Though offers are ordinarily made to specific persons, it is possible to make offers to any one, or to every one, who may perform a specified act or make a specified promise. The commonest illustration of such offers is furnished by offers of reward for the apprehension or conviction of criminals.54 General offers are usually to be construed as addressed to the first person who may perform the act requested,55 but it is possible to make an offer of reward to every one who may do the act requested. Thus in a well-known English case 56 the offer in question was to pay 100 reward to any one who should contract influenza after using one of the defendant's smoke balls three times daily for two weeks.57 Though the point was not involved in the case, it would seem that the offer was susceptible of acceptance by more than one person.

A letter of credit also may be a general offer addressed to any one who will advance money upon the faith of it.58 Sometimes

53 In So. Hetton Coal Co. v. Harwell, etc., Coal Co. [1898], 1 Ch. 465, a liquidator who was offering coal property for sale wrote-"The highest net money tender I receive (all other things being equal and satisfactory), that tender I will at once accept." The language of the court seems to indicate the opinion that the liquidator would have been bound to accept a tender coming within this description. The tender in question, however, which was "of such a sum as will exceed by 200 the amount offered by another bidder," the amount of whose bid was unknown, was not a tender within the meaning of the liquidator's proposal.

54 See illustration of such offers in-fro, Sec.33.

55 See infra, Sec. 74.

56 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1892], 2 Q. B. 484; [1893] 1 Q. B. 256.

57 Similarly in Stollery v. Maskelyne, 15 T. L. Rep. 79, there was an offer by a conjurer of 500 to any one could imitate his trick. It may be supposed that this offer could have been accepted by more than one person,

58 Ex parte Asiatic Banking Corporation, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 391; Posey p. Denver Nat. Bank, 7 Col. App. 108, 42 Pac. 684.

In the latter case a letter stating "if you are still there and need the money you can make a draft on me for $500 and I will pay it," was held to amount to an offer which might be accepted by a bank cashing such a draft. A aimnewspapers offer a prize to one who shall receive the most votes, written on coupons cut from copies of the newspaper. When the votes have been cast a contract is formed with those who cast votes for the winning candidate for the benefit of that candidate.59 A similar principle has been applied to entries in races or other competitions.60 In the case of the Satanita 61 it was held that the owner of the yacht Satanita had entered into a contract with the owner of the yacht Valkyrie to pay all damage which might be caused by infringement of the rules. The entry of the Satanita by her owner for the regatta contained this clause: "I undertake that, while sailing under this entry, I will obey and be bound by the sailing rules of the Yacht Racing Association and the by-laws of the club." Among the rules was the following: " Rule 24: ... If a yacht, in consequence of her neglect of any of these rules, shall foul another yacht . . . she shall forfeit all claim to the prize, and shall pay all damages," It was the conclusion of the court that the entry constituted a general offer to all other contestants, which had been accepted by them. The case at least shows the possibility of such a general offer. Had the entry been addressed to the other contestants, there could have been no doubt of the correctness of the decision. Upon the actual facts it would seem rather that there was a promise to the regatta committee to whom the entry was addressed. This promise was doubtless for the benefit of the other contestants, but does not seem, when fairly construed, to contemplate an agreement with them.62 The relation of the parties to the transaction seems similar to the relation between a club and its members with reference to its by-laws; which are "in ilar decision is Oil Well Supply Co. p. MaccMurphy, 119 Minn. 000,138 N. W. 784.

59 Millsaps p. Urban, 116 Ark. 90, 171 8. W. 1198; Smead v. Steams, 173 ls. 171, 156 N. W. 307. See also Weiss s. Price, (Iows,) 172 N. W. 939.

60 Peters v. Agricultural Soc, 3 N. Brunswick Eq. 127.

61 [18951 P. D. 248, aff'd sub nam. Clarke v. Dunraven, [1897) App. Cas. 59.

62 It is suggested by Sir Frederick Pollock, Contracts (8th ed.), page 27, that "the secretary of the club who receives the entries may be regarded as an agent to receive . . . the offer," but, as is stated on the same page, the secretary is not "in any ordinary sense" an agent. He is, in short, just as much and just as little an agent as any promisee who receives a promise for the sole benefit of a third person. See infra, Sec. 352.

effect a contract between the different members and the corporation." 63