(2) Other courts hold that if the new promise is not dependent on the payment of the pre-existing indebtedness it is not within the statute of frauds, but that if it is so dependent it is within the statute even if it is made on a new consideration and primarily for the benefit of the promisor.1 Where this theory obtains A's promise to pay C's indebtedness to B on consideration that B will forbear to enforce a lien on C's property is within the statute,2 even if A expects to gain some indirect advantage for himself thereby ;3 and so is A's promise to pay C's debt to B if C fails to pay it after B extends the time of payment.4 Under this rule, A's promise to fall without the statute must be a promise to discharge a liability which is fixed upon him and which he must discharge in any event in some way, even if the liability of the principal debtor were to cease to exist; and the sole effect of A's promise must be to designate the manner in which he is to discharge his liability with the consent of the party to whom he owes it. The modern tendency of courts is unquestionably toward the adoption of this rule, although it may still be unsafe to say that it has the indorsement of the weight of authority.

3 See Sec. 623.

1Merrell v. Witherby, 120 Ala. 418; 74 Am. St. Rep. 39; 23 So. 994; 26 So. 974; Board of Commissioners v. Cincinnati Co., 128 Ind. 240; 12 L. R. A. 502; 27 N. E. 612; King v. Lumber Co., 80 Minn. 274; 83 N. W. 170; Giles v. Ma-honey, 79 Minn. 309; 82 N. W. 583; Maurin v. Fogelberg, 37 Minn. 23; 5 Am. St. Rep. 814; 32 X. W. 858; Grant v. Wolf, 34 Minn. 32; 24 N. W. 289; Lamkin v. Palmer, 164 N. Y. 201; 58 N. E. 123; White v. Rintoul, 108 N. Y. 222; 15 N. E. 318; Garfield v. Ins. Co., 69 Vt. 549; 38 Atl. 235; McKenzie v. Bank, 9 Wash. 442; 43 Am. St. Rep. 844; 37 Pac. 668. "Original promises as distinguished from collateral promises under the statute of frauds required to be made in writing are such as are founded on a new consideration, the debt antecedently contracted for still subsisting, moving to the promisor and beneficial to him and such that the promisor thereby comes under an independent duty of payment, irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor." White v. Rintoul, 108 N. Y. 222; 15 N. E. 318 (from syllabus in 15 N. E. 318; quoted in Greene v. Latcham, 2 Colo. App. 416; 31 Pac. 233). "A consideration to support a promise not in writing to pay the debt of another must be of a peculiar character, and must operate to the advantage of the promisor and place him under a pecuniary obligation to the promisee independent of the original debt, which obligation is to be discharged by the payment of that debt." McKenzie v. Bank, 9 Wash. 442, 445; 43 Am. St. Rep. 844; 37 Pac. 668; citing Ackley v. Parmen-ter, 98 N. Y. 425; 50 Am. Rep. 693; Cross v. Richardson, 30 Vt. 641.

2 White v. Rintoul, 108 N. Y. 222; 15 N. E. 318; Durham v. Arledge, 1 Strobh. Law (S. C.) 5; 47 Am. Dec. 544.

3 McKenzie v. Bank, 9 Wash. 442; 43 Am. St. Rep. 844; 37 Pac. 668.