180, 95 Am. Dec. 170; Boukofsky v. Powers, 1 Utah, 333; Gruenberg v. Buhring, 6 Utah, 414, 16 Pac. 486.

75Friebee v. Seaman, 49 Iowa, 96; Baylies v. Street, 61 Iowa, 627, 2 N. W. 437; Brisbin v. Fanner, 16 Minn. 215, 219; Gailer v. Grinnel, 2 Aiken, 349 (judgment); Bradley v. Brigge, 22 Vt. 96 (judgment). This result seems to have been reached without discussion in Abner v. York, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 643,

41 S. W. 309; Waltemar v. Schnick's Est., 102 Mo. App. 133, 76 S. W. 1053; McSween v. Windham, 104 8. Car. 508, 89 S. E. 500. In Enright v. Griffith, (Wis. 1919), 172 N. W. 156, a husband had made part payment to his wife on a note he had given her before marriage. The court held that the implied promise did not create a new contract between husband and wife on which under the local statute time would not run, but merely extended the statutory period on the original debt.