As a married woman's contract is void and not voidable it is incapable of ratification by any agreement or conduct after the woman acquires the power to make contracts,1 whether such power is acquired by the death of the husband,2 or by her obtaming an absolute divorce from him,3 or by a change in the law giving her power to make contracts,4 or by the rendition of a decree of court under local statutes, conferring the powers of a feme sole.5 In obiter, however, some dissent from this view may be found.6 Under some statutes, moreover, a contract of a married woman may be voidable only, and subject to ratification.7 Ratification must be at least as formal, even under these statutes, as an original contract.8 It must also be effected by conduct unequivocally intended as a ratification. Thus if it was possible to ratify business debts after the act of 1897 authorizing a married woman to incur such debts, the mere recognition, after the passage of the act, of the existence of a note given for such debts before the passage of the act, does not make her liable.9 While perfectly harmonious with the views already expressed, it must be noticed that if the contract could cause any liability in equity, such liability would support a promise made after capacity had been acquired and this contract would be enforceable at law.10 So a subsequent promise after acquiring capacity to contract, to perforin a contract made before such capacity is acquired is enforceable if based on a new consideration. Thus a note executed by a married woman and her husband was void as to her before 1881, in Indiana,11 but a renewal after 1881 by husband and wife of note given before is good as to both.12

13 Belser v. Banking Co., 105 Ala. 514; 17 So. 40.

1 Williams v. Paine, 1G9 U. S. 55; Davie v. Davie (Ark.), 18 S. W. 935; Williams v. Paine, 7 App. D. C. 11G; Security Savings Bank v. Smith, 38 Or. 72; 62 Pac. 794; Farmers', etc., Bank v. Loftus. 133 Pa. St. 97; 7 L. R. A. 313; 19 Atl. 347.

2 Freeman's Appeal, 68 Conn. 533; 57 Am. St. Rep. 112; 37 L. R. A. 452; 37 Atl. 420; Weisbrod v. Ry., 18 Wis. 35; 86 Am. Dec. 743.

3 Macfarland v. Heim, 127 Mo. 327; 48 Am. St. Rep. 629; 29 S. W. 1030.

1 New England, etc., Co. v. Powell, 94 Ala. 423; 10 So. 324; Heiney v. Lontz, 147 Ind. 417; 46 N. E. 665; Austin v. Davidson, 128 Ind. 472; 25 Am. St. Rep. 456; 12 L. R. A. 120; 26 N. E. S90; Davis v. Schmidt (Ind. App.), 31 N. E. 84; Ruppel v.

Kissel (Ky.), 74 S. W. 220; Porter-field v. Butler, 47 Miss. 165; 12 Am. Rep. 329; Musick v. Dodson, 76 Mo. 624; 43 Am. Rep. 780; Weathers v. Borders, 121 N. C. 387; 28 S. E. 524; Buchanan v. Hazzard, 95 Pa. St. 240; Glidden v. Strupler, 52 Pa. St. 400; Radican v. Radican. 22 R. I. 405; 48 Atl. 143; Sherwin v. Sanders, 59 Vt. 499; 59 Am. Rep. 750; 9 Atl. 239. But where the instrument takes effect on delivery, a re-delivery after acquiring capacity makes the instrument valid. Brown v. Bennett. 75 Pa. St. 420; Jourdan v. Jourdan. 9 S. & R. (Pa.) 268; 11 Am. Dec. 724.

2 Mover v. Haworth, 8 Ad. & El. 467; 35 E. C. L. 442; Union, etc., Bank v. HartwelL 84 Ala. 379; 4 So. 456; Austin v. Davis, 128 Ind. 472; 25 Am. St. Rep. 45(1; 12 L. R. A. 120; 26 X. E. 890; Long v. Brown, 66 Ind. 160; Porterfield v.

Butler, 47 Miss. 165; 12 Am. Rep. 329; Condon v. Barr, 49 X. J. L. 53; 6 Atl. 614; Nesbitt v. Turner, 155 Pa. St. 429; 23 Atl. 750.

3 Putnam v. Tennyson, 50 Ind. 456; Thompson v. Warren, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 488; Musick v. Dodson, 76 Mo. 624; 43 Am. Rep. 780; Hay-ward v. Barker, 52 Vt. 429; 36 Am. Rep. 762.

4 Thompson v. Hudgins, 116 Ala. 93; 22 So. 632; New England, etc., Co. v. Powell, 94 Ala. 423; 10 So. 324; Loomis v. Brush, 36 Mich. 40; Valentine v. Bell, 66 Vt. 280; 29 Atl. 251.

5 Russell v. Rice (Ky.), 44 S. W. 110.

6 "Her contracts independent of statute were merely voidable and to avoid them she must plead her disability." Strauss v. Glass, 108 Ala. 546, 551; 18 So. 526.

7 Steiner v. Tramum, 98 Ala. 315; 13 So. 365. This case was decided under a statute allowing a wife to authorize her husband to sell or exchange her estate; and it was held that she might ratify an exchange made by him so as to vest in herself title to the property received in exchange.

8 Duncan v. Freeman, 109 Ala. 185; 19 So. 433.

9 Mercantile Co. v. Bowers, 105 Tenn. 138; 58 S. W. 287.

10 Condon v. Barr, 49 N. J. L. 53; 6 Atl. 614; Sherwin v. Sanders, 59 Vt. 499; 59 Am. Rep. 750; 9 Atl. 239.