It is everywhere agreed that the fact that an infant was trading as an adult or otherwise appeared to be of age, and that the other party contracted with him on the belief that he was an adult, does not affect the validity of the transaction or the infant's privilege either at law69 or in equity.70 If the infant is guilty of actual misrepresentation of his age, the authorities are not so uniform but the view is generally accepted that he is not thereby precluded in an action at law from asserting with its ordinary consequences his privilege as an infant.71

69Miller p. Blankley, 38 L T. (N. 8.) 527; MacQraal v. Taylor, 167 IT. S. 688, 695, 42 L. Ed. 326, 17 Sup. Ct. 961; Oliver v. McCIellan, 21 Ala. 675; Buchanan v. Hubbard, 96 Ind. 1; Folds v. Ailardt, 35 Minn. 488, 499, 29 N. W. 201; Houston v. Cooper, 3 N. J. L. 866; Van Winkle v. Ketcham, 3 Caines, 323; Curtin v. Patton, 11 & & R. 305, 309; Carpenter v. Pridgen, 40 Tex. 32, 35; Gramnan, Marx & Cline Co. v. Krieniti, 142 Wis. 556, 126 N. W. 50.

70Stikeman v. Dawson, 1 De G, & S. 90; Miller v. Blankey, 38 L. T. (N. S.) 527; Alvey v. Reed, 115 Ind. 148 17 N. E. 265, 7 Am. St. Rep. 418, (Code); Baker p. Stone, 136 Mass.405; Brantley v. Wolf, 60 Miss. 420; Rivers v. Gregg, 5 Rich. Eq. 274, 279.

71 Bartlett v. Wells, 1 B. & S. 836; De Roo v. Foster, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 272; Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300, 312, 26 L. Ed. 87; Tobin v. Spann, S5 Ark. 656, 109 S. W. 534, 16 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 672; Beauchamp v. Bertig, 90 Ark. 351, 119 S. W. 75, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 659; Merriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40; Raymond v. General Motorcycle Co. (Mass.), 119 N. E. 359; Conrad v. lane, 26 Minn. 389, 4 N. W. 695, 37 Am. Rep. 412; Alt v Graff, 65 Minn. 191, 68 N. W. 9; United States Corp. v. Ulrickson, 84 Minn. 14, 20, 86 N. W. 613, 87 Am. St. Rep. 326; Miller v. St. Louis Ac. R., 188 Mo. App. 402, 174 8. W. 166; Burley v. Russell, 10

N. H. 184, 34 Am. Dee. 146; Conroe v Birdsall, 1 Johns. Cas. 127, 1 Am. Dec 105; Brown v. McCune, 5 Sand. 224; International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115. But see contra, First Nat. Bank v. Casey, 158 Ia. 349, 138 N. W. 897; Damron v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 268, 61 S. W. 459, 96 Am. St. Rep. 453; Commander v. Brazil, 88 Miss. 668, 41 So. 497, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1117; Lake v. Perry, 95 Mies. 550, 49 So. 569; Cobbey v. Buchanan, 48 Neb. 391, 67 N. W. 176; Harseim v. Cohen (Tex. Civ. App.), 25 S. W. 977. See also Putnal v. Walker, 61 Fla. 720, 55 So. 844, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 33; County Board v. Hensley, 147 Ky. 441, 144 S. W. 63, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 643; Harper v. Utsey (Tex. Civ. App.), 97 S. W. 508. In Graumaa, Marx & Cline Co. v. Krienitz, 142 Wis. 566, 126 N. W. 50, the court held that though an infant would be estopped to avoid a contract beneficial to himself, if he fraudulently represented himself as having capacity to contract, he would not be so estopped by his fraud to avoid an obligation as a surety where he received no benefit. In R. Leslie, Ltd., v. Sheill, [1914] 3 K. B. 607 (C. A.), the defendant, an infant, by fraudulently misrepresenting that he was of full age induced the plaintiffs to lend him two sums of 200 each. In an action by the lender to recover the amounts advanced, the court denied

An infant who seeks equitable relief, however, is generally held to be estopped to avoid a transaction in which he has made such a misrepresentation, unless he can restore any consideration received by him.72 This equitable doctrine has recently been summarized in England as follows: "I think relief, reversing the judgment of Hor-ridge, J. Lord Summer said in the Court of Appeal: "To the claim for return of the principal moneys paid to the infant under the contract that failed, as money had and received to the plaintiffs' use, there are at least two answers: the infancy itself was an answer before 1874 at common law, and the Infants' Relief Act, 1874, is an answer now. An action for money had an received against an infant has been sustained, where in substance the cause of action was ex delicto: Bris-tow v. Eastman, 1 Esp. 172; approved before 1874 in In re Seager, 60 L. T. 885, and cited without disapproval in Cowem v. Nield, [1912] 2 K. B. 419. Even this has been doubted, but where the substance of the cause of action is contractual, it is certainly otherwise. To money had and received and other indebitatus counts infancy was a defence just as to any other action in contract: Alton v. Midland Ry. Co., per Wiltes, J., 34 L. J. (C. P.) 292, at pp. 297, 298; In re Jones, per Jessel, M. R., 18 Ch. D. at p. 118."

72 Ex parte Unity Association, 3 De G. &. J. 63 (citing earlier authorities by which the court felt bound but of which it expressed its dislike); Cornwall if. Hawkins, 41 L. J. Ch. 439 (compare Bartlett v. Wells, 1 B. A 8. 836; DeRoo v. Foster, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 272]; Schmithetmer v. Eiseman, 7 Bush, 298; Ingram v. Ison, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 48, SO 8. W. 787; County Board v. Hensley, 147 Ky. 441, 144 S. W. 63, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 643; Goff v. Murphy, 153 Ky. 634, 156 S. W. 95; Ferguson v. Bobo, 54 Miss. 121; Ostrander v. Quia, 84 Miss. 230, 36 So. 257, 105 Am. St. Rep. 428; Ryan v. Growney, 125 Mo.

474, 28 S. W. 189, 755; Hayes v. Parker, 41 N. J. Eq. 630, 7 Atl. 511; International Land Co. v. Marshall, 22 Okla. 693, 98 Pac. 951, 19 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1056; Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S. E. 411, 38 L. R, A. 694. See also Davidson v. Young, 38 I11. 145. See further, supra, Sec.232. See, however, Sims v. Ever-hardt, 102 U. 8. 300, 26 L. Ed. 87, which seems to express a contrary view, though the plaintiffs bill offered to have the consideration deducted from the amount claimed from the defendant. The force of this decision is somewhat weakened by the fact that the court was evidently ignorant of the distinction made by the English decisions between legal and equitable proceedings so far as this question of estoppel is concerned. Sims v. Ever-hardt is cited as controlling in Sanger v. Hibbard, 104 Fed. 455, 43 C. C. A. 635. In Tobin v. Spann, 85 Ark. 556, 109 S. W. 534, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 672, also, the court sustained a bill to set aside the deed of two infants, though the infants had stated that they were of age. The court did not refer to any distinction between cases where infants seek equitable relief and other cases. Under Ia. Code, Sec.3190, the court adopts the equitable rule and holds the infant estopped. First Nat. Bank v. Casey, 158 Ia. 349,138 N. W. 897. See also Geer v. Hovy, 1 Root, 179. In Grauman, Marx & Cline Co. v. Krien-1U, 142 Wis. 556, 126 N. W. 50, the court said that the infant might be estopped but only in oases where the infant was a person having actual discretion, and was fraudulent, and where the transaction was beneficial to the that the whole current of decisions down to 1913, apart from dicta which are inconclusive, went to shew that, when an infant obtained an advantage by falsely stating himself to be of full age, equity required him to restore his ill-gotten gains, or to release the party deceived from obligations or acts in law induced by the fraud, but scrupulously stopped short of enforcing against him a contractual obligation, entered into while he was an infant, even by means of a fraud."73 Such misrepresentation has, moreover, other effects. Though the infant may not lose his privilege under the bargain at law or perhaps even in equity, the adult acquires also the right to disaffirm the contract.74 A transaction induced by fraud is voidable by the defrauded person, and it is immaterial for this purpose whether the fraudulent person is an infant or an adult.75 Whether the infant is liable in tort for deceit in misrepresenting his age is not so clear. There is considerable authority that he is not.76 The sounder view, however, is that the infant is liable.77 It is conceded in all the cases that an infant is as a rule liable for bis torts 78 and there is no valid reason why he should not be liable for false and fraudulent representations as fully as for other torts, nor if he is in general liable for his deceits is there any reason to distinguish the case where the injurious consequence of the deceit is entering into an unenforceable contract from cases where the injurious consequences are of a different nature. The reasoning generally given in cases which protect the infant, "that infants are liable for their torts, yet the form of action does not determine their liability, and they cannot be made liable when the cause of action arises from a contract, although the form is ex delicto," 79 does not meet the difficulty. The infant is not held liable on his contract either in form or substance if he is held liable for deceit.

73 By Lord Sumner in R, Leslie, Ltd., v. Shall, [1914] 3 K. B. 607, 618 (C. A.)

In Stocks v. Wilson, [1913] 2KB. 235, an infant who had obtained furniture from the plaintiffs by falsely stating that he was of age, and had sold part of it for 30 was judged liable in a personal judgment by Lush, J., to pay this 30. Whether this decision was based on a liability to restore what was in the infant's possession, or was a personal judgment irrespective of property in the infant's hands is possibly doubtful. If the latter is the effect of the decision, it is overruled by the later case of R. Leslie, Ltd., v. Sheill.

74 This suggests the inquiry as to the right to rescind a bargain with an infant and reclaim from him what had been transferred if the reason of disaffirmance is not based on any wrong of the infant, but, e. g., on mutual mistake; or if the plaintiff also is an infant and seeks to rescind on that ground. Here it seems that the infant would be freed not only from liability on his contract but also from quasicontractual liability unless he had still in hand the property or its proceeds by which he was originally enriched.

75 Lempriere v. Lange, 12 Ch. D. 67S; Pritchett v. fife, 8 Ala. App. 462, 62 So. 1001; Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359. So where the infant obtains goods with fraudulent intent not to pay for them. Ashlock v. Vivell, 29 111. App. 314; Wallace v. Mores, 5 Hill, 391; Kilgore v. Jordan, 17 Tex. 341, 351.

75 The "earlier authorities are clear to this point that no such action can be maintained. Johnson v. Pie, 1 Ley. 169, and 1 Keb. 905; Grove v. Nevill, 1 Keb. 778; Green v. Green-bank, 2 Marsh. 485." Merriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40. To the same effect are Liverpool Assoc, v. Fairhurst, 9 Ex. 422; R. Leslie, Limited, v. Sheill, 11914] 3 K. B. 607 (C. A.), (discrediting Stocks v. Wilson, [1913) 2 K. B. 235); Slayton v. Barry, 175 Mass. 513, 56 N. E, 574, 49 L. R. A. 560, 78 Am. St. Rep. 510; Brooks v. Sawyer, 191 Mass. 151, 76 N. E. 953; 114 Am. St. Rep. 594; Raymond v.