A memorandum need not be contained in one writing; any number may be taken together to make out the necessary written expression of the terms of the bargain provided there is sufficient connection made out between the papers without the aid of parol evidence further than to identify papers to which reference is made. This connection may be made out either from the physical attachment18 of the different papers treated as sufficient in Morrell d. Studd,  2 Ch. 648, commented on in 30 L. Qu. Rev. 4.
15 Harter v. Morris (Ind. App.), 123 N. E. 23; Newlin v. Hoyt, 91 Minn. 409, 98 N. W. 323; Kingman v. Davis, 63 Neb. 678, 88 N. W. 777; Spence v. Apley (Neb.), 94 N. W. 109; Mon-tauk Assoc, v. Daly, 62 N. Y. App. Div. 101, 70 N. Y. 8. 881, affd., without opinion, 171 N. Y. 659, 63 N. E. 1119. All these decisions relate to land.. In Lewis p. Johnson, 123 Minn. 409, 143 N. W. 1217, 1128, L. R. A. 1915 D. 150, the court said: "A parol agreement to deal on the bams of a rejected [written] offer is of no avail. After the contract had once expired, it could not be resuscitated by parol, any more than it could have been originally created by parol. This position would be too clear to admit of question if, instead of a few days, a few years had intervened between the expiration of the written contract and the attempt to revive it. Upon principle, however, it is evident that the length of time which had elapsed can make no difference in this respect. Davis v. Parish. Litt. Sel. Cas. (Ky.) 153, 12 Am. Dec, 287." It may be supposed, however that even if several years had intervened parties might expressly adopt a prior writing as a present memorandum, and that the writing would be sufficient, but the mere fact that the new parol agreement was in terms identical with the previous writing would not make the writing a memorandum of the later agreement.
16Fletcher v. Underwood, 240 111. 554, 88 N. E. 1030; Carskaddon v. South Bend, 141 Ind. 696, 39 N. E. 667, 41 N. E. 1; Haw v. American Nail Co., 89 Iowa, 745, 56 N. W. 501. This was so held even though the subsequent purchaser (the plaintiff) wrote an acceptance on the written instruction. Lusky v. Reiser, 123 Term. 705, 164 S. W. 777, L. R. A. 1916 C. 400.
17 See supra, Sec. 660.
18Fisher v. Kuhn, 54 Miss. 480, 483 (land); Coe v. Tough, 116 N. Y. 273, 277, 22 N. E. 550 (goods); and cases cited in the following notes.
at the time of signature, or by reference. Thus, if documents are pinned together it is enough.19 So a letter and the envelope in which it was sent may be taken together and the envelope used to show the name of the person to whom the letter was addressed when that name did not appear in the letter itself.20 So a memorandum in a book which does not contain the name of the seller is sufficiently connected with a leather cover upon which the seller's name is stamped, to allow the name to be treated as part of the memorandum.21 So a writing indorsed upon the back of another may be taken as part of it.22 A more extreme case is suggested in an English decision; 23 a signature to one of several sheets which are together at the time but not in any way united. It seems doubtful whether both papers could be used in such a case, though if both sheets were put in one envelope possibly that would be a sufficient connection between them.
19Tollman v. Franklin, 14 N. Y. 584 (land). See also Bunch v. Hart, 62 Ark. 330, 35 S. W. 534 (written contract, not within statute).
20 Pearce v. Gardner, [1897) 1 Q. B. 688. In Coe v. Tough, 116 N. Y. 273, however, where two documents were put in the same envelope the court, though holding the papers could be read together because of reference of one to the other, did not mention the inclusion of the papers in the same envelope as a reason for its holding.
21 Jones p. Joyner, 82 L. T. (N. S.) 768.
22Jelks v. Barrett, 52 Miss. 315 (land). See also Gage v. Cameron, 212 111. 146, 172, 72 N. E. 204. The contrary was decided in Wilstaoh v. Heyd, 122 Ind. 674, 23 N. E. 963, following Ridgway v. Ingram, 50 Ind. 145, 10 Am. Rep. 706. In these Indiana cases the face of the memorandum contained no description of the property, but a description was indorsed on the back. This was held insufficient on the ground that an indorsement was no better than a separate paper, and if it contained no reference to the face could not be used.
The decisions seem clearly wrong. Of course, if a signed indorsement refer to the face of the document there can be no difficulty in reading the two together. Flowers v. Steiner, 108 Ala. 440, 19 So. 321 (contract of married woman); Thomas v. Drennen, 112 Ala. 670, 20 So. 848 (land); Corning v. Loomis, 111 Mich. 23, 69 N. W. 85 (land); Tunstall v. Cobb, 109 N. C. 316, 14 S. B. 28 (land).
23 Kenworthy v. Schofield, 2 B. 4 C. 945. "It occurred to me at first that this might be likened to the case of a will consisting of several detached sheets, when a signature of the last, the whole being on the table at the time, would be considered a signing of the whole; but there the sheet signed is a part of the whole." The case decided that the signature of an auctioneer in his book was not sufficiently connected with 'the conditions of the sale contained in another document, and being in the same room, since there was no reference in the book to the memorandum. See contra (erroneously), McBrayer'n. Cohen, 92 Ky. 479, 18 S. W. 123.