The suggestion has been made that the acceptance of an offer relates back to the time when the offer was made. The original basis for this suggestion seems to be found in cases decided prior to the recognition of continuing offers.28 But in a few later decisions also it has been said or assumed that there was a relation of the acceptance to the offer.29 There is no need, however, to invoke a fictitious relation. Undoubtedly the offer and the acceptance must exist at the same moment in order to form a contract. But this result is reached by the continuance of the offer to the time of the acceptance, not by a relation back of the acceptance to the time when the offer was first made. As has been pointed out30. if the doctrine of relation were applied, even as between the parties themselves, the consequence would be that an offer might be accepted in spite of the death or insanity of the Bank of Ireland v. McManamy, [1916] 2 Ir. K. B. 161. A few decisions seem inconsistent with the foregoing. Haw-kins v. Hawkins, 50 Cal. 558 (compare Meyer p. Haas, 126 Cal. 560, 58 Pac. 1042); Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. p. Belli-with, 83 Fed. Rep. 437 (compare Great Northern Ry. Co. p. Kasischke, 104 Fed. Rep. 440, 449); Binford v. Bruno, 22 Lad. App. 512, 54 N. E. 146. See further a full note in 32 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 946.

28In Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Mer. 441, 454, Lord Eldon said of a contract by correspondence-"The acceptance mast be taken as simultaneous with the offer," and see further, supra,

29 This seems to be assumed in Potter v. Sanders, 6 Hare, 1, and in Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463. In the latter case Bacon, V. C, declared that this was the law and therefore gave the plaintiff priority over one who had acquired title to the land in question after the offer was made, but prior to its acceptance by the plaintiff; and though the decision was reversed, it was on another ground. In Garrett v. Trabue, 82 Ala. 227, 3 So. 149; Smith p. Bang-ham, 156 Cal. 359, 104 Pac. 689, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 522; Willetts v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 45, 47, 6 Am. Rep. 31; Grossman p. Schenker, 206 N. Y. 466, 100 N. E. 39.

30 Langdell, Summary of Cont., Sec. 7.

offeror occurring alter the making of the offer but before the acceptance,31 and it would even be true that no offer could be effectually revoked, as an acceptance whenever made would by relation precede the revocation. Where the interests of third persons are involved, it is well settled that the fiction of relation will never be adopted.32 Therefore if A makes an offer to sell property to B, and subsequently makes an offer to sell the same to C, and both B and C accept the offer, the one who accepts first, thereby completing a contract, is entitled to the land; not the one to whom the offer was first made, which would be the case if the doctrine of relation were applied.33 And as between the parties themselves there is no need here to invoke a fiction, and many reasons against it. The decisions cited in the following section as to place of contract, in effect also decide the time of the contract; because if the acceptance related to the time when the offer was made, the place of contract would necessarily be that where the offer was made, since only there was an offer in existence at the time to which the relation is had.